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Partners or Rivals in Reconciliation? The 
ICTR and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts 
LEO C. NWOYE* 
A major question for post-conflict governments to consider is how 
best to shape reconciliation efforts. This Article examines two transitional 
justice mechanisms that were utilized in Rwanda’s post genocide era and 
assesses their contributions to reconciliation. The two principal approaches 
which emerged in the Rwandan context were the establishment of 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), via the international 
political community whilst grassroots efforts within Rwanda were channeled 
through the gacaca court system. While each of these systems, though 
unintended and incoherent hybrid justice strategies, possessed strengths 
and weaknesses, this legal pluralist structure nevertheless yielded 
positive reconciliation results. 
The Article posits that this legal pluralist system did not represent a 
perfect mechanism for attaining all reconciliation goals. It did, however, 
function to facilitate reconciliation as a process that demands transitional 
justice individually and collectively, as well as highlight gaps in the 
system that were largely and ostensibly filled by a number of 
constructive initiatives instituted by the Rwandan government in their 
continued reconstruction of Rwanda. 
  
 
 *   © 2014 Leo C. Nwoye.  The author is an Assistant Appeals Counsel in the Office 
of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) at the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Between April and July 1994,1 about eight hundred thousand2 of 
approximately seven million people were massacred in what one author 
described as the fastest genocide in history.3 The Rwandan genocide also 
ranks among the worst mass carnage ever perpetrated in history, 
particularly with its use of ‘low-tech’ weaponry and the socio-cultural 
similarities of the perpetrators, complicit bystanders, and victims.4 Most 
 
 1.  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 106–11 (Sept. 2, 
1998); ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 1 
(1999); Paul J. Magnarella, The Background and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda, 3 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 801, 815–17 (2005) [hereinafter The Background and Causes of the 
Genocide]. 
 2.  According to the literature and sources reviewed, there is considerable controversy 
over the exact number of Tutsis (and politically moderate Hutus) murdered between April and 
July 1994. The Trial Chamber in Akayesu stated that the “estimated total number of victims in 
the conflict varies from 500,000 to 1,000,000 or more.” Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T 
¶ 111. At a U.N. Security Council (“UNSC”) meeting, Rwanda’s Representative, Manzi 
Bakuramutsa, estimated the number of dead in the course of the genocide to be over 1 
million. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) 
[hereinafter SC Verbatim Record 3453]. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights, Réne Degni-Ségui, estimated that by late June 1994, between 200,000 
and 500,000 persons were killed. See U.N. Comm’n Human Rights, Report of the 
Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr R Degni-Séqui, Special Rapporteur of 
the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 of Commission resolution 
E/CN.4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, 51st sess., ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (June 28, 1994) 
[hereinafter Human Rights in Rwanda]. In her comprehensive study of the Rwandan 
genocide, Des Forges estimated that 500,000 Tutsi were murdered. DES FORGES, supra 
note 1, at 15–16. Prunier, however, calculates the approximate number of deaths to be 
between 800,000 and 850,000. See GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF 
A GENOCIDE 265 (1995) [hereinafter HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE]. Kuperman argues that the 
total Tutsi population of Rwanda was estimated at 650,000 with 500,000 being killed in 
the genocide. See Alan J. Kuperman, Rwanda in Retrospect, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 94, 101 
(2000). Nevertheless, most writers regard the number of deaths during the genocide to be 
in the range of 500,000 to 1 million. The precise numbers, however, are not crucial to this 
Article. 
 3.  “[T]he dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of the 
Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient mass killing since the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM 
YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 4 (1998) [hereinafter 
TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED]. 
 4.  See e.g., Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice 
as Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 29 (2006) (citations omitted) [hereinafter 
Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity]; Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda: A Paper Umbrella in the Rain? Initial Pitfalls and Brighter Prospects, 
73 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 187, 188, 192 (2004) (citations omitted). 
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of the victims were civilians from the Tutsi ethnic group.5 The perpetrators 
included government officials, soldiers, police, militia members, and 
civilians, mostly of Hutu ethnicity. Equally, it was reported that several 
thousand civilians, most of whom were Hutus,6 were killed by Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (“RPF”) soldiers after the genocide period.7 
Accordingly, post-genocide Rwanda required the establishment of an 
effective post-conflict scheme,8 particularly in regard to reconciliation. 
The situation raised many questions. What types of processes and 
institutions would represent an appropriate response? How effective or 
complete are the approaches both individually as well as collectively? Is 
authentic reconciliation possible after the genocide or will it have to be 
imposed? Who reconciles with whom? How is reconciliation defined 
and measured? Further, the mass involvement of the general population 
in perpetrating the genocide gave the post-conflict Rwandan government 
an extremely delicate challenge; namely, that the victims and perpetrators 
had no choice other than to coexist with each other. 
Typically, transitional societies like Rwanda—when emerging from 
regimes marked by grave human rights abuses, particularly where they 
seek to rebuild in the aftermath of total devastation—face a process of 
reconciliation that is very difficult.  Current examples include Iraq and 
Libya.9 With the complexities of reconciliation exacerbated by the lack 
of a widely accepted interpretation and meaning for the term, extensive 
arguments over what transitional justice entails are inevitable. 
Yet it seems that certain transitional approaches have become somewhat 
standardized. For example, the truth commissions of Central and South 
 
 5.  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T ¶¶ 111, 127, 157–69, 173, 259.  Human Rights in 
Rwanda, supra note 2, at ¶ 21. Kuperman, supra note 2. 
 6.  Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) estimated that RPF killed between 25,000 and 
45,000 Hutu civilians during and immediately after the genocide. DES FORGES, supra 
note 1, at 728, 733; GÉRARD PRUNIER, AFRICA’S WORLD WAR: CONGO, THE RWANDAN 
GENOCIDE AND THE MAKING OF A CONTINENTAL CATASTROPHE 16–19 (2009) [hereinafter 
AFRICA’S WORLD WAR]; see also EDOUARD KAREMERA, DRAME RWANDAIS L’AUTRE FACE 
DU GENOCIDE 464 (2012) [hereinafter DRAME RWANDAIS]. 
 7.  An investigative team from the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (“UNHCR”) concluded in late 1994 that in the months directly following the 
genocide, the RPF killed “thousands of civilians per month.” U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees, Note, La Situation au Rwanda, confidential, Sept. 23, 1993, quoted in DES 
FORGES, supra note 1, at 728. 
 8.  Peter Uvin & Charles Mironko, Western and Local Approaches to Justice in 
Rwanda, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 219, 219 (2003) [hereinafter Western and Local 
Approaches]. 
 9.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AT A CROSSROADS—HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAQ YEARS 
AFTER THE U.S,-LED INVASION 1–4 (Feb. 2011). HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 
2014: IRAQ, http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/iraq?page=2 (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2014). HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2014L LIBYA, http://www.hrw. 
org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/libya (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
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America in the 1980s and 1990s sought to ascertain the truth about the 
crimes committed by the political and social elites and, for the most part, 
offered amnesty in exchange for the truth.10 The architects of these truth 
commissions contended that it was not feasible to punish perpetrators if 
they were to obtain the truth about their crimes.11 
Similarly, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(“TRC”) offered amnesty to apartheid leaders in exchange for information 
about their crimes against the black majority.12 Reconciliation was a key 
objective of the TRC, which believed punishing apartheid leaders was 
likely to arouse civil conflict.13 As such, a political compromise like 
offering amnesty for the truth about crimes and for national reconciliation 
was deemed more appropriate.14 
Conversely, the U.N.15 Security Council (“UNSC”) has recognized the 
“need to eschew one-size-fits-all formulas and the importation of foreign 
model.”16 Moreover, different transitional societies choose dissimilar and 
diverse objectives and often pursue them in very different ways, usually 
because of post-conflict political, social, economic, and legal constraints. 
For example, reconciliation and justice were incongruent and irreconcilable 
goals for South Africa.17 For Rwanda, reconciliation was unthinkable 
without some level of justice. As Rwanda’s President, Paul Kagame 
articulated: “I don’t understand what reconciliation would mean unless 
some of those responsible were brought to justice.”18 
A foremost theme in post-conflict reconstruction and transitional 
justice has been legal pluralism, through which multiple legal systems 
 
 10.  Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions: —1974-1994 A Comparative Study, 
16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 597, 613–14, 621–23, 627–29, 653–55 (1994). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  PHIL CLARK, THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION 
IN RWANDA: JUSTICE WITHOUT LAWYERS 30–31 (2010) [hereinafter THE GACACA COURTS, 
POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE]. 
 13.  Id. This approach represented a global shift in both transitional notions of justice as 
well as transnational practices and has since become a benchmark—albeit implicitly—in other 
post-conflict environments like Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, which are seeking reconciliation. 
 14.  Jeremy Sarkin, The Trials and Tribulations of South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, 12 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS., 617, 620–22 (1996). 
 15.  U.N. is United Nations. 
 16.  U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶¶ 38–48, U.N. Doc S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter 
The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice]. 
 17.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 31. 
 18.  PETER E. HARRELL, RWANDA’S GAMBLE: GACACA AND A NEW MODEL OF 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 37 (2003). 
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coexist with one another within the context of the same social space, in 
order to promote principled outcomes.19 These legal systems can also 
coexist both domestically as well as internationally, and, despite having 
different functions, they can culminate in a distinct type of legal pluralism. 
Indeed, legal pluralism may actually be as effective as, if not more effectual 
than, a singular exclusive legal system in supporting reconciliation. 
Rwanda’s post-conflict legal landscape has a type of legal pluralism that 
incorporates formal international trials on the one hand and domestic 
criminal trials as well as grassroots systems on the other. 
On the international level, the UNSC established the International 
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (“ICTR”),20 an ad hoc judicial body located 
in Arusha, Tanzania, operating independently of all national systems, 
including the Rwanda legal system.21 It was mandated to prosecute the 
persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, committed in Rwanda and by Rwandan citizens in 
neighboring States, between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.22 The 
Security Council believed this would “contribute to the process of national 
reconciliation.”23 
On the national level, the Rwandan government established the gacaca 
court system in June 200224 as an addition to the domestic criminal courts.25 
The gacaca court system is separate and distinct from the ICTR and 
arose out of the national justice system’s inability to handle the vast 
 
 19.  John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 2, 38–
39 (1986). 
 20.  See S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1,  U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, (Nov. 8, 1994) (Establishing 
the ICTR and annexing its Statute). 
 21.  S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at Annex, art. 8(2); NICHOLAS A. JONES, THE 
COURTS OF GENOCIDE: POLITICS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN RWANDA AND ARUSHA 9, 95 
(2010). 
 22.  S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at Annex, art. 1. 
 23.  Id. at 1. 
 24.  The word “Gacaca” is derived from the Kinyarwanda word meaning “the 
lawn” or “the grass,” in reference to the conducting of hearings in open spaces in full view of 
the community. See Filip Reyntjens, Le Gacaca ou la Justice du Gazon an Rwanda, 40 
POLITIQUE AFRICAINE 31, 32 (1990). 
 25.  The Rwandan government created two additional courses of action including 
Rwandan military trials and international third-party trials taking place in foreign jurisdictions, 
both of which—while significant—only operated peripherally. To date, there have been 
prosecutions of Rwandan fugitives in connection with the 1994 Rwandan genocide in 
Belgium (8); Canada (1); Switzerland (1); France (1); Netherlands (1). Richard Karegyesa, 
Presentation at Annual Interpol Expert Meeting, The Challenges of International 
Cooperation in the Prosecution of International Crimes: An ICTR Perspective, Arusha, 
Tanzania (Oct.  29, 2010) (on file with author).  However, this Article will not address the 
national courts, these supplementary mechanisms, or their contribution to reconciliation in 
Rwanda. 
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number of backlogged genocide cases in a prompt and efficient manner.26 
This backlog was largely caused by the fact that many judges, prosecutors 
and lawyers were killed or had fled the country during the bloodbath.27 
While the ICTR fundamentally utilizes a formal, western-style retributive 
system of trial and punishment procedures, gacaca is a relatively informal, 
traditional Rwandan method of conflict resolution that was adapted to 
meet the discerned needs of the post-genocide environment.28 It was 
created to be different from the ICTR in many ways, principally with 
regards to being culturally and socially sensitive to post-genocide Rwanda 
in its endorsement of reconciliation and provision of transitional justice.29 
The legal pluralist system in Rwanda within which the ICTR and 
gacaca courts coexist, and operate to each other’s mutual benefit, has more 
impact and is more effective in accomplishing transitional justice goals 
than either the ICTR or gacaca courts could be in isolation. 
There is some controversy with respect to the efficiency and effectiveness 
of these incongruent systems and their alleged failure to promote 
transitional justice and reconciliation in Rwanda.30 The ICTR has received 
criticism for its slow pace, its high expense, its remoteness, its distance 
from the place where the crimes were committed and where the victims 
reside, its cultural incompetence, its inability to authentically support 
reconciliation for the Rwandan people, and its perceived acquiescence of 
 
 26.  By 2000, the Rwandan courts had only tried about 2,500 to 5000 genocide cases of 
the 120,000 to 130,000 suspects. The trials of many of these cases were criticized as being 
unfair under international standards and Rwandan law. U.N. Secretary-General, Report 
of the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Prepared by the Special Representative of 
the Commission on Human Rights Pursuant to Economic and Social Council Decision 
1999/288 of 30 July 1999, ¶ 128, U.N. Doc. A/54/359 (Sept. 17, 1999) [hereinafter 
Situation of Human Rights]; Elizabeth Neuffer, Kigali Dispatch: It Takes a Village, 222 
NEW REPUBLIC 18, 18 (2000); Max Rettig, Gacaca: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in 
Postconflict Rwanda?, 51 AFR. STUD. REV. 25, 28 (2008). 
 27.  For example, out of the 758 judges, 70 prosecutors, and 631 support staff of 
the national and provincial courts, only 244 judges, 12 prosecutors, and 137 support staff 
were alive and in the country in November 1994. JONES, supra note 21, at 84. 
 28.  See, e.g., Megan M. Westberg, Rwanda’s Use of Transitional Justice after 
Genocide: The Gacaca Courts and the ICTR, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 331, 337–59 (2011). 
 29.  See Peter Uvin, The Introduction of a Modernized Gacaca for Judging Suspects of 
Participation in the Genocide and the Massacres of 1994 in Rwanda (2000) (Discussion 
Paper) (Belg.). 
 30.  See, e.g., Westberg, supra note 32, at  345–66; Amnesty Int’l, Rwanda: Gacaca: A 
Question of Justice, AI Index AFR 47/007/2002 (Dec. 2002) [hereinafter A Question of 
Justice]. 
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victor’s justice.31 This is all the more poignant given that the international 
criminal tribunals do not naturally lend themselves to the promotion of 
reconciliation.32 
This Article considers whether the ICTR endeavored to promote 
reconciliation by incorporating this non-legal, non-juridical, and quasi-
political notion into its judgments. Specifically, it asks: how have the 
judges, trial, and appeal chambers attempted to decipher this specific, 
yet vague and curious assignment into their decisions? What were their 
understandings of the concept? In what circumstances were they inclined 
to apply the concept? Were any references made to the term? And if so, 
was it more likely to increase or reduce the sentence? 
Regarding the gacaca courts, many observers raised concerns about 
government interference, perceptions of victor’s justice, low standards of 
legal professionalism, human rights infringements, inadequate legal training 
and qualifications of its lay gacaca judges, and the fairness of proceedings 
held without legal representation, particularly as this afforded limited 
protection for defendants than in conventional courts.33 Some highlight 
the complexity of this system and fundamentally misconstrue it as a 
somewhat archaic form of indigenous justice,34 poorly equipped to meet 
the subjective needs of the Rwandan people.35 
 
 31.  Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional 
Justice, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 355, 369–71 (2005); Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The 
Impunity Gap of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 
34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 49, 51 (Winter 2011) [hereinafter Impunity Gap]. 
 32.  MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY 
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE at 26 (1998); Impunity Gap, supra note 31, at 78; 
Hideaki Shinoda, Peace-Building by the Rule of Law: An Examination of Intervention in 
the Form of International Tribunals, Presentation at the Annual Convention of International 
Studies Association, Chicago, (Mar. 22, 2001) and at the Centre of International Studies, 
University of Cambridge (May 22, 2001), http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol7 
_1/Shinoda.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 33.  See, e.g., Situation of Human Rights, supra note 26, ¶¶ 157, 159–60; Westberg, 
supra note 32, at 353–57; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE COMPROMISED—THE LEGACY 
OF RWANDA’S COMMUNITY-BASED GACACA COURTS 27–82 (May 2011). 
 34.  See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n Human Rights, Question of the Violation of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World: Report of the Situation of 
Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Special Representative, Mr. Michael Moussalli, 
pursuant to Resolution 1998/69,54th Sess., ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/33 (Feb. 8, 1999); 
Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing 
with the Mass Atrocity of 1994, 18 B.U. INT’L L. J. 163, 167 (Fall 2000); Helen Scanlon 
& Nompumelelo Motlafi, Indigenous Justice or Political Instrument? The Modern Gacaca 
Courts of Rwanda in PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE? THE DILEMMA OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN 
AFRICA 308–12 (Chandra Lekha Sriram & Suren Pillay eds., 2011). 
 35.  Angela Tobin, Widows and Community Based Transitional Justice in Post 
Genocide Rwanda, 10 BRIT. J. COMMUNITY JUST., 27, 31–32 (2012) (citing Jennie Burnet, 
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Contrarily, in 2004, the former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan 
emphasized that indigenous and informal traditions for administering 
justice or settling disputes must be given due regard in the transitional 
period in post-conflict society, but that this must be done in conformity 
with international standards.36 This seems somewhat paradoxical and 
appears to advocate for modifying traditional systems. This Article explains 
that reverting to traditional justice is impermanent and in some ways, 
should be viewed as a compromise to relieve overburdened formal justice 
systems until they are in a position to take over the reins again. 
In any event, a post-conflict government’s domestic and international 
approaches to accountability, whether utilizing judicial or non-judicial 
mechanisms, do not always have to be mutually exclusive.37 They can also 
serve as complementary components of a comprehensive reconciliation 
strategy.38 
This Article serves to contribute to the existing interpretations and 
analysis of whether the ICTR and gacaca contributed to reconciliation in 
Rwanda. Additionally, it provides further insights on the practicality of 
applying the concept of reconciliation in post-conflict environments, both 
individually and collectively. This Article also analyzes the ICTR and the 
gacaca courts at a crucial period. The ICTR is in the process of completing 
its last few cases39 and winding down its operations.40  The gacaca courts, 
on the other hand, have completed their mandate, having tried several 
thousands of genocide suspects.41 
 
The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda, 3 J. GENOCIDE 
STUD. & PREVENTION 173, 187 (Aug. 2008)). 
 36.  The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 16, at ¶ 36. 
 37.  JANE E. STROMSETH, INTRODUCTION: GOALS AND CHALLENGES IN THE PURSUIT 
OF ACCOUNTABILITY in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSES 3 (Jane E. Stromseth ed., 2003). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Status of Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/Cases/ 
StatusofCases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) [hereinafter ICTR Status 
of Cases].   
 40.  Statement by Justice Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor UN-ICTR & UN-MICT to 
the United Nations Security Council, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (Jun 5, 
2014),  http://www.unictr.org/TABID/155/DEFAULT.ASPX?ID=1413 (last visited Oct. 19, 
2014). 
 41.  See Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations, 
Justice and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/ 
en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgjustice.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); see also 
Rwanda “Gacaca” Genocide Courts Finish Work, BBC NEWS (June 18, 2012),  http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18490348 (last visited Oct. 15, 2014); Curtains fall 
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The Article is organized into six main sections. The next section is an 
overview of the Rwandan genocide, civil conflict, the nature of Hutu-
Tutsi relations, and the international context surrounding the creation of 
the ICTR. The third section explores the various concepts of reconciliation 
and legal pluralism, developing a theoretical framework for analysis. It 
frames reconciliation as being an outcome and a process in terms of 
relationship-building, conflict resolution, social transformation, and a 
discursive tool that can permeate the everyday lives of the population. It 
also assesses the role that reconciliation plays in the Rwandan context. 
The fourth section briefly examines the concept of legal pluralism, looking 
at how traditional and customary justice (both influenced by formal 
colonial laws) worked alongside each other, while considering the Rwandan 
example. The fifth section analyzes the ICTR and the gacaca courts, both 
separately and collectively as a legal pluralist system, as well as their 
reconciliation goals, without framing the two mechanisms in opposition 
to one another. It also evaluates their contributions through retributive and 
restorative justice in facilitating reconciliation in Rwanda. Additionally, 
it assesses the role reconciliation plays in the Rwandan context and briefly 
examines the programs established by the Rwandan government that 
functioned alongside the legal pluralist system of the ICTR and gacaca 
courts. Critical to this section is the assumption that the nature of 
reconciliation is dynamic and complex, with the international community’s 
understanding and operationalization of reconciliation fundamentally 
divergent from that of the Rwandan government. Finally, the sixth section 
makes concluding remarks. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF RWANDAN HISTORY 
This section explores the backdrop to the conflict in Rwanda, the 
genocide, and the critical historical ethno-political connection, in order 
to facilitate understanding transitional justice in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide and, crucially, to put into context any reconciliation 
efforts thereafter. 
The bloodbath that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 resulted from an 
“intricately interwoven ethno-political struggle,”42 with the influences of 
forces within and outside Rwanda instrumental in shaping Hutu-Tutsi43 
relations. An appreciation of these factors is therefore critical for  
 
on Gacaca, THE INDEPENDENT (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.independent.co.ug/rwanda-
ed/rwanda/5843-curtains-fall-on-gacaca (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 42.  JONES, supra note 21, at 17. 
 43.  Some authors have treated the terms Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa as being invariable 
and write these terms without the “s” plural suffix. Where appropriate in this Article, this 
plural suffix will be used to distinguish the singular from the plural forms. 
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understanding the genocide, which one author described as “the defining 
event in Rwandan history.”44 
There have been contentious versions of the events in Rwanda,45 differing 
depending on the group in power at any particular stage.46 Typically, in 
societies reliant on oral traditions, the dominant group determines which 
version of history is conveyed.47 As Temple-Raston noted, “[h]istory in 
Rwanda has always been malleable, growing out of story lines of one’s 
own choosing. If one was Hutu, then the heroes were Hutu. If one was 
Tutsi, the opposite is true. In that story-telling, that exaggeration and 
embellishment came the seeds of conflict.”48 
Some have described the atrocities as exclusively or largely based on 
ethnic or tribal tensions between the Hutus and the Tutsi minority group.49 
However, this line of thought is somewhat flawed as “the history of 
divisions among Rwandans is far more complex [. . .] and is grounded in 
social, economic and political factors.”50 
A.  Background to the Rwandan Conflict 
Events in the early 1990s are important for understanding the genocide 
context.51 On October 1, 1990, the RPF, comprised of many descendants of 
Tutsi refugees who fled Hutu violence in the 1960s, invaded Rwanda 
from Uganda.52 The Rwandan government forces repelled the RPF53 and 
a guerrilla war broke out in the northeast of the country.54 
 
 44.  Philip Gourevitch, After Genocide: A Conversation with Paul Kagame, 72 
TRANSITION 162, 167 (1996). 
 45.  See, e.g., Marie Beatrice Umutesi, Is Reconciliation Between Hutus And Tutsis 
Possible?, 60 J. INT’L AFF.,157, 157–71 (2006). 
 46.  HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 80–81. 
 47.  JONES, supra note 21, at 17. 
 48.  DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, JUSTICE ON THE GRASS: THREE RWANDAN JOURNALISTS, 
THEIR TRIAL FOR WAR CRIMES AND A NATION’S QUEST FOR REDEMPTION 17 (2008). 
 49.  Mariann M. Wang, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Opportunities 
for Clarification, Opportunities for Impact, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 175, 179 (1995). 
 50.  Wang, supra note 49; GEORGE W. MUGWANYA, THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: APPRAISING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE UN TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 33 
(2007). 
 51.  For a useful account of the key events in 1990, see PETER UVIN, AIDING VIOLENCE: 
THE DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISE IN RWANDA 60–65 (1998). 
 52.  HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 93–126. 
 53.  The Tutsi refugee diaspora had fled to camps located in the countries surrounding 
Rwanda and by the late 1890s, they had become increasingly organized. Large numbers 
of Tutsi refugees in Uganda had joined the victorious rebel National Resistance Movement 
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After nearly three years of fighting, the government and the RPF signed 
the Arusha Peace Accords in August 1993. On October 5, 1993, the UNSC 
authorized the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission 
for Rwanda (“UNAMIR”) to support the implementation of the Accords.55 
UNAMIR was given a six-month mandate to oversee a transition towards 
power sharing between the Hutu-dominated administration and the RPF 
in the Rwandan military and government.56 
Incidents that occurred inside and outside of Rwanda aggravated ethnic 
tensions during this period. On October 21, 1993, the assassination of 
the Hutu Burundian President Melchior Ndadaye, by members of the 
Tutsi- controlled army, led to hostilities and mass killings between Burundian 
Hutus and Tutsis.57 This led to the flight of thousands of refugees to 
Rwanda and triggered fears among Rwandan Hutu that the violence would 
spill across the border.58 Many Hutu politicians (assisted by extremist media 
sources such as the Hutu magazine Kangura and the radio station Radio 
Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (“RTLM”)) used the violence in Burundi 
as justification to call for the mobilization of Hutus in Rwanda.59 
In the meantime, the ruling party, Mouvement Républicain National 
pour la Démocratie et le Développement (“MRND”), recruited Hutu youths 
to the youth wing called Interahamwe.60 During the genocide, this group 
perpetrated many killings of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.61 
By the end of March 1994, no transition coalition government was yet 
set up and the situation in Rwanda was extremely tense.62 Mugwanya 
described the situation as “akin to a loaded gun that only needed someone or 
 
during the Bush War of the 1980s and formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”) in 
1985 as a political movement. However, because the RPF was formed largely of combat-
hardened veterans, it proved to be a formidable military force when political options 
seemed to disappear. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: 
COLONIALISM, NATIVISM AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 182–83 (2001); see also Akayesu, 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T ¶ 95. 
 54.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 13. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY 
IN RWANDA 96–101 (2003). 
 57.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 13. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 103–04; see also AFRICAN RIGHTS, 
RWANDA: DEATH, DESPAIR AND DEFIANCE 36–45 (1995); THE GACACA COURTS, POST-
GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 13; JEAN-PIERRE CHRÉTIEN, UN GÉNOCIDE AFRICAIN: 
DE L’IDÉOLOGIE À LA PROPAGANDE, in RAYMOND VERDIER, EMMANUEL DECAUX & JEAN-
PIERRE CHRÉTIEN RWANDA: UN GÉNOCIDE DU XXÈME SIÈCLE 45–55 (1995). 
 60.  When translated from Kinyarwanda, “Interahamwe” means, “Those who work 
together,” or, “Those who fight together.” 
 61.  DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 4; HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 242–
44; Death, Despair and Defiance, supra note 59, at 54–65, 100, 573. 
 62.  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 104, 106. 
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something to push the trigger and to set the whole of Rwanda ablaze.”63 
That trigger was the death of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana 
on April 6, 1994.64 
Within an hour of the crash, Rwanda’s Army (“Forces Armées 
Rwandaises” or “FAR”) and militias erected roadblocks and, together 
with the Presidential Guards, started killing Tutsis and Hutus opposed to 
Habyarimana’s government.65 The murders began at the roadblocks and 
Presidential Guards and armed militias went from household to household, 
executing Tutsis and Hutus accused of cooperating with Tutsis.66 
The mass killings expanded quickly beyond Kigali into other towns 
and villages across Rwanda.67 A self-proclaimed interim government 
was also established to steer the campaign of terror.68 Between April 6, 
1994 and July 1994, members of the interim government and other Hutu 
authorities intensified their campaign for the extermination of all Tutsis 
and their alleged supporters throughout Rwanda.69 They also distributed 
weapons to Hutu militias and selected Hutu civilians for the perpetration 
of the atrocities.70 In the ensuing weeks, state officials incited the Hutu 
population to kill Tutsis, buoyed by hate broadcasts on the RTLM.71 It 
 
 63.  APPRAISING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE UN TRIBUNAL, supra note 50, at 40. 
 64.  He was returning from a heads of state meeting in Dar-es-Salaam to discuss, 
inter alia, the implementation of the peace accords and the ethnic violence in Rwanda 
and Burundi. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T ¶ 106; see also 1994: Rwanda Presidents’ 
Plane ‘Shot Down,’ BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/6/ 
newsid_2472000/2472195.stm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 65.  U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Rwanda 
Genocide, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Report of the 
Independent Inquiry into the Rwanda Genocide]; Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-966-4-T, ¶ 
107; The Background and Causes of the Genocide, supra note 1, at 815; TOMORROW WE 
WILL BE KILLED, supra note 3, at 114–15; Dallaire, supra note 56, at 221–61. 
 66.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 14. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 107, 110; DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 
196–204. 
 69.  See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 107, 108, 110; DES FORGES, supra note 
1, at 181–221; The Background and Causes of the Genocide, supra note 1, at 815–16, 
citing TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED, supra note 3, at 109. See also HISTORY OF A 
GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 213–80; VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 53–55 (1998) [hereinafter THE ICTR]. 
 70.  Linda Melvern, The Past Is Prologue: Planning the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, 
in AFTER GENOCIDE: TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUTION AND 
RECONCILIATION IN REWANDA AND BEYOND 24–27; Westberg, supra note 33, at 335. 
 71.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 14. 
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was estimated that around 250,000 Tutsis were killed in the first two 
weeks of the genocide.72 
On the whole, the U.N.’s role in interceding to prevent or stop the killings 
was inadequate,73 the UNAMIR peace-keeping forces were small and 
lacked the mandate to disarm the perpetrators or to take similarly drastic 
measures to stop the crimes.74 While the UNSC deliberated the character 
of its involvement in the conflict, the RPF captured Kigali on July 4, 1994. 
Two weeks later, the RPF took control of the whole country and stopped 
the genocide.75 Many thousands of mostly Hutu refugees fled into the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”), among them many of the 
main organizers and perpetrators of the genocide.76 
A lesser publicized part of the Rwandan civil conflict is that a considerable 
number of civilians were also killed by RPF soldiers.77 It is estimated 
that the RPF killed several thousand civilians, most of whom were Hutus.78 
An investigative team from the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (“UNHCR”) concluded in late 1994 that, in the months directly 
following the genocide, the RPF killed “thousands of civilians per month.”79 
While the number of deaths paled in comparison to the genocidal killings, 
certain incidents may have been a military response to the recurring 
incursions from ex-FAR soldiers and Interahamwe.80 According to Haskell 
 
 72.  ALAN J. KUPERMAN, THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: GENOCIDE 
IN RWANDA 16 (2001); DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 770; THE GACACA COURTS, POST-
GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 14. 
 73.  APPRAISING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE UN TRIBUNAL, supra note 50, at 41. 
 74.  Boutros Boutros-Ghali, THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA 38 ¶ 106 (1993-
1996); Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Rwanda Genocide, supra note 65, at 
31–32. 
 75.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 15. But see 
Rwanda’s Untold Story, BBC News (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/ 
b04kk03t.  University of Michigan academics, Professors Allan Stam and Christian 
Davenport allege that the RPF did not stop the genocide. Id. They claim that the killing of 
civilians had begun and ended in many locations before the RPF arrived in the area, 
because most of the Tutsis had either been killed or had fled. Id. Yet this viewpoint 
ostensibly ignores the fact the RPF were engaged in a war with the FAR and could not 
simply match the rate at which the massacres were being perpetrated. See supra note 3 
and accompanying text; GUY VASALL-ADAMS, RWANDA: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL 37 
(Oxfam 1994). 
 76.  Id.; HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 298. 
 77.  Impunity Gap, supra note 31, at 50. 
 78.  AFRICA’S WORLD WAR, supra note 6, at 16–19; DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 
728, 734. HRW estimated that RPF killed between 25,000 and 45,000 Hutu civilians 
during and immediately after the genocide. See DRAME RWANDAIS, supra note 6, at 464; 
Rwanda’s Untold Story, supra note 75. 
 79.  U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Note, La Situation au Rwanda, Sept. 
23, 1993, quoted in DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 728. 
 80.  This group also included deposed interim government and other high-ranking 
civilian and military authorities, as well as many other extremists. See U.N. Office of the 
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and Waldorf, “[m]any of the killings took place after the RPF had already 
gained control over parts of the country; they therefore cannot be explained 
as ‘collateral damage’ of the conflict.”81 
To comprehend how the genocide was possible, key features of Rwandan 
history must be explored, particularly the nature of divisions between 
Hutus and Tutsis. 
B.  Historical Overview of Hutu-Tutsi Divisions 
A Tutsi aristocracy emerged and ruled Rwanda in the pre-colonial 
period.82 It established a near-feudal class system, in which the Tutsis 
came to dominate most facets of Rwandan life while the Hutu plunged 
into poverty.83 Magnarella described the pre-colonial period as akin to a 
caste system, where the Tutsis subjugated the Hutus through two main 
methods, uburetwa (corvee labour service and offerings of beer in return 
for access to land)84 and ubuhake (where poor men became clients or 
children of a Tutsi lord, obliged to “provide a variety of services to his 
patron or lord, including cultivating his fields, repairing his huts and 
possibly giving him wives or daughters as concubines”).85 
The nature of Hutu-Tutsi relations changed drastically under colonialism 
and played a role in molding the circumstances that staged the Rwandan 
genocide.86 The German and Belgian colonial powers were partial to the 
 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rapport du Projet Mapping concernant les 
violations les plus graves des droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire 
commises entre mars 1993 et juin 2003 sur le territoire de la République démocratique 
du Congo [Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed Within the Territory of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo Between March 1993 and June 2003] at 50 (Aug. 
2010); see also LARS WALDORF, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DDR: THE CASE OF RWANDA 6 
(2009); THE ICTR, supra note 75, at 55–58. There were several incursions in the prefectures 
of Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, Gitarama, Kibuye, and Kigali targeting the genocide survivors. 
These incursions stopped after the dismantling of refugee camps. See François-Xavier 
Nsanzuwera, The ICTR Contribution to National Reconciliation, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
944, 948 (2005); AFRICA’S WORLD WAR, supra note 6, at 55. 
 81.  Impunity Gap, supra note 31, at 50. 
 82.  The Background and Causes of the Genocide, supra note 1, at 802–03. 
 83.  Id.; CATHARINE NEWBURY, THE COHESION OF OPPRESSION CLIENTSHIP AND 
ETHNICITY IN RWANDA 140–41 (1988). 
 84.  PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA’S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS 
AND THE UN CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 5 (2000) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN AFRICA]; HISTORY OF 
A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 12–14. 
 85.  JUSTICE IN AFRICA, supra note 84, at 5. 
 86.  JONES, supra note 21, at 20. 
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Tutsi ruling monarchy and perceived their dominance as evidence of 
their racial superiority.87 The colonial powers took advantage of the 
practice, integrating the ‘tradition’ of indentured labor into their system,88 
thereby facilitating indirect rule.89 
As Gourevitch writes, “[n]othing so vividly defined the divide [between 
Hutus and Tutsis] as the Belgian regime of forced labour, which required 
armies of Hutus to toil en masse . . . and placed Tutsis over them as 
taskmasters.”90 Arguably, this sowed the seeds of resentment among the 
Hutus, which was later to explode into violence and brutality against 
Tutsis. 
During the 1920-1930s, the Belgian colonial power officially demarcated 
the population into three groups, with the Hutus representing about 84% 
of the population,91 Tutsis representing about 15% and Twas representing 
about 1%.92  In line with this segregation, it became compulsory for every 
Rwandan citizen to carry an identity card mentioning his or her ethnicity.93 
This ethnic partitioning had significant consequences in all aspects of 
Rwandan society, with the Tutsis gaining substantial privileges.94 Mamdani 
states: “racialization [. . .] was embedded in institutions, which in turn 
undergirded racial privilege and reproduced racial ideology.”95 
The demarcation of Rwandans into ethnic groups and the reference to 
ethnic background on identity cards was maintained even after Rwanda’s 
independence and was only abolished after the 1994 carnage.96 During 
the genocide, soldiers, militias, and other killers at roadblocks systematically 
checked people’s identity cards and separated Tutsis from the rest for 
extermination.97 
 
 87.  Id. at 21; see WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra note 53, at 80; see also 
DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
 88.  HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 25. 
 89.  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T ¶¶ 80–82; Prosecutor v. Nahimana (The Media 
Case), Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 106–08 (Dec. 3, 2003); The Background 
and Causes of the Genocide, supra note 1, at 806; Wang, supra note 49, at 179–80; THE 
ICTR, supra note 75, at 49. 
 90.  TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED, supra note 3, at 57. 
 91.  While the Hutus made up approximately 84% of the population, they held less 
than 3% of the chieftain positions and around 17% “of posts in such areas as the judiciary, 
agriculture and veterinary services.” JUSTICE IN AFRICA, supra note 84, at 10. 
 92.  DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 37; The Background and Causes of the Genocide, 
supra note 1, at 808. 
 93.  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T ¶ 83; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR- 
95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 14 (Sept. 2, 1998); The Background and Causes of the Genocide, 
supra note 1, at 808. 
 94.  APPRAISING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE UN TRIBUNAL, supra note 50, at 34–35. 
 95.  WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra note 53, at 87. 
 96.  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T ¶ 83. 
 97.  DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 212–14; Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T ¶ 123. 
But cf. Burundi example, infra p. 137.   
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Some decades after the end of World War II, there was movement in 
Africa towards decolonization.98 During this period, the Tutsis attempted 
to free themselves from colonial repression and campaigned for Rwanda’s 
independence.99 
The Belgian colonial government quickly withdrew their backing in order 
to “[t]o support Hutu aspirations for a greater role in their country’s 
affairs, believing that minority [Tutsi] rule was unsustainable and fearful 
of the pan-Africanist tendencies which they discerned among the Tutsi 
ruling class.”100 The consequence of Belgians’ withdrawal of support for the 
Tutsi minority was a growing sense of Hutu empowerment.101 Political 
parties, ranging from moderates seeking political power-sharing and 
inclusive politics to extremists seeking political dominance on the part of 
either Hutus or Tutsis, were all “ethnically rather than ideologically 
based.”102 
In 1959, the newly formed Hutu political party, the Parti du Mouvement 
de I’Emancipation des Bahutu (“PARMEHUTU”), led by Grégoire 
Kayibanda, mounted a successful revolt against the Tutsi mwami.103 During 
this transition, there were widespread massacres of Tutsis in 1959 that 
led to a mass exodus of the Tutsi minority to neighboring countries.104 
Systematic killings and the massacre of Tutsis continued even after 
Rwanda became independent in 1962.105 Brutal clampdowns on those 
 
 98.  APPRAISING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE UN TRIBUNAL, supra note 50, at 35. 
 99.  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T ¶ 85. 
 100.  GUY VASSALL-ADAMS, RWANDA: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION 8–
9 (1994), quoted in Wang, supra note 49, at 180; see also The Background and Causes 
of the Genocide, supra note 1, at 5; DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
 101.  HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 42–45. 
 102.  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T ¶ 88; DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 38–39; 
The Background and Causes of the Genocide, supra note 1, at 5. There were four main 
political factions, namely, Mouvement Democratique Repubicain (“MDR”), who described 
themselves as a Hutu grassroots movement; Union Nationale Rwandaise (“UNAR”), 
who were comprised of Tutsi monarchists; Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la 
Masse (“APROSOMA”); and Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais (“RADER”). 
These last two groups, in terms of ideology, were in between the aforementioned two 
factions. APROSOMA was predominantly Hutu while RADER brought together moderates 
from the Tutsi and Hutu elite APPRAISING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE UN TRIBUNAL, 
supra note 50, at 36 n.37. 
 103.  When translated, the term refers to a king. 
 104.  Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 
7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349, 350–51 (1997) [hereinafter The Trials of Concurrent 
Jurisdiction]; HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 51. 
 105.  Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 501, 502 (1996) [hereinafter Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda]. 
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viewed as traitors by Hutu leaders created an atmosphere of trepidation 
and prevented open censures of the state.106 Tutsis were systematically 
excluded from power and some privileges.107 Over the next four decades, 
“the cycle of violence repeated itself on many occasions,”108 particularly 
in 1959, 1963,109 1966, 1973, 1990, 1992, 1993 and 1994.110 
Historians have also observed the unusual and destructive levels of 
popular obedience towards social and political leaders in Rwanda.111 
Some argue that this culture of obedience was vital in the government’s 
ability to incite the Hutu population to perpetrate the 1994 genocide.112 
Others have contended that the lack of accountability for crimes committed 
by these Hutu leaders in part afforded license to those who planned, 
incited, and perpetrated the genocide in 1994.113 
1.  Divergent Views on Pre-Colonial Hutu-Tutsi Relations 
There has been much discourse among scholars and commentators on 
the nature of the pre-colonial Hutu-Tutsi relations.114 It is critical that 
 
 106.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 18. 
 107.  The Background and Causes of the Genocide, supra note 1, at 809–10. According 
to Haile-Mariam, the Habyarimana government imposed a severe quota system, which 
limited Tutsis to 9% of school enrolment and civil service positions and prohibited them 
from entering the military. Yacob Haile-Mariam, The Quest for Justice and Reconciliations: 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court, 22 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 667, 682 (1999). 
 108.  Wang, supra note 49, at 180–81; The Background and Causes of the Genocide, 
supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 109.  Wang, supra note 49, at 180–81.  By 1963, there were deaths of some 10,000 Tutsi, 
while an additional 130,000 fled to neighbouring countries. HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra 
note 2, at 51, 56. 
 110.  S.C. Res. 935, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (Dec. 9 1994); S.C. Res. 935, ¶ 
55, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Docs. S/1994/1125 at 12 (Oct. 4, 1994); U.N. Econ. and Soc. 
Council, Report by B.W. Ndaye, Special Repporteur, on His Mission to Rwanda From 8 
to 17 April 1993, ¶¶ 16, 27, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1 (Aug. 11, 1993); Wang, 
supra note 49, at 180–81; THE ICTR, supra note 75, at 47; APPRAISING THE CONTRIBUTION OF 
THE UN TRIBUNAL, supra note 55, at 36. 
 111.  HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 54–61. 
 112.  HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 57; DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 44–
45; Jeremy Sarkin, The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in Rwanda, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 767, 772 (1999); TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED, 
supra note 3, at 23–25; but see infra p. 179. 
 113.  See, e.g., Alison Des Forges, The Ideology of Genocide, 23 ISSUE: J. OPINION 44, 
45–46 (1995); Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda, Ten Years On: Front Genocide to Dictatorship, 
103 AFR. AFF. 177, 208 (2004); William Schabas, Le Rwanda, le Burundi, et la Maladie 
d’Impunité, in RWANDA: UN GÉNOCIDE DU XXÈME SIÈCLE 115–23 (Raymond Verdier, 
Emmanuel Decaux & Jean-Pierre Chrétien eds., 1995). 
 114.  HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, ch.1; DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 31–
34; Catharine Newbury, Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda, 45 AFR. TODAY 
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this polemic is reconciled particularly in the context of pursuing post-
conflict reconciliation. 
There are two main divergent views concerning pre-colonial relations 
between the Hutus and Tutsis.115 Corey and Joireman provide a historical 
account from the Hutu standpoint, “insist[ing] that ethnic discord is 
rooted in pre-colonial history and that these previously existing divisions 
were merely exacerbated by changes wrought by colonial domination.”116 
The other view argues that Hutus and Tutsis peacefully coexisted in the 
pre-colonial era.117 
There is another school of thought that contends the distinction between 
the Hutus and Tutsis was based on lineage or lines of kinship rather than 
ethnicity118 and that persons could change from one group to another, as 
one became rich or poor, or even through marriage.119 There were also 
cases of “social transformation” whereby an individual changed from 
being classed as Tutsi to Hutu, or vice versa, depending on how many cattle 
heads he or she had acquired or lost.120 The ICTR describes the classification 
as “sociological categorization” as opposed to “ethnic identification,”121 
which virtually amounted to “a common ethnicity.”122 They lived together 
 
7, 10–11 (1998) [hereinafter Ethnicity and the Politics of History]; JUSTICE IN AFRICA, 
supra note 84, at 307. 
 115.  JONES, supra note 21, at 18–19. 
 116.  Allison Corey & Sandra F. Joireman, Retributive Justice: The Gacaca Courts 
in Rwanda, 103 AFR. AFF. 73, 74 (2004) [hereinafter Retributive Justice]. Additionally 
there were pre-colonial Kinyarwadan proverbs that suggested the existence of ethnic 
stereotypes, such as “Umututsi iyo akize aragukirana,” which means, “When a Tutsi becomes 
rich, he ignores you;” “Umuhutu ntashimwa kabiri,” which means, “A Hutu cannot be 
thanked twice;” “Inzira ngufi yamaze abana b’abatwa,” which means, “Twas are naturally 
not prudent.” See generally PIERRE CREPEAU & SIMON BIZIMANA, PAROLE ET SAGESSE: 
VALEURS SOCIALES DANS LES PROVERBES DU RWANDA (1979). Further, Magnarella posits 
that during Rwanda’s pre-colonial period including instances of conflict between Hutus 
and Tutsis, particularly during the reign of Tutsi King Rwabugari (1860-1895). See The 
Background and Causes of the Genocide, supra note 1, at 813. 
 117.  HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 10–20, 39. 
 118.  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 81; The Media Case, Case No. ICTR 99-
52-T, ¶ 106. 
 119.  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T ¶ 81; Wang, supra note 49, at 179. 
 120.  Wang, supra note 49, at 179; The Background and Causes of the Genocide, supra 
note 1, at 803. Magnerella, however, advises that statistics of such kinds of ‘social 
transformations’ appear to be unobtainable, citing JACQUES J. MAQUET, THE PREMISE OF 
INEQUALITY IN RWANDA: A STUDY OF POLITICAL RELATIONS IN A CENTRAL AFRICAN 
KINGDOM 150 (1961). 
 121.  Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 35 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 122.  Id. ¶ 34. 
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without any territorial boundaries and intermarriage was commonplace.123 
Additionally, they shared the same language, culture, and traditional 
customs as well as the Roman Catholic/Protestant faith, which did not 
exist until the 1900s.124 
This theory is problematic for two reasons. First, it ignores the existence 
of the Twa and does not explain how they assimilated into Rwandan 
society or their social class. Second, the fact that two or more groups of 
people live in the same place and share certain traditions or customs 
does not necessarily mean that they have characteristics that equate to a 
common ethnicity. There are always subtle or obvious elements that 
differentiate them. 
For example, Rwanda and Burundi share a similar language125 and 
culture and have very similar demographics.126 Burundi, post-independence, 
removed the identity card system that was introduced in Rwanda, yet it 
experienced mass killings in 1972 and 1993 and civil war from 1993-
2005 on the basis of the ethno-political relations of the Tutsis and the 
Hutus.127 Although there was no apparent basis for differentiating the 
two tribes, these groups were still able to identify one another. 
Fundamentally, the historical record of a peaceful coexistence between 
the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda’s pre-colonial history is not fully known.128 
Nevertheless, these significant differences of historical interpretations 
are crucial to the discourse about progressing forward after mass violence. 
There needs to be a reconciliation of history if the relations between the 
 
 123.  HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 5. 
 124.  Vern Neufeld Redekop & Oscar Gasana, Implication of Religious Leaders in 
Mimetic Structures of Violence, J. OF RELIGION & SOC’Y ¶ 1 (Supp., Sept. 2, 2007), http:// 
moses.creighton.edu/JRS/pdf/2007-9.pdf [hereinafter Implication of Religious Leaders]; 
The Background and Causes of the Genocide, supra note 1, at 807, 820. 
 125.  Kinyarwanda is the official language of Rwanda and the Kirundi is the official 
language of neighbouring Burundi. Yet, these Bantu languages are very similar in most 
aspects and are mutually intelligible. 
 126.  African Union, Rwandan: The Preventable Genocide, ¶ 3.22 (July 2000), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d1da8752.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). , 
 127.  Id at ¶ 3.21–3.29, 7.32;Heavy shelling in Burundi capital, BBC NEWS (Apr. 18, 
2008),  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7354005.stm (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). See generally  
René Lemarchand, The Burundi Genocide in CENTURIES OF GENOCIDE: ESSAYS AND 
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 321–37 (Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons & Israel W. Charny eds., 
2004). 
 128.  Rosemary Nagy, Traditional Justice and Legal Pluralism, in TRANSITIONAL 
CONTEXT: THE CASE OF RWANDA’S GACACA COURTS, IN RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 100 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009); Ethnicity and the 
Politics of History, supra note 114, at 9–10; Bert Ingelaere, The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, in 
TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: LEARNING FROM 
AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 25 (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds., 2008). 
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Hutus and the Tutsis are to be improved.129 Indeed, how a society addresses 
its past has a major seminal effect on whether it will attain long-term peace 
and stability.130 It is often said, “those who ignore their history are 
condemned to repeat it.”131 Mamdani states, “History teaching in schools 
has stopped [. . .] [b]ecause there is no agreement on what should be 
taught as history.”132 
The Rwandan government embarked on a process of truth telling through 
the gacaca courts.133 It intended to provide an account of the genocide 
and its history, which was key to its argument that the colonialists were the 
cause for the ethnic tensions.134 By insisting on this version of history and 
placing much of the blame on outsiders, the pathway to reconciliation 
would seem easier.135 The outcome of this approach remains to be seen. 
Additionally, the ICTR has recently sought to provide a definitive 
account of the Rwandan genocide, as told through its proceedings and 
judgments, as part of its mandate and completion strategy. This could 
provide a contextualized historical, albeit legal, account and would thus 
leave an enduring legacy for the Rwandan population and the international 
community. 
C.  International Context 
It is important to note that beyond the failure of the international 
community to intervene during the genocide, there are two important 
contextual factors. First, the historical “international” response to mass 
atrocities that stemmed from the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials,136 and 
second, the parallel establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal 
 
 129.  A great deal of peace has been secured in Indonesia through non-truth (sometimes 
lies) and reconciliation—with the populace putting the horror of their past behind them 
and moving on. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., ANOMIE AND VIOLENCE: NON-TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION IN INDONESIAN PEACEBUILDING 42 (2010), available at http://press.anu. 
edu.au?p=19121. 
 130.  Jeremy Sarkin, Promoting Justice, Truth and Reconciliation in Transitional 
Societies: Evaluating Rwanda’s Approach In the New Millennium of Using Community 
Based Gacaca Tribunals To Deal With the Past, 2 INT’L L. F. DU DROIT INT’L 112, 112 
(2000). 
 131.  Adapted from George Santayana, Vol. I, Reason in Common Sense, http://www. 
gutenberg.org/files/15000/15000-h/vol1.html (last visited Oct. 14 2014). 
 132.  WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra note 58, at 267. 
 133.  Ingelaere, supra note 128, at 33–34; Nagy, supra note 128, at 87, 93. 
 134.  Ingelaere, supra note 128, at 25; Nagy, supra note 128, at 99–100. 
 135.  Nagy, supra note 128, at 99–100. 
 136.  JONES, supra note 21, at 107; Westberg, supra note 33, at 342. 
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for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”).137 These factors have played a major role in 
the path taken by the international community. 
Des Forges and Longman state that “[when] the killing began, evidence 
of preparations for mass slaughter had been available to the UN, the 
United States, France and Belgium for several months.”138 They further 
argued that the failure of the international community to take action 
produced a sense of collective guilt that was a major contributing factor 
in the development of the ICTR.139 Zacklin refers to the setting up of the 
ICTR as “an act of political contrition.”140 
The creation and operation of a parallel ad hoc tribunal addressing 
crimes committed during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia provided 
a template for an ad hoc international tribunal for Rwanda.141 It is 
apparent that the ICTR would not have been created had it not been for 
the ICTY, which was established a year earlier.142 
III.  RECONCILIATION IN THEORY 
There are various kinds, levels, and dimensions of reconciliation. A 
key challenge for any post-conflict environment is the question of how 
to address a violent past with a view to creating a peaceful future. 
Depending on the nature and origins of the conflict, this will involve the 
coming together of three social entities of the opposing sides to the 
conflict, namely: (i) individuals, (ii) groups, and (iii) governments. In order 
to assess the reconciliation efforts of the Rwandan legal pluralist system, 
it is critical to carefully define the concept of reconciliation. 
Reconciliation is at times conflated with notions of amnesty, 
forgiveness, healing, peace, harmony, justice, peace-making, peace-
building, relationship-building, truth, apology, peaceful coexistence, 
 
 137.  See S.C. Res. 827, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (Establishing 
the ICTY and annexing its Statute); Westberg, supra note 33, at 342. 
 138.  Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide In Rwanda, 
in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS 
ATROCITY 51 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004). 
 139.  Id. at 51–52. 
 140.  Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. OF INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 541, 542 (2004) [hereinafter The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals]. 
 141.  Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 105, at 501; APPRAISING THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE UN TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, supra note 50, at 44. 
 142.  See Richard J. Goldstone, Leslie Vinjamuri, Anthony Dworkin, & Professor 
Conor Gearty, Do War Crime Trials Do More Harm Than Good? (May 3, 2007). Richard 
Goldstone was the first chief prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR from August 1994 to 
September 1996. William Schabas, Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 879, 880 (2005); see also Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 105, at 501; 
Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: the Politics and 
Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT’L. L. 501, 502–03 (1996). 
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reconstruction, reconstitution, rehabilitation, and restoration.143 In truth, 
none of these concepts are unequivocal, and they do not have contrasting 
meanings when compared to reconciliation. There have been attempts at 
clarification but a consensus of its meaning has proved elusive.144 
Yarn described reconciliation as the “renewal of applicable relations 
between persons who have been at variance”145 and, as such, entails the 
restoration of social interactions and the diminution of social tension 
stemming from historical antagonistic events.146 
Kriesberg deems reconciliation to be a set of “processes by which parties 
that have experienced an oppressive relationship or destructive conflict 
with each other move to attain or to restore a relationship that they believe 
to be minimally acceptable.”147 He further highlights the variability of 
forms of coexistence between two or more groups and emphasizes that 
reconciliation can influence the quality of the relationship.148 
A key related issue is whether reconciliation is a collective or individual 
occurrence. In her work on truth commissions, Hayner differentiated 
between reconciliation on the personal level, which involves healing and 
forgiveness, and reconciliation on the broader collective scale (i.e., national 
and political).149 She emphasized the importance of communal 
acknowledgement of past conflict and violence.150 Indeed, in any post-
conflict environment, memory, whether it serves to remember or forget the 
past, is a crucial element in the process of reconciliation.151 Hayner also 
argues that truth commissions facilitate open dialogue about “past silenced 
or highly conflictive events” and establish a common truth about the past 
thereby promoting reconciliation on a broader collective scale.152 Yet, it 
 
 143.  KLAUS BACHMANN, THOMAS SPARROW-BOTERO & PETER LAMBERTZ, WHEN 
JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS: INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY OF AD HOC INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 291 (Jan. 1, 2013) [hereinafter WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS]. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  DOUGLAS H. YARN, DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 375 (1999). 
 146.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 44. 
 147.  Louis Kriesberg, Changing Forms of Coexistence, in RECONCILIATION, JUSTICE 
AND COEXISTENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 47, 48 (Mohammed Abu-Nimer ed., 2001). 
 148.  Id. at 49–55. 
 149.  PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTH: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND 
ATROCITY 155 (2001). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 294. 
 152.  PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTH: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND 
ATROCITY 154–69 (2001). 
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is questionable whether this top-down approach would eventually permeate 
down into people’s everyday lives. 
Rotberg states, “[i]f societies are to prevent recurrence of past atrocities 
and to cleanse themselves of the corrosive enduring effects of massive 
injuries to individuals and whole groups, societies must understand—at 
the deepest possible levels—what occurred and why.”153 In this way, the 
contribution of the ICTR and the gacaca courts, as will be discussed later, 
can encourage the truth telling process and facilitate the establishment of 
documentary material that “may serve the (re-) construction of collective 
identities.”154 
According to Bar-Tal and Bennink, reconciliation is a psychological 
process for the formation of lasting peace.155 It necessitates the transformation 
of beliefs, attitudes, and emotions regarding one’s own group, the others, 
and the relationship between them.156 Galtung states that reconciliation 
involves “the process of healing the traumas of both victims and perpetrators 
after violence, providing a closure of the bad relation. The process prepares 
the parties for relations with justice and peace.”157 Brounéus contends that 
reconciliation is “a societal process that involves mutual acknowledgement 
of past suffering and changing of destructive attitudes and behavior into 
constructive relationships toward sustainable peace.”158 
Similarly, Lederach regards reconciliation as a “space for the 
acknowledging of the past and envisioning of the future [which] is the 
necessary ingredient for reframing the present.”159 He endorses having a 
“relationship-centric” interpretation of reconciliation, the responses of 
which must permeate down to the level of individual interactions.160 
 
 153.  Robert I. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 3 (Robert I. 
Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
 154.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 304. 
 155.  Daniel Bar-Tal & Gemma H. Bennink, The Nature of Reconciliation as an 
Outcome and as a Process, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION 11, 12–
15, 36–37 (Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed., 2005) (citations omitted) [hereinafter The Nature 
of Reconciliation]. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Johan Galtung, After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Resolution: 
Coping with Visible and Invisible Effects of War and Violence, in RECONCILIATION, JUSTICE 
AND COEXISTENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 3 (Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ed., 2001). 
 158.  KAREN BROUNÉUS, RETHINKING RECONCILIATION: CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TRUTH TELLING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH IN RWANDA, Paper I 
¶ 2 (2008). 
 159.  JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN 
DIVIDED SOCIETIES 27 (1997). 
 160.  John Paul Lederach, Five Qualities of Practice in Support of Reconciliation 
Processes, in FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION: RELIGION, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION 183, 185–86 (Raymond G. Helmick & Rodney Petersen eds., 2001) 
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As an interim deduction, it seems clear that reconciliation is a complex 
term and there seems to be little consensus on its meaning.161 Yet, there 
are two recurring themes from the varying reconciliation definitions given 
above: (i) the transformation of social relationships, with psychological 
change being required individually and collectively in order to influence 
relationships and restore damaged associations; and (ii) generating, facing, 
and addressing the truth about the past. These themes are inextricably 
linked and, at the same time, mutually independent. 
The term “reconciliation” is multifaceted, particularly because it is both 
an objective (i.e. something to attain) and a process (i.e. a means of realizing 
the objective). The objective of reconciliation is the creation of a harmonious 
state of affairs for the future.162 It necessitates a present-day approach, 
which means that all parties involved must work constructively towards 
the objective.163 
Reconciliation is an enduring and multifaceted endeavor, the tempo of 
which cannot be prescribed, forced, or rushed.164 It entails the difficult 
adjustment to flawed realities which require changes in feelings, outlook 
and expectations.165 It is also especially an all-encompassing process that 
applies to everyone, not only perpetrators and victims.166 
Indeed, there are broad interpretations of reconciliation that frame it as 
the rebuilding of both individual and collective relationships following a 
conflict, with the emphasis being on collaboration and communication 
between the polarized groups.167 Reconciliation necessitates considerably 
more than peaceful coexistence and obliges the parties to cease acting 
violently toward each other. 
 
[hereinafter Five Qualities of Practice]; THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, 
supra note 12, at 44. 
 161.  See WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 309. 
 162.  David Bloomfield, Reconciliation: An Introduction, in RECONCILIATION AFTER 
VIOLENT CONFLICT: A HANDBOOK 12 (David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes & Luc Huyse 
eds., 2003). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 13. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism and “Traditional” Justice: The Case of the Gacaca 
Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 765, 770 [hereinafter 
Hybridity, Holism and Traditional Justice]; THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, 
supra note 12, at 44; National Unity and Reconciliation Comm’n, Rwandan Reconciliation 
Barometer, at 16–18 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer]. 
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The absence of violence does not necessarily denote peace.168 It may 
simply mean that the factions are shunning each other, thereby opting for 
polarization instead of restored relations.169 Reconciliation necessitates 
the mending of damaged relations so that there can be future involvement 
between them.170 Lederach states, “to enter reconciliation processes is to 
enter the domain of the internal world, the inner understandings, fears 
and hopes, perceptions and interpretations of the relationship itself.”171 
The Rwandan populace experienced the genocide both individually and 
collectively.172 As such, the reconciliation measures must focus on the 
gap and interconnectivity between the individual and collective levels.173 
Reconciliation initiatives that concentrate on the collective level are 
inevitably ineffectual when the masses affected by conflict number in the 
millions. Purposeful endeavors cannot purely seek out groups of hundreds 
of thousands people concurrently without recognizing how the genocide 
was felt on the individual level. The reconciliation of individual social 
relationships can provide a meaningful entryway through which lasting 
reconciliation could be more broadly realized.174 
Reconciliation is therefore both a “backward-looking and forward-
looking” process, which seeks to address the root causes of past conflict 
so as to create a more positive and constructive dynamic in the future.175 
In attempting to define reconciliation at this juncture, it is important to 
distinguish it from two terms (as noted above) with which is it often 
confused, peace and healing.176 While both terms are fundamental to the 
reconciliation process and outcomes, neither term is adequate as a complete 
definition of reconciliation from a transitional justice perspective. 
First, peace (or any of its correlated activities like peacekeeping or 
peacebuilding) is not same as reconciliation. It is a precondition for 
reconciliation and it is more than the mere absence of war and violence.177 
Hence, the broader peace-building objectives of stopping violence and 
 
 168.  Hybridity, Holism and Traditional Justice, supra note 167, at 770; THE GACACA 
COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 44. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Five Qualities of Practice, supra note 160, at 185. 
 172.  Hybridity, Holism and Traditional Justice, supra note 167, at 770. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Dan Sinh Nguyen Vo, Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation, BEYOND 
INTRACTABILITY (July 2008), http://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/vo-reconciliation 
[hereinafter Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation]. 
 175.  Hybridity, Holism and Traditional Justice, supra note 167, at 770; THE GACACA 
COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 45. 
 176.  Hybridity, Holism and Traditional Justice, supra note 167, at 771. 
 177.  Rep. of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, 55th Sess., ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/55/ 
305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21 2000); Hybridity, Holism and Traditional Justice, supra note 
167, at 771. 
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preventing a future occurrence should lay a foundation on which “deeper, 
inter-personal, relationship-focused reconciliation” can occur.178 
Second, healing does not equate to reconciliation, even though the two 
terms are inherently linked.179 It refers to the capacity of individuals and 
groups to mentally surmount traumatic ordeals, particularly when suffered 
during conflict.180 Moreover, it is a crucial precondition for reconciliation.181 
Reconciliation operates within a socio-cultural, socio-economic, and 
socio-political context. As such, any definition of meaningful reconciliation 
process, particularly concerning transitional justice in Rwanda, must 
recognize the unique post-conflict environment182 and the historical origins 
of the genocide.183 In any event, according to Nguyen Vo, “[n]o single form 
of reconciliation effort is perfect or satisfactory to all circumstances and 
parties involved. Sometimes hard choices have to be made in deciding 
whether one form is preferable to another, depending on the specific and 
temporal circumstance of each conflict and society.”184 
A.  Reconciliation, Conflict Resolution and Social Transformation 
Reconciliation overlaps with conflict resolution and is closely linked 
to social transformation, particularly when it is framed in terms of its 
desired goals rather than an enduring process.185 Conflict resolution entails 
the ending of undesired conflicts by focusing on the disputed subject matter 
initially causing the conflict, within a relatively short timeframe.186 In 
contrast, social transformation—which is an ongoing process—when tied 
to reconciliation, requires that disputes be resolved by changing the focus 
 
 178.  Hybridity, Holism and Traditional Justice, supra note 167, at 771; THE GACACA 
COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 45. 
 179.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 45. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Marian Hodgkin, Reconciliation in Rwanda: Education, History and the State, 
60 J. OF INT’L. AFF. 199, 207–09 (2006). 
 183.  See Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation, supra note 174, at Conflict 
Transformation and Reconciliation. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Herbert C. Kelman, Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological 
Perspective, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION (Kindle ed., ch. 5 
(Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed., 2005) (citations omitted). 
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from the conflict itself toward the relationships undergirding the conflict, 
so as to generate desired outcomes.187 
As such, by extension, peace and conflict resolution embody the 
required standards for reconciliation. The role that emotion has in 
promoting reconciliation has been taken increasingly more seriously in 
the international public sphere, particularly in the last decade.188 
Assefa views reconciliation to be one of a number of conflict-handling 
mechanisms.189 “The essence of reconciliation is the voluntary initiative 
of the conf1ict parties to acknowledge their responsibility and guilt [. . .] 
[T]he parties are not only meant to communicate one’s grievances against 
the actions of the adversary, but also [to] engage in self-reflection about 
one’s own role and behavior in the dynamic of the conflict.”190 
Nguyen Vo states that reconciliation is a human process to which the 
admission of guilt and forgiveness are central for both individual and 
collective healing.191 On the individual level, reconciliation requires a 
confession and repentance by the perpetrators in order to impact the 
victim’s psychological healing process.192 Alternatively, a confession or 
an apology creates a connection between the contending parties that is 
essential for the reconciliation to be enduring.193 
B.  Politico-Legal, Discursive and the Everyday                                 
Dimensions of Reconciliation 
Reconciliation is regularly credited as having a politico-legal dimension, 
in that it possesses a certain normative path in which it  guides the 
political and legal affairs that may circumscribe, support, and frame it.194 
The core idea here is that the fortification of social equalities through 
inter alia respect for the rule of law as well as regard for political liberties, 
civil liberties, and social inclusiveness by political and legal institutions 
 
 187.  The Nature of Reconciliation, supra note 155, ch. 1. 
 188.  In 2000, Argentinean President Fernando de la Rua apologized for Argentina’s 
indulgence of Nazi immigrants. In 2005, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
apologized for Japan’s aggression during World War II. One only needs to refer to the 
collapse of the 1993 Oslo Accords—which intended to end the conflict between Israelis 
and Palestinians—and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, as tragic instances of 
this dynamic. See Nurit Shnabel et al., The Role of Acceptance and Empowerment in 
Promoting Reconciliation from the Perspective of the Needs-Based Model, 2 SOC. ISS. & 
POL’Y REV. 159, 160 (2008). 
 189.  Hizkias Assefa, Reconciliation, in PEACEBUILDING: A FIELD GUIDE 341 (Luc 
Reychler & Thania Paffenholz eds., 2001). 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation, supra note 174. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 304. 
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should, in theory, sustain conflict resolution and thereby forestall the 
recurrence of hostilities.195 
Indeed, in the long term, the rule of law is considered to influence, shape 
and ‘train’ people’s habits and inter-personal relations whether individually 
or collectively, which can assist reconciliation.196 Yet, while a steady 
establishment of the rule of law into people’s lives does not necessarily 
bring about a particular result, it must be borne in mind that legal values 
are not universal and should be recognized as “a product of social forces, 
and itself a conduit of those same forces.”197 As such, the law develops 
into a directive that permeates into the consciousness of the populace 
and becomes assimilated.198 
The influence of discussion to the generations of the populace is very 
dependent on the capacities for outreach into people’s everyday life and 
practices, as well as the government’s ability to penetrate into “the soil 
of living culture.”199 
Rigby links reconciliation and everyday life, advocating a ‘culture of 
reconciliation,’ and claiming that it is “the only sound basis for the 
development of a new and resilient culture of respect for human rights 
and for human difference, a culture that is embodied in the everyday 
routines of life within the family, the school, the neighborhood, and the 
wider community.”200 
Indeed, this is the place where hypothetical goals and reality meet. 
Discourse can assist to bridge this gap, as was evident in the South African 
case (with its Truth and Reconciliation Committee). This was both 
instrumental and effective for the endorsement of reconciliation, at the 
grassroots level, by obliquely planting it into public consciousness with 
its “culture of open debate and open discussion.”201 With this in mind, it 
seems clear that much will depend on the ICTR and gacaca court’s abilities 
to outreach and impact the populace every day. 
 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 305. 
 197.  Susan S. Silbey, Legal Culture and Legal Consciousness, in 13 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIOR SCIENCES 8623–24 (Neil J. Smelser & 
Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). 
 198.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 304. 
 199.  Id. at 307. 
 200.  ANDREW RIGBY, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION: AFTER THE VIOLENCE 180, 
183–92 (2001). 
 201.  ANNELIES VERDOOLAEGE, RECONCILIATION DISCOURSE: THE CASE OF THE TRUTH 
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 17–18, 60–61 (2008). 
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C.  Upshot: Reconciliation, A Broad Definition 
From the above, it seems clear that reconciliation has a wide definition 
and it is not a universal or clear concept.202 Reconciliation can be seen as 
a number of interconnected and overlapping variables that can exist in a 
distinctive configuration in any unique post-conflict environment. The 
weight attached to each variable can change over time and geography. 
Reconciliation can also be seen as a goal as well as a process. It can also 
be a long, slow, and arduous process, but every step forward is rewarded 
by the reinforcement of sustainable peace. 
1.  The Rwandan Context of Reconciliation 
The historical rift between the Hutus and Tutsis significantly catalyzed 
the genocide.203 As such, any reconciliation efforts within Rwanda which 
suppress the knowledge and understanding of past events create systemic 
hurdles to transitional justice and, more narrowly, the role of reconciliation 
within such a framework. 
There is seemingly no nationally accepted version of Rwanda’s history.204 
Indeed, there have been contentious versions of the events in Rwanda,205 
differing depending on the group, whether or not they are in power at 
any particular stage.206 It is arguable that these variances in opinions 
could open the door to revisionism.207 
It is clear from literature that there are differences in the way international 
organizations and domestic organizations define and frame reconciliation in 
the Rwandan context. For example, the U.N. describes the Rwandan 
reconciliation process more broadly in terms of: (1) the reconstruction of 
the Rwandan identity and (2) the balance of justice, peace, truth, and 
security in the nation.208 
 
 202.  Supra section III., III.A. and III.B.; see also WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra 
note 143, at 309. 
 203.  Supra sections II.A. and II.B. 
 204.  Supra section II.B.1. 
 205.  See e.g., Marie Beatrice Umutesi, Is Reconciliation Between Hutus and Tutsis 
Possible?, 60 J. INT’L AFF. 157, 164–65 (2006). 
 206.  HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 80. Typically, in societies reliant on 
oral traditions, the dominant group determines which version of history is conveyed. As 
Temple-Raston noted, “[h]istory in Rwanda has always been malleable, growing out of story 
lines of one’s own choosing. If one was Hutu, then the heroes were Hutu. If one was Tutsi, 
the opposite is true. In that story-telling, that exaggeration and embellishment came the 
seeds of conflict.” TEMPLE-RASTON, supra note 48, at 17. 
 207.  See e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, END OF TRANSITION IN RWANDA: A 
NECESSARY POLITICAL LIBERALISATION, AFRICA REPORT N°53, 16–18 (Nov. 13, 2002). 
 208.  U.N., Background Information on the Justice and Reconciliation Process in 
Rwanda, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgjustice.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2014). 
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The Rwandan government created the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (“NURC”) in March 1999 and gave them the broad mandate 
of promoting and nurturing reconciliation among Rwandans.209 NURC 
has been seeking public opinion through surveys on various aspects of 
social cohesion since 2002.210 Specifically, it frames reconciliation on a 
domestic level, positing that reconciliation in Rwanda is informed by six 
variables: political culture, human security, citizenship and identity, 
transitional justice, historical understanding, and social cohesion.211 
Political culture is essential to reconciliation in Rwanda, particularly 
in light of possible suspicions emanating from the fact from the former 
regime’s role in endorsing the genocide.212  Citizens must view their 
political leaders as both legitimate and effectual.213 Commitment to national 
reconciliation processes, including those relative to transitional justice, is 
dependent upon the feeling of material, physical, and cultural security.214 
Further, there is a realization that socio-economic pressures were also 
instrumental to the genocide’s origin.215 The “conditions of scarcity,” which 
predated the genocide, aggravated, and magnified the deeply-entrenched 
ethnic frictions.216 
Restructuring Rwanda’s national identity is widely framed as a key 
component of the reconciliation process by primarily domestic sources.217 
The NURC implicitly points out that this area of reconciliation is inherently 
problematic.218 In a quantitative survey of over 3,000 Rwandan citizens 
from across cultural boundaries, more than 97% underscored the importance 
 
 209.  NURC was created by Organic Law Nº 03/1999 of Mar. 12, 1999. This was 
later amended under Law Organic Law Nº 35/2002 of Nov. 14, 2002. NURC, Background of 
the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php? 
id=83  (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 210.  NURC, Social Cohesion in Rwanda—An Opinion Survey, Results Survey 2005-
2007, NURC.GOV 1 (March 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Social Cohesion in 
Rwanda]. 
 211.  Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer, supra note 167, at 86. 
 212.  Id. at 9–10, 32. 
 213.  Id. at 9–10. 
 214.  Id. at 10. 
 215.  The Background and Causes of the Genocide, supra note 1, at 817–18; Moise 
Jean, The Rwandan Genocide: The True Motivations for Mass Killings, 1 EMORY ENDEAVORS 
IN WORLD HIST. 1, 6–7 (2007). 
 216.  Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer, supra note 167, at 10; The Background 
and Causes of the Genocide, supra note 1, at 817–21. 
 217.  Hodgkin, supra note 182, at 203; Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer, supra 
note 167, at 10. 
 218.  Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer, supra note 167, at 53–54. 
NWOYE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/12/2016  4:59 PM 
 
150 
of having a national identity and national values.219 However, many 
participants concurrently thought that any reference to ethnicity or ethnic 
groups was proscribed in Rwanda.220 Understanding the past and confronting 
the sources of historical social divisions that informed the genocide is 
critical to reconciliation in Rwanda and could, “if conducted well, [. . .] 
further social reconstruction and cohesion.”221 
The NURC posits that, if the conflicting groups believe they have 
received justice, they will support and more meaningfully facilitate 
reconciliation in the nation.222 Social cohesion would therefore be 
produced by the trust, nurtured by justice, with the positive development 
of inter-ethnic relationships crucial to the reconciliation process.223 
While the NURC recognizes that reconciliation is both a process and 
an objective, it presents the following principles as reinforcing the key aim 
of unity and reconciliation: 224 
 The promotion of the Rwandan identity and placement of 
national interests before those related to ethnicity; 
 The fundamental countering of genocide ideology; 
 Nation-building governed by rule of law and human rights 
respect; 
 The countering of any type of discrimination; 
 The promotion of synergy in the nation building process; 
 The healing of psychological and psychosocial wounds whilst 
telling the truth regarding genocide events and promoting 
forgiveness and repentance; 
 The commitment to never allowing events similar to those 
which occurred in 1994 to happen again; and 
 The mutual striving for self-determination and passion 
regarding work. 
Additional responsibilities in this regard also include:225 
 
 219.  Id. at 10, 24. 
 220.  Id. at 10, 54–57. 
 221.  Hodgkin, supra note 182, at 200. The term “social cohesion” is commonly defined 
as “the glue that bonds society together.” It necessitates that individuals in society “feel a 
sense of belonging and identify with a collective identity” with individuals trusting each 
other and working together toward mutual goals or satisfying emotional needs. Social 
Cohesion in Rwanda, supra note 210, at 1–2. 
 222.  Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer, supra note 167, at 11, 60–71. 
 223.  Id. at 11, 71–86. 
 224.  Id. at 19. 
 225.  Ingando, RWANDAPEDIA, http://www.rwandapedia.rw/explore/ingando (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2014). 
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 Contributing to the design and coordination of national 
programs for the promotion of unity and reconciliation; 
 Putting in place and developing mechanisms aimed at restoring 
and strengthening reconciliation; 
 Mobilizing and raising awareness among Rwandans on 
questions related to unity and reconciliation; 
 Conducting research, organizing conferences and debates, 
sharing information and publishing documents about peace, 
unity, and national reconciliation;  
 Consulting on activities aimed at fighting divisionism 
within the Rwandan society and strengthening unity and 
reconciliation; 
 Reporting and fighting against any act, written document, or 
any statement aimed at spreading any form of divisionism or 
xenophobia; 
 Drafting each year, and as often as necessary reports on unity 
and national reconciliation; 
 Follow-up on how public and private institutions, civil society, 
authorities, and Rwandans in general, understand unity and 
national reconciliation principles and policies. 
It seems ostensible that both perspectives ignore economic and political 
barriers to reconciliation in varying degrees. International perceptions of 
reconciliation are ostensibly tied to retributive justice and may have 
prevented the efficacy of reconciliation in Rwanda. Moreover, the economic 
assistance of the U.N. and Western nations may have also inadvertently 
diminished the autonomy of the Rwandan people in the reconciliation 
process.226 
The NURC’s report does not explicitly forge connections between the 
human variables (as mentioned in sections 3.0 and 3.0.1) and reconciliation, 
with apology particularly being absent from their report. Yet, it does 
point out the part that forgiveness and healing play as indicators of 
transitional justice efficacy.227 The notion of forgiveness, however, can 
be more divisive than healing, particularly if any discourse of forgiveness 
will require sacrificing retributive justice.228 
 
 226.  See Jeffrey H. Powell, Amnesty, Reintegration, and Reconciliation in Rwanda, 
5 MIL. REV. 84, 89 (2008). 
 227.  Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer, supra note 167, at 70, 88. 
 228.  See THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 40–41; 
see also Jean Baptiste Kayigamba, Without Justice, No Reconciliation: A Survivor’s 
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Some have argued that any discourse of forgiveness will demand 
sacrificing punitive or deterrent justice.229 Some have also argued that 
forgiveness will involve survivors being coerced to overlook the crimes 
committed and accept a plea to let go of their suffering.230 
Yet, the role that emotion has in promoting reconciliation has been 
taken increasingly more seriously in the international public sphere, 
particularly in the last decade.231 Both the healing and relationship-
building elements of the human aspect are required for effective 
reconciliation. 
Equally central to the social transformation process are the constituents of 
truth and reparations. As regards truth, Clark identifies three components 
namely: truth-telling, truth-hearing and truth-shaping.232 The aim of these 
components is the creation and nurturing of a safe environment within 
which both victims and perpetrators can discuss their experiences openly 
and without fear.233 
In order for social transformation to occur long-term, reconciliation 
must recognize the human aspects and processes of apology, forgiveness, 
and healing. However, the Rwandan context has atypical socio-cultural 
and socio-economic factors that prevent the incorporation of apology, 
forgiveness, and healing within the ICTR process and, to a limited extent, 
gacaca court systems. 
IV.  LEGAL PLURALISM 
Legal pluralism is scarcely considered in the context of transitional 
justice.234 The African continent is perhaps a current example of a live 
 
Experience, in AFTER GENOCIDE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND BEYOND 33–42 (Phil Clark & Zachary D. Kaufman 
eds., 2009). 
 229.  See THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 42–43; 
see also Kayigamba; supra note 228, at 33–42. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  In 1998, the former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and former U.S. 
president Bill Clinton apologized for failing to prevent the Rwandan genocide. In 2000, 
Argentinean President Fernando de la Rua apologized for Argentina’s indulgence of 
Nazi immigrants. In 2005, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi apologized for 
Japan’s aggression during World War II. One only needs to refer to the collapse of the 
1993 Oslo Accords—which intended to end the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians—
and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, as tragic instances of this dynamic. See 
Nurit Shnabel, The Role of Acceptance and Empowerment in Promoting Reconciliation 
from the Perspective of the Needs-Based Model, 2 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 159, 160 
(2008). 
 232.  See THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 34. 
 233.  See Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation, supra note 174. 
 234.  Nagy, supra note 128, at 89. 
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laboratory of effectual legal pluralism.235 It can allow for a different 
reading of legal pluralism and provide solutions for post-conflict 
environments. 
A distinction would have to be made between what Merry236 terms as 
“classic legal pluralism,” which originates from historical and anthropological 
studies of the relationship between colonial power and the ‘indigenous’ 
colonized state, and “new legal pluralism,” which relates to the “complex 
and interactive ordering between official and unofficial forms of 
ordering.”237  Regarding the latter form of legal pluralism, the notion of a 
normative order and the centrality of the state as the source of legitimate 
rule is questionable, as it is not the only ‘correct’ way of regulating and 
adjudicating issues.238 
Legal pluralism in this sense can encompass non-government forces of 
social control such as religious or customary courts, multicultural polices, or 
codification of customary law.239 In terms of globalization, legal pluralism 
alludes to an array of state, intrastate, transnational, and international 
legal orders.240 In truth, legal pluralism crosses colonialism and globalization, 
focusing on the interactions between dominant and subordinate groups.241 
This Article concentrates on the ‘classic’ legal pluralism. 
Griffiths describes legal pluralism as a situation “in which law and 
legal institutions are not all subsumable within one ‘system’ but have 
their sources in the self-regulatory activities of all the multifarious social 
fields present, activities which may support, complement, ignore or frustrate 
one another [. . .].”242 The term ‘legal pluralism’ was first employed to 
describe the connections between formal colonial law and informal 
traditional/customary practices and formal colonial law,243 which could 
 
 235.  Jacques Frémont, Legal Pluralism, Customary Law and Human Rights in 
Francophone African Countries, 40 VICTORIA UNIV. WLLINGTON L. REV. 149 (2009). 
 236.  Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. SOC’Y & REV. 869, 872–74 (1988) 
[hereinafter Legal Pluralism]. 
 237.  Nagy, supra note 128, at 89. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Griffiths, supra note 19, at 39. 
 243.  Filip Reyntjens, The Development of the Dual Legal System in former Belgian 
Central Africa (Zaire-Rwanda-Burundi), in EUROPEAN EXPANSION AND LAW 111–27 
(Wolfgang J. Mommsen & Jaap A. de Moor eds., 1992) [hereinafter Dual Legal System]; 
Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity, supra note 4, 10–11. 
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be viewed as a feature of the universal process of ‘modernization’ 
established by the colonial powers. 
The colonial rulers imposed their laws on the colonized state, believing 
that it would replace their traditional/customary practices in due time.244 
As such, the context of legal pluralism was assumed to be temporal in 
nature, although the laws were largely dispensed along racial lines, with 
the colonial laws for white citizens and customary laws for the indigenous 
residents.245 Moreover, traditional/customary practices were deemed to 
be hindrances to national development and this view persisted even after 
independence.246 
After independence, the subsequent governments sought to end legal 
pluralism and unify national practices, but this was met with strong 
resistance.247 As a result, some aspects of pluralism and pre-colonial oral 
customary law remained untouched and others were codified248 to invariable 
written laws. Yet, most of these written laws did not capture all traditional/
customary justice enmeshed in the practices of everyday life of individuals 
and groups.249 
In truth, traditional/customary justice systems are adaptable and can 
change as their socio-cultural, political, and economic situations change. 
This highlights a distinction between the informal traditional justice systems 
and formal systems: the traditional/customary justice systems are able to 
adapt much more quickly and naturally than formal justice systems, which 
can change, but at a slower pace since it necessitates the modification of 
laws. 
Additionally, traditional/customary justice systems tend to have a 
number of other characteristics, namely, a focus on groups rather than 
individuals; a goal of cooperation, compromise, and communal harmony; 
and an emphasis on restitution over other forms of punishment.250 
 
 244.  Dual Legal System, supra note 243. 
 245.  Id., Nagy, supra note 128, at 89. 
 246.  Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity, supra note 4, at 11; Legal Pluralism, supra note 
236, at 871–72. 
 247.  Dual Legal System, supra note 243. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity, supra note 4, at 4. 
 250.  PENAL REFORM INT’L, ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE ROLE 
OF TRADITIONAL AND INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 9 (2000) [hereinafter ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA]. 
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A.  Historical Legal Pluralism in Rwanda 
Germany was the first colonial power to occupy Rwanda, from 1896 
until 1916 and did not attempt to get in the way of Rwandan society.251 
Hence, during this period gacaca remained unaffected.252 But this came 
to an end when Rwanda was officially transferred to the Belgians in 
1919, which is when the distinctions between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa 
became ensconced.253 Rwanda was already an existing well-organized 
kingdom and, as such, the Belgians chose a system of indirect rule. This 
meant that all the native arrangements were left untouched.254 
The Belgians wielded more impact than the Germans.255 While they 
never interfered with gacaca directly, their approach towards the customary 
administrative and legal system weakened the operations of the old-style 
gacaca. The kings, who were the heads of the traditional justice system, 
and the chiefs of Rwanda were reduced to lower-level players with 
limited power.256 
Additionally, the Belgian authorities further undermined Rwanda’s 
traditional justice system by foisting written laws and western-style 
courts on the population.257 And while the gacaca courts subsisted, their 
adjudicating powers were removed, were placed under their control, and 
were organized in accordance with a strict hierarchy system that had never 
been known before.258 The western courts were the only courts authorized 
to judge in penal cases—with the gacaca courts only permitted to deal 
with civil cases.259  Yet, despite their officious and interventionist 
approaches, the Belgian colonial administration made no real formal 
attempts to harmonize the tradition/customary laws with their formal 
state laws.260 
After the Hutu social revolution in 1959 and independence in 1962, the 
relations of domination changed.261 Rwanda’s post-colonial government, 
 
 251.  ARTHUR MOLENAAR, GACACA: GRASSROOTS JUSTICE AFTER GENOCIDE: THE KEY 
TO RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA? 17 (2005). 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. at 18–19. 
 254.  Id. at 18. 
 255.  Id. at 17. 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id. at 18. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Dual Legal System, supra note 243. 
 261.  Molenaar, supra note 251, at 19–20. 
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consisting of Hutu leaders, attempted to establish legislative accord.262 
They linked pre-colonial traditions with the domination of the Tutsi-
aristocracy; the first independent governments showed no interest in 
keeping and maintaining past legal values.263 They imposed strict restrictions 
on traditional justice and declared it as lesser and substandard to written 
law.264 
Nevertheless, gacaca remained an important part of the legal landscape, 
although it lost some features that are characteristic of traditional/customary 
justice systems, such as its flexibility.265 This was partly because 
approximately 95% of the populace were engaged in agriculture, which 
was an area where traditional justice was firmly established.266 It was 
also partly because the official courts were burdened with a lot of cases.267 
As such, the government was compelled to make use of the old-style 
gacaca to ease the burden on the domestic courts. 
B.  Divergent Views on Legal Pluralism 
A majority of post-colonial states have shifted towards a unified system 
or laws or some form of dual codification with a bill of rights.268 In some 
countries, traditional/customary practices still persist in certain areas of 
family, marriage, inheritance, and property.269 Indeed, where traditional/
customary practices are authorized by the government, it may signify a 
change from colonial rule towards an African way of doing things.’270 
It is not the intention to create the very simplistic and somewhat naïve 
discussion of cultural relativism and universalism. Yet, two key 
perspectives need to be outlined. First, given the historical background 
of many countries like Rwanda, we need to be cautious of, as Mamdani 
contends, the frequency of traditional/customary law being replicated as 
 
 262.  Id. at 19. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Nagy, supra note 128, at 91. 
 269.  Id. For example, Tanzania—in addition to the following sources of law, namely: 
the Constitution; Statutes; Case Law; Received Laws and International laws and treaties, 
it also has Customary and Islamic laws. The Customary law can only take effect when it 
does not conflict with statutory law. Whereas Islamic law is only applicable to Muslims 
and the courts are empowered to apply Islamic law to matters of succession in communities 
that generally follow Islamic law in matters of personal status and inheritance (as per 
under the Judicature and Applications of Laws Act [2002]). See Bahame Tom Nyanduga 
& Christabel Manning, Guide to Tanzanian Legal System and Legal Research, http://www. 
nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Tanzania.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
 270.  Nagy, supra note 128, at 90. 
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authentic tradition and how tradition in a post-colonial African state 
becomes “a test” or an assessment of rights, justice, and entitlements.271 
Additionally, many of the traditional/customary practices are viewed as 
oppressive and, at times, harsh.272 
Secondly, and conversely, one also needs to be circumspect  about 
censures (particularly internationally), of traditional/customary practices, 
which are often grounded in human rights discourse.273 It is important to 
remember that, similar to arguments for colonization in the past, human 
rights can operate as the new standard of advancement based on Western 
systems with, as Merry states, culture replacing race as a subtle differentiating 
marker in the post-colonial era.274 
Moreover, Mutua states that the human rights body of law is situated 
as “savior” to the “savagery” of non-Western culture for an archetypal 
“non-white, passive victim.”275 In reality, very few societies that can viewed 
as remote because of globalization. Additionally, human rights notions 
are increasingly permeating the cognizance of the population.276 
As mentioned in first section, the Rwandan post-conflict legal landscape 
has a type of legal pluralism that features the ICTR and the gacaca 
courts.277 The next section articulates how each of the two transitional 
justice mechanisms have facilitated reconciliation, with particular emphasis 
on how the legal pluralist system has cultivated or precluded outlined 
reconciliation goals. 
V.  THE ICTR, GACACA COURTS, LEGAL PLURALISM AND 
RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA 
A.  The ICTR—Reconciliation Processes and Outcomes 
UNSC Resolution 955 sanctioned the establishment of the ICTR in 
1994 and referred its principal aims, which are: “[to] contribute to ensuring 
 
 271.  Mahmood Mamdani, Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming 
the Political Legacy of Colonialism, 43 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 651, 657 (2001); 
Nagy, supra note 128, at 91. 
 272.  Nagy, supra note 128, at 91. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Sally Engle Merry, From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization, 28 
L. SOC’Y & INQUIRY. 569–71, 578–83 (2003); Nagy, supra note 128, at 91. 
 275.  Makau W. Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 
42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 201, 207–08 (2001); Nagy, supra note 128, at 91. 
 276.  Nagy, supra note 128, at 91. 
 277.  But see supra note 25. 
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that such violations are halted and effectively redressed” thereby 
“contribut[ing] to the process of national reconciliation and to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace Rwanda.”278 
The ICTR commenced its first case in 1997279 and since then it has 
been subject to several criticisms, particularly with regards to efficiency 
and cost.280 It has also been criticized281 for not achieving its mandate 
promptly enough.282 The ICTR has thus far completed 56 cases,283 acquitted 
12 detainees, released two detainees,284 and has no trials currently in 
progress.285 It has released seven detainees after completion of their 
sentences.286 It also has 7 additional cases on appeal287 and has transferred 
10 cases to national jurisdiction.288 There are nine accused still at large.289 
Many also consider it an expensive entity.290 For example, in the 2010 
and 2011 biennial budget, the ICTR had the U.N. approve a gross budget 
of $245,295,800.291 For comparison, this figure represents approximately 
 
 278.  S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20. 
 279.  See generally Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T. 
 280.  See e.g., Westberg, supra note 33, at 359–62. 
 281.  See President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rep. of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 
1994, transmitted by Note of the Security-General, U.N. Doc A/53/429-S/1998/857 
(Sept. 23, 1998); see also Will Ross, Rwanda Genocide: Did Bizimungu Trial Take Too 
Long?, BBC NEWS (May 17, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13434232. 
 282.  One only needs to refer to the cases of Nyiramasuhuko and Ndindiliyimana as 
examples of lengthy trial proceedings, with both lasting in excess of 10 years. Prosecutor 
v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, T Judgment, 1469-1519 (June 24, 2011); 
Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Judgment, 517–40 (May 17, 2011). 
 283.  See ICTR Status of Cases, supra note 39. “Completed cases” refers to the cases 
against individuals that have gone through the trial and appeal processes and have resulted in 
convictions. Contrary to the webpage, a number of cases have since been completed. The 
cases of Édouard Karemera and Matthieu Ngirumpatse; Ildéphonse Nizeyimana; and Callixte 
Nzabonimana were completed on 29 September 2014. See ICTR Appeals Chamber Delivers 
Judgements in Three Cases, ICTR, http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1423 
(Oct. 14, 2014). 
 284.  Their indictment was withdrawn. See ICTR Status of Cases, supra note 39. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Included in this number is the case of Augustin Ngirabatware is now being 
handled by the MICT (Arusha Branch), which is a residual mechanism that was established to 
conclude the ICTR’s remaining tasks. See MICT, http://unmict.org/about.html (last visited 
July 5, 2014). 
 288.  See ICTR Status of Cases, supra note 39. 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  See e.g., The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, supra note 140, at 
544–45; Westberg, supra note 33, at 344–45, 360. 
 291.  General Information, ICTR, http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/ 
tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) [hereinafter ICTR General Information]. 
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15% of Rwanda’s estimated total national expenditures in 2011.292 
Indeed, the total estimated cost of the gacaca courts during its operation 
is over 29 billion Rwanda Francs,293 which equates to approximately 
$43,224,490.294 In contrast, since its commencement in 1994 until 2008, 
the ICTR has run at a total cost of approximately $1.1 billion.295 
The source of the delays is, in part, because of the complications 
involved in prosecuting international crimes. When the ICTR took on its 
first cases, it was a growing criminal court. Its establishment from the 
ground up was a challenging assignment and until it became familiar with 
its work, it was unable to process cases as efficiently as well-established 
tribunals and domestic judicial systems. Additionally, in its early stages, 
it encountered a number of physical, financial, legal, and procedural 
impediments that led to delays.296 Further, the ICTR has served as an 
unprecedented entity that has provided groundbreaking justice and has 
shaped the future of international post-conflict platforms.297 
The goal of national reconciliation in Resolution 955 is broad and 
somewhat daunting, particularly because in their resolution, the UNSC 
did not address it or offer guidance on how it was to be attained.298 It seems 
that an ordinary comprehension of reconciliation may have been presupposed, 
with a suggestion of a legalistic understanding of reconciliation, but this 
cannot be verified with any certainty. Yet, fundamentally, national 
 
 292.  Rwanda’s estimated expenditures in 2012 totaled approximately $1.91 billion. See 
The World Factbook: Rwanda, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
 293.  See Interview with the Executive Secretary of National Gacaca Service Domithile 
Mukantaganzwa on the eve of closing of Gacaca Courts, GOV’T OF RWANDA, http://www. 
gov.rw/Interview-with-the-Executive-Secretary-of-National-Gacaca-Service-Domithile-Muka 
ntaganzwa-at-the-eve-of-closing-of-Gacaca-Courts (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 294.  Id. Gacaca’s cost of operation is estimated to be 29,652,000,000 Rwandan 
Francs. The currency was converted using XE Universal Currency Converter, available 
at http://www.xe.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 295.  Westberg, supra note 33, at 345. 
 296.  For example, the ICTR had experienced staffing problems when trying to 
recruit attorneys, investigators, and other professionals who were fluent in both English and 
French, for the Office of the Prosecutor. Louise Arbour, The Status of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 HOFSTRA 
L. & POL’Y SYMPOSIUM 37, 42 (1999). 
 297.  APPRAISING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE UN TRIBUNAL, supra note 50, at 270–
71. 
 298.  The Czech Republic representative, in the UNSC debate over Resolution 955, 
argued that the ICTR “is hardly designed as a vehicle for reconciliation. . . . but reconciliation 
is much more complicated process.” SC Verbatim Record 3453, supra note 2, at 7. 
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reconciliation is an internal domestic process. The ICTR, therefore, 
represents an international endeavor to forge national reconciliation “. . . 
as an ancillary contribution to its main judicial function of trying the 
cases before it.”299 
The ICTR is governed by its own Statute, which is annexed to 
Resolution 955300 and yet there is no mention of reconciliation therein.301 
Some commentators like, Paradelle et al. have highlighted this discrepancy, 
emphasizing that the statute structures and organizes the functioning of 
the tribunal, especially in regard to, inter alia, defining the crimes, 
sanctions, penal responsibilities, various procedures, and the rights of the 
accused/convicted.302 Indeed, if reconciliation was a vital and key aspect 
of the Tribunal’s mandate, then why was it not explicitly in the statute? 
This contrasts with the report of the TRC, which clearly explained, in the 
instructions to the commission, what the members should keep in mind 
while attempting to improve reconciliation in the country.303 
It seems apparent that the term reconciliation connoted “the fight against 
impunity and the introduction of the rule of law” when the ICTR was 
established, which in turn “served to legitimize” its genesis.304 
Any lasting legacy left by the Tribunal pertaining to reconciliation in 
Rwanda is largely limited to its judicial efforts.305 However, thus far it 
seems apparent that reconciliation has not played any significant part in 
judgments by the trial and appeal chambers that have been pronounced 
at the time of writing.306 Generally, the notion of reconciliation is not 
 
 299.  Conference on Challenging Impunity, Kigali, Rwanda, Nov. 7–8, 2006, The 
ICTR Outreach Program: Integrating Justice and Reconciliation, 1. 
 300.  See generally S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, Annex. 
 301.  Id. 
 302.  Murielle Paradelle, Hélène Dumont & Anne-Marie Boisvert, Quelle justice pour 
quelle réconciliation? Le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda et le jugement du 
génocide, 50 MCGILL L.J. 359, 367 (2005) [hereinafter Quelle justice]. 
 303. See 1 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 110 
(1998), available at http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume%201.pdf, quoted 
in RECONCILIATION DISCOURSE, supra note 201, at 60; WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra 
note 143, at 322. 
 304.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 325–26. 
 305.  See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at Annex, art. 1; see also Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, 
Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 32 (June 1, 2000) (“The objective in 
creating the Tribunal is to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the atrocities in 
Rwanda, to put an end to impunity and thereby to promote national reconciliation and 
restoration of peace.”); Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, ¶ 19 
(Feb. 5, 1999) (“The objective was to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the atrocities in 
Rwanda in such a way as to put an end to impunity and thereby to promote national 
reconciliation and the restoration of peace.”). 
 306.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 326, 337. 
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referred to or mentioned.307  If it does appear, it makes ‘direct or indirect 
reference’ to Resolution 955.308 
The Trial Chamber in the Media Case judgment recalled that its primary 
rationale for holding individuals accountable for their conduct was the 
intent to “contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace. Justice should serve as the beginning 
of the end of the cycle of violence that has taken so many lives, Tutsi 
and Hutu, in Rwanda.”309 
In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber pointed out the equation between ending 
impunity and national reconciliation: 
In resolution 955 of 8 November, 1994 which was passed by the Council in this 
connection clearly indicates that the aim of the establishment of the Tribunal 
was to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the atrocities in Rwanda in such 
a way as to put an end to impunity and thereby to promote national reconciliation 
and the restoration of peace. It is therefore clear that the penalties imposed on 
accused persons found guilty by the Tribunal must be directed on the one hand 
attri—attribution (sic) of said accused who must see their crime punished and 
on the other hand as deterrence, namely dissuading for good those who will be 
tempted in future to perpetrate such atrocities by showing them that the 
International community was no longer ready to tolerate serious violations of 
International humanitarian law and human rights.310 
Similarly in Rutaganda: 
In determining the sentence, the Chamber shall be mindful of the fact that this 
Tribunal was established by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations within the context of measures the Council was 
empowered to take under Article 39 of the said Charter to ensure that violations 
of international humanitarian law in Rwanda in 1994 were halted and effectively 
redressed. The objective was to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the 
atrocities in Rwanda in such a way as to put an end to impunity and thereby to 
promote national reconciliation and the restoration of peace. That said, it is clear 
that the penalties imposed on accused persons found guilty by the Tribunal must 
be directed, on the one hand, at retribution of the said accused, who must see 
their crimes punished, and over and above that, on other hand, at deterrence, 
namely to dissuade forever, others who may be tempted in the future to perpetrate 
such atrocities by showing them that the international community shall not tolerate 
the serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.311 
 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id. at 326. 
 309.  The Media Case, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, ¶ 109; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20. 
 310.  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sentence, ¶ 8 (Oct. 2, 1998). 
 311.  Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 454–55 (Dec. 
6, 1999). 
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While the authors of these statements seem to presuppose the reader’s 
familiarity with the complex hypotheses behind the varied definitions of 
reconciliation, it seems clear they believe reconciliation and peace can be 
attained through prosecution, retribution and deterrence.312 It is also clear 
that prosecution and punishment are objectives per se.313 Deterrence in 
this context represents an end to impunity, which is very much connected to 
the consolidation of the rule of law, both national and international.314 
Yet, the statements are vague in that they lack specificity regarding the 
connection between the two concepts. As discussed further below, the 
deterrent effect of international trials, like the ICTR, is doubtful.315 
The guilty pleas and confessions given by some of the accused at the 
ICTR might be viewed as contributing to reconciliation in Rwanda— 
although its reconciliatory impact is difficult to measure. Moreover, it is 
rarely expounded how exactly the connection of reconciliation and 
mitigation of sentences should be comprehended.316 The problem may 
stem from the conceptual vagueness of the term and is not helped by the 
fact that other notions often appear alongside reconciliation—and at times 
imply that it may mean something else. For example, in the case of 
Semanza, the Trial Chamber stated:  
Having found the Accused guilty, the Chamber now turns to the question of 
sentencing. The appropriate sentence serves to further the goals of retribution, 
deterrence, stigmatisation, rehabilitation, protection of society and national 
reconciliation.317 
To date, eight out of 75 indictees318 have pled guilty after entering into 
plea agreements with the ICTR Prosecutor.319 Some, like Paradelle et al., 
have argued that the ICTR treated these events as small-scale reconciliation 
occasions and, as such, missed numerous opportunities to publicly 
 
 312.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 327. 
 313.  SC Verbatim Record 3453, supra note 2, at 7. 
 314.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 327. 
 315.  Infra p. 171. 
 316.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 327. 
 317.  Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 
554 (May 15, 2003). 
 318.  This refers to the indictees whose cases have proceeded to trial. 
 319.  Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 
3–4 (Sept. 4, 1998); Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR 98-39-S, Sentence, ¶¶ 4–5 
(Feb. 5, 1999); Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, 
¶¶ 110–11 (June 1, 2000); Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-T, Judgment 
and Sentence, ¶¶ 14–15, 17 (Mar. 14, 2005); Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Case No. ICTR-
00-60-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 9–10, 12 (Apr. 13, 2006); Prosecutor v. Serugendo, 
Case No. ICTR-2005-84-I, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 2–8, 11 (June 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. 
Nzabirinda, Case No. ICTR-01-77-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 7, 9–10 (Feb. 23, 2007); 
Prosecutor v. Rugambarara, Case No. ICTR-00-59-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 4–7 
(Nov. 16, 2007). 
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use guilty pleas as a reconciliation tool.320 After the plea agreements, the 
accused gave statements expressing regret and seeking forgiveness from 
the victim’s families, survivors, and citizens in Rwanda.321 Some have 
pledged to work against genocide ideology, and all have called on Rwandans 
to view their guilty pleas as a step towards peace and reconciliation.322 
It is evident from the ICTR’s judgments that guilty pleas can constitute a 
mitigating circumstance, thereby influencing the sentence. Omar Serushago, 
head of an interahamwe militia, pled guilty to genocide and crimes against 
humanity.323 The interahamwe militia were purportedly notorious for 
murdering civilians in Gisenyi between April and July 1994.324 In light 
of his guilty plea, he was sentenced to a single term of 15 years’ 
imprisonment.325 In Ruggiu, the accused pled guilty to direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide and persecution as a crime against  
humanity.326 After his guilty plea, the Chamber sentenced him to 12 years’ 
imprisonment.327 
Another useful example is the case of Juvénal Rugambarara, the former 
bourgmestre328 of Bicumbi commune. He pled guilty to extermination as 
a crime against humanity after, in his capacity as Mayor, he failed to take 
reasonable and necessary measures to investigate the crimes committed 
in the commune and to apprehend and punish the perpetrators.329 The 
crimes committed resulted in the deaths of thousands of Tutsi civilians 
in Mwulire, Mabare and Nawe sectors of Bicumbi commune:330 
A guilty plea may have a mitigating effect on the sentence by: the showing of 
remorse, repentance, the contribution to reconciliation, the establishment of the 
truth, the encouragement of other perpetrators to come forward, the sparing of a 
 
 320.  Quelle justice, supra note 302, at 378–80. 
 321.  See e.g., Serushago, Case No. ICTR 98-39-S, ¶ 40. 
 322.  Id. 
 323.  Id. § 4–5, 25(viii). 
 324.  Id.; TRIAL, Omar Serushago, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/ 
trial-watch/profiles/profile/203/action/show/controller/Profile.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
 325.  Id. § V. 
 326.  Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, § I, B. 
 327.  Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, § IV. Based on the statute set forth in S.C. 
Res. 955, supra note 20, articles 1 and 7, the ICTR was able to convict Ruggiu, an 
Italian-Belgian, for the crimes he committed in Rwanda while working as a journalist 
and radio presenter for the RTLM. 
 328.  This is a French word which, when translated to English, means Mayor. 
 329.  Rugambarara, Case No. ICTR-00-59-T, ¶¶ 5, 25. 
 330.  Id. ¶ 24. 
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lengthy investigation and trial and thus time, effort and resources, and the fact 
that witnesses are relieved from giving evidence in court.331 
“Rugambarara’s . . . plea . . . may contribute to the process of national 
reconciliation in Rwanda. The Chamber considers these factors as  
mitigating.”332 Reconciliation, contrition and truth-telling are seemingly 
viewed as a distinct mitigating factors. Yet, as Bachmann et al. point 
out, aren’t these aspects also logical components of reconciliation?333 
How are they different? This highlights the abstruse nature of the 
term reconciliation. The tribunal implicitly acknowledges that pleading 
guilty as a contribution to reconciliation could be a negotiation instrument 
as regards to sentencing.334 
The approach, insofar as it refers to reconciliation, follows the 
jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia. Specifically, in the case of Biljana Plavšic,335 the Trial 
Chamber stated: 
Two matters related to a plea of guilt concern expression of remorse and steps 
toward reconciliation. In this regard, the Prosecution notes that the accused has 
expressed her remorse “fully and unconditionally” and the hope that her guilty 
plea will assist her people to reconcile with their neighbors. The Prosecution states 
that this expression of remorse is noteworthy since it is offered from a person 
who formerly held a leadership position, and that it “merits judicial consideration.336 
In this case, the guilty plea is akin to what Long and Brecke would 
term a “reconciliation event,” which is a “public, symbolic meeting […] 
between belligerents indicating a desire for improved relations . . .”337 It 
also seems that the more well-known and high profile a person is, “the 
better his or her chances of improving apology, forgiveness and 
reconciliation at the grassroots level.”338 
However, the majority of the ICTR convicts refuse to recognize their 
role in the crimes and maintain their guiltlessness, which does not accord 
with national reconciliation in Rwanda.339 
 
 331.  Id. ¶ 30. 
 332.  Id. ¶ 35. 
 333.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 329. 
 334.  Id. 
 335.  Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (Feb. 
27, 2003). 
 336.  Id. ¶ 70. 
 337.  WILLIAM J. LONG & PETER BRECKE, WAR AND RECONCILIATION: REASON AND 
EMOTION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION ix (2003). 
 338.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 329. 
 339.  Timothy Gallimore, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and its Contributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 14 NEW ENG. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 239, 253 (2008) [hereinafter The Legacy of the ICTR]. 
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This also highlights a problem with international criminal justice, which 
arguably focuses, in varying degrees, more on the rights of the criminal 
and not those of the victim.340 The same is applicable in the ICTR, as the 
victims are the missing party in the legal proceedings.341 The ICTR 
Statute does not provide a right to compensation for victims, primarily 
because they are not party to the proceedings—although in limited 
circumstances, the “Tribunal also endeavors, within the budgetary 
constraints of the section for witness protection, to assist ailing witnesses 
who testify before the Judges in Arusha.”342 
Nevertheless, the lack of reparations to victims in the ICTR perhaps 
adversely impacts national reconciliation because it does not create the 
necessary link between the perpetrator and the victim; the victims are not 
afforded the chance to value the remorse and sympathy of the perpetrator. 
The apology is made in the ICTR courtroom in Arusha rather than at the 
relevant location in Rwanda where most of the survivors reside.343 
Additionally, it is possible for an interested party or victim to commence 
civil action for compensation based on the decision of a Trial Chamber 
at the ICTR. However, they would be required to wait until the case finishes 
before instituting proceedings. Hence, they would be at a disadvantage 
as the ICTR cases can take years to conclude.344 It is also exacerbated by 
the fact that Rwanda is a developing country and poverty generates 
survival concerns on a daily basis.345 With this in mind, it is improbable 
that the victims will forfeit their limited resources and time on another 
trial.346 
 
 340.  Jean Marie Kamatali, The Challenge of Linking International Criminal Justice 
and National Reconciliation: The Case of the ICTR, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 115, 131 
(2003). 
 341.  Concerning victims in the ICTR Statute, the key provisions are contained in 
article 21, which provides that the ICTR “shall provide in its rules of procedure and 
evidence for the protection of victims and witnesses. Such protection measures shall 
include, but shall not be limited to, the conduct of in camera proceedings and protection 
of the victim’s identity.” Article 23 provides that “[i]n addition to imprisonment, the 
Trial Chamber may order the return of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal 
conduct, including by means of duress, to their rightful owners.” S.C. Res. 955, supra 
note 20, at Annex, arts. 21, 23. 
 342.  U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 55th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/55/435-S/2000/927, ¶ 79–81 (Oct. 2, 2000); see also Nsanzuwera, supra note 80, 
at 946. 
 343.  See Westberg, supra note 32, at 360–61. 
 344.  Kamatali, supra note 340, at 131–32. 
 345.  Id. 
 346.  Id. 
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Notwithstanding the limitations of the ICTR’s adversarial legal process, 
the creation of historical records would promote, to some extent, healing 
and reconciliation because it acknowledges the persecution and suffering 
that the survivors/victims experienced.347 
Some scholars regard clemency as a key component of reconciliation.348 
However, in the ICTR context, some question who is permitted to forgive 
and give clemency.349 Should it be for the court to decide without any 
participation by the victim? Article 27 of the ICTR Statute stipulates that 
“[t]here shall only be pardon or commutation of sentence if the President 
of the [ICTR], in consultation with the judges, so decides on the basis of 
the interests of justice and the general principles of law.”350 
There has only been one application of a commutation of sentence, 
albeit not in the context of Article 27. As mentioned above, the Tribunal 
convicted Georges Ruggiu for his involvement in the genocide and 
sentenced him to 12 years’ imprisonment.351 He was to serve the remainder 
of his sentence in Italy,352 but, on April 21, 2009, the Italian authorities 
granted him early release, in contravention of the ICTR Statute.353 This 
raises questions as to what deliberations and justifications a country where 
those sentenced by the ICTR are serving their punishment, like Italy, would 
consider when deciding whether or not to grant a pardon. Is the decision 
based on its domestic legislation? Will they consult the ICTR or Rwanda? 
Such applications of clemency by States hamper the ICTR’s proclaimed 
reconciliation mandate. 
A dominant censure of the ICTR has been that it is geographically too 
far, remote, and removed from Rwandan society.354 At times this tends 
to work against the culture and the people of Rwanda, who do not feel 
 
 347.  The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339, at 255. 
 348.  Kamatali, supra note 340, at 129. 
 349.  Id. 
 350.  S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at Annex, art. 27; see also INT’L CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, r. 124–26 (Jan. 31, 2010) 
[hereinafter RPE], available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Evidance/ 
English/130410amended%206_26.pdf. The judges adopted the initial Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence on June 29, 1995. The Rules have undergone several amendments, the most 
recent being January 31, 2010. 
 351.  Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, § 4 (June 
1, 2000). 
 352.  Georges Omar Ruggiu Transferred to Italy, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
RWANDA, ICTR/INFO-9-2-555.EN (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default. 
aspx?ID=37. 
 353.  Convicted Journalist Released Early in Violation of ICTR Statute, THE HAGUE 
JUSTICE PORTAL (May 29, 2009), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=10688. 
 354.  See e.g., Westberg, supra note 33, at 360–61. 
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justice is served.355 Moreover, some have criticized the Tribunal because 
those who are convicted do not serve their sentences in Rwanda.356 So 
far, the bulk of those convicted are serving their sentences in Mali and 
Benin.357 Although, as mentioned above, that is no longer the case given 
the recent judicial reforms implemented in Rwanda.358 Indeed, the ICTR 
can transfer cases to the Rwandan national courts and other jurisdictions 
on the proviso that, inter alia, the accused will receive a fair trial.359 
Traditionally, Rwanda is a country where the family and community 
structure play key roles in society.360 Within the Rwandan culture, an 
individual’s role as a part of a community is important and is reflected in 
the origins of gacaca.361 As such, a person is obliged to make amends to 
those he has harmed.362 It seems the ICTR is devoid of this feature.363 
However, this perception is unwarranted. The decision to hold these 
trials hundreds of miles away from Rwanda could be viewed as a necessary 
compromise, particularly because during that period time, Rwanda was 
in the midst of political disarray and seemingly unable to facilitate the 
establishment of the ICTR. Further, even if it were located in Rwanda, 
the trials would still “suffer a crisis of legitimacy . . . fueled by conflicting 
conceptions of justice, by Rwandan anger at Tribunal mismanagement 
 
 355.  Westberg, supra note 33, at 359; Hybridity, Holism and Traditional Justice, supra 
note 167, at 816. 
 356.  See e.g., Westberg, supra note 33, at 361–62. 
 357.  These are two of the seven countries that have signed agreements with the 
U.N. for the purpose of enforcing ICTR sentences. The U.N. has secured enforcement 
agreements with the following countries: Mali, Italy, France, Rwanda, Benin, Swaziland 
and Sweden. See Detention of Suspects and Imprisonment of Convicted Persons The Detention 
Facility, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/tabid/114/default.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2013). 
 358.  Supra pp. 175–76.  
 359.  RPE, supra note 350, r. 11 bis; see also S.C. Res. 1503, 1–2, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). On June 28, 2011, a specially designated Referral Chamber 
referred the Uwinkindi case to the Rwandan domestic court system under rule 11 bis, 
marking an important landmark in the ICTR’s history. Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi, 
Case No. ICTR-01-75-AR11bis, Decision on Uwinkindi’s Appeal against the Referral of 
his Case to Rwanda and Related Motions (Dec. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Uwinkindi Appeal 
Decision]; Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision 
on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 222–25 (June 28, 
2011) [hereinafter Uwinkindi Decision]. Adama Dieng, Capacity-Building Efforts of the 
ICTR: A Different Legacy, 9 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 403, 420–21 (2011). 
 360.  Ingelaere, supra note 128, at 33–34. 
 361.  Id. 
 362.  Id. 
 363.  Westberg, supra note 33, at 360. 
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and the slow pace of trials and by the Tutsi-led Rwandan government’s 
efforts to control the Tribunal’s prosecutorial agenda for its political 
ends.”364 
1.  The Challenges of Linking Justice with Reconciliation 
The ICTR’s reconciliation mandate has been used as an instrument for 
arguments in a number of cases. On appeal in the Media Case, Jean-
Bosco Barayagwiza, who was originally sentenced to 35 years 
imprisonment,365 contended that the Trial Chamber placed too much weight 
on the notions of retribution and deterrence, and not enough weight on 
national reconciliation.366 The Appeals Chamber, unmoved by this 
contention, held that Barayagwiza, did not explain how the sentence 
imposed would damage national reconciliation.367 Furthermore, the 
purpose of rehabilitation should not be given undue weight in view of 
the gravity of the crimes committed.368 It seems that Barayagwiza focused 
on retribution and deterrence as opposed to reconciliation. Yet according 
to Bachmann et al., the notions of deterrence and retribution may actually 
be hidden in the meaning of reconciliation, particularly in regard to 
combatting impunity.369 
The Appeals Chamber offered further clarification (and rationalization) in 
the Kamuhanda case, by stating: 
[W]hile national reconciliation and the restoration and maintenance of peace are 
important goals of sentencing, they are not the only goals. Indeed, the Trial Chamber 
correctly referred to “deterrence, justice, reconciliation, and the restoration and 
maintenance of peace” as being among the goals consistent with Security Council 
Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994 which set up the Tribunal. These goals cannot 
be separated but are intertwined, and, in any case, nothing in Resolution 955 
indicates that the Security Council intended that one should prevail over another. 
The Appellant contends that sentencing him to life imprisonment would deprive 
“both his fellow Rwandans and their country of what they could learn from him 
upon his release” and therefore not serve the goal of national reconciliation. The 
Appeals Chamber is not persuaded by this argument. The Trial Chamber was 
free to conclude that any advantage in terms of national reconciliation gained by 
the Appellant’s eventual release was either minimal or was outweighed by the 
 
 364.  Victor Peskin, Courting Rwanda: The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach 
Programme, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 950, 951 (2005). 
 365.  Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze v. The 
Prosecutor (Media Appeal Case), Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 1039 
(Nov. 28, 2007). 
 366.  Id. ¶ 1056, which states: “Appellant Barayagwiza argues that, in determining 
his sentence, the Trial Chamber placed too much emphasis on the objectives of retribution 
and deterrence, and not enough on those of national reconciliation and rehabilitation.” 
 367.  Id. ¶ 1057; WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 332–33. 
 368.  Id. ¶ 1057. 
 369.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 333. 
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harms to both general deterrence and national reconciliation that would be created 
by a lenient sentence that was not perceived to reflect the gravity of the crimes 
committed. Moreover, too lenient a sentence might also undermine other 
fundamental principles of sentencing, in particular proportionality, by giving the 
impression that the punishment does not reflect the gravity of the crimes committed. 
In any case, it is not a matter—as the Appellant contends—of “the triumph of 
the law over the barbarous acts that were committed” or of whether or not 
“sentencing [him] to life imprisonment [would] contribute, even momentarily, to 
the restoration of peace or national reconciliation, which is one of the Tribunal’s 
goals.” It is settled case law before both the ICTR and the ICTY that the underlying 
principle is that Trial Chambers must tailor the penalty to fit the individual 
circumstances of the accused and the gravity of the crime. The Appellant has 
neither demonstrated that the Trial Chamber committed any error in its 
assessment of the goals behind the creation of the Tribunal, nor that the Trial 
Chamber improperly exercised its discretion in determining the appropriate 
sentence.”370 
This paragraph from the judgment reveals how the different interpretations 
of reconciliation challenge each other.371  The Tribunal, as an executer of 
the law, adopted a retributivist approach and deemed that perceptions of 
justice would better serve reconciliation.372 In truth, releasing the accused 
based on his contentions would be viewed as negative and detrimental to 
national reconciliation in Rwanda.373 The aforementioned Appeal Chamber’s 
judgment on the Kamuhanda case implies that, while reconciliation is an 
identified steering and mitigating gauge on which an accused could be 
sentenced, it is not a guiding principle or an envisioned goal. 
2.  “Mimetic Structures of Violence” and Reconciliation 
Confronting the “mimetic structures of violence” that are entrenched 
in the “minds of individuals who live in an environment of recurring and 
deep-rooted conflict” is a key component in encouraging national 
reconciliation in Rwanda.374 
 
 370.  Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-A, Appeal 
Judgment, ¶ 351 (Sept. 19, 2005). 
 371.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 336. 
 372.  Id. 
 373.  Id. 
 374.  Timothy Gallimore, Unresolved Trauma: Fuel for the Cycle of Violence and 
Terrorism, in 2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM: CLINICAL ASPECTS AND RESPONSES 
143, 146–47 (Chris E. Stout ed., 2002); The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339, at 258. 
Both documents cite René Girard, “who hypothesized that violence is engendered 
through scapegoating and mimetic desire. The premise of mimetic desire is that people 
imitate the actions of others who they admire.” Victims of violence would detest, rather 
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The existence of negative role models may propagate conflict in Rwanda. 
As the genocide’s key perpetrators, particularly the leaders who are 
among the ICTR convicts, become icons or gain infamy, the public will 
view them as heroes to be revered and imitated.375 For example, on 
November 26, 1991, the front cover of Kangura magazine had an image 
of Grégoire Kayibanda, First Republic’s second president, who made 
Hutus the governing ethnic group after the massacres in 1959.376 Cynically, 
it had for its title: “Tutsi: Race of God,” with an image of a machete on 
the left. To the right of the machete, it states “[w]hich weapons are we 
going to use to beat the cockroaches for good?”377 Such images and words 
were used by extremists in the media to incite the Rwandan population 
to commit genocide.378 
Another threat is from mimeses, a critical psychological factor that 
causes victims to continue violence and to persecute others as a way to 
compensate for their guilt and shame they feel because of their own 
victimization.379 By emulating the violence of the persecutor, the victim 
discards his oppression and sates his urge for vengeance.380 
The ICTR’s key contribution to reconciliation and justice in Rwanda 
is holding the principal perpetrators accountable for the genocide.381 By 
arresting and taking away these politically influential figures from public 
life and stigmatizing them, the ICTR divested the perpetrators of their 
major leaders, thereby abating their military and political disruption of 
peace in Rwanda.382 This also ruptured the “mimetic cycle of violence 
and revenge” that characterizes the history of impunity in Rwanda.383 
Moreover, the ICTR’s arrest of these figures outside Rwanda extended 
 
than admire, their assailants. “However, the basic human need for power causes victims 
to desire the position of power that their victimizers occupy. Power and control become 
the objects of desire and victims identify in a positive way with that aspect of their 
aggressors. Victims become perpetrators in order to regain power. They model the 
behaviour of their victimizers.” The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339, at 258 n.47. 
 375.  Mimetic structures of violence may possibly endure for several hundred years. 
“They are passed on through the generations . . . people within an identity group mimetically 
join in the violence initiated by certain members of their group . . . .” Implication of Religious 
Leaders, supra note 124, at ¶ 6. 
 376.  See supra p. 134. 
 377.  Batutsi Bwoko Bw’imana, KANGURA, Nov. 1991; The Media Case, Case No. 
ICTR 99-52-T, ¶ 160; DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 72–73. 
 378.  See generally The Media Case, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T,  ¶¶ 136–73. 
 379.  See generally FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN WHITE MASKS (Charles Lam Markmann 
trans., Pluto Press 2008) and at 174; The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339, at 259, 
n.51. 
 380.  Id. 
 381.  Nsanzuwera, supra note 80, at 948. 
 382.  Id. 
 383. The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339, at 259. 
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the hand of justice beyond the Rwandan justice system’s limited reach, 
because Rwanda did not have extradition treaties with countries harboring 
suspects at that time.384 
While there is limited evidence that justice contributes to reconciliation in 
societies that have experienced mass violence, the convictions handed 
down by the ICTR symbolize the international community’s reconfirmation 
that the crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994 were among the most 
atrocious of human acts, which deserve condemnation and punishment 
under international law.385 
At times, the sentences handed down do not appear to reflect the 
gravity of the crimes and are viewed negatively in Rwanda, thereby 
affecting the ICTR’s limited reconciliation efforts. Furthermore, the 
sentences imposed do not contain clearly formulated information as to 
how justice will contribute to national reconciliation in Rwanda.386 If 
leaders are “seen to be away receiving ‘international justice,’” which is 
generally perceived as lenient, then they are not fully and severely punished 
relative to (at the very least) national values and standards for the horrors 
that were committed.387 
For example, the Trial Chamber found Grégoire Ndahimana, the 
bourgmestre of Kivumu Commune, guilty of genocide and extermination 
as crimes against humanity, based on the mass killings committed at 
Nyange Church, Kivumu Commune, Kibuye Prefecture, on April 15 and 
16, 1994.388 Ndahimana was given a single sentence of 15 years’ 
imprisonment.389 While his convictions were affirmed on appeal, the 
Appeals Chamber concluded that Ndahimana’s responsibility, in relation 
 
 384.  The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339, at 242. 
 385.  See e.g., Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, ¶ 20 
(Feb. 5, 1999).  
[I]t is clear that the penalties imposed on accused persons found guilty by the 
Tribunal must be directed, on the one hand, at retribution of the said accused, 
who must see their crimes punished, and over and above that, on other hand, at 
deterrence, namely to dissuade for good others who may be tempted in the future to 
perpetrate such atrocities by showing them that the international community 
shall not tolerate the serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights. 
 386.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 326. 
 387.  See The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction, supra note 104, at 358–59 (explaining 
that lenient sentencing incentivizes perpetrators to admit to their crimes). 
 388.  Prosecutor v. Ndahimana, Case No. ICTR-01-68-T, Judgment, ¶¶  27–29, 840–43 
(Dec. 30, 2011). 
 389.  Id. ¶ 872. 
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to the crimes, was “more appropriately described as that of a participant 
in a joint criminal enterprise rather than as that of an aider and abettor.”390 
As such, his sentence was increased to 25 years’ imprisonment.391 
These sentences typically raise a number of questions from a lay 
perspective: Does it serve as adequate retribution or deterrence of a 
government-sponsored mass murder, enthused by racial ideology? Does 
15-25 years (as opposed to life imprisonment) for genocide and 
extermination as a crime against humanity dissuade others, who may be 
tempted in future to perpetrate such crimes, by demonstrating that the 
international community will no longer tolerate grave human rights 
abuses? 
The deterrent effect of international trials is questionable. Since the 
establishment of a permanent international court, ad hoc tribunals and 
even hybrid courts, there have been many conflicts where mass human 
rights abuses were committed and continue to be perpetrated. This is true 
in Kenya,392 South Sudan,393 Iraq394 and Syria,395 to name a few. It is 
doubtful that such sentences would have a positive impact on reconciliation 
in Rwanda. 
More research is necessary regarding the long-term impacts on 
international courts on the ground level. However, in reality, the precise 
deterrent effects of international courts may take significant time to 
determine and understand. It is possible the effects may never be known. 
It is more difficult to empirically measure the absence of an action rather 
than its occurrence. 
Furthermore, even if a quantifiable decrease in human rights violations is 
determined, it would be virtually impossible to determine the exact 
contribution resulting from deterrence; especially with the existence of 
other variables, such as shifts in international norms, differing cultural 
 
 390.  Prosecutor v. Ndahimana, Case No. ICTR-01-68-A, Judgment, ¶ 251. 
 391.  Id. at ¶ 254. 
 392.  Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence [CIPEV], Final Report, at 
272, 305, 308 (Oct. 15, 2008). 
 393.  Thousands dead in South Sudan violence, UN says, BBC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25511595 (last visited Oct. 16 2014). 
 394.   
 395.  U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission 
of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 1, U.N. Doc A/HRC/27/60 (Aug. 13, 2014); 
Syria conflict: UN report accuses Assad regime of massacres and crimes against humanity, 
THE INDEPENDENT (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/syria-conflict-un-report-accuses-assad-regime-of-massacres-and-crimes-against-humanity 
-9694116.html (last visited Oct. 16 2014). 
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settings, and changing domestic and international political and economic 
pressures.396 
3.  ICTR’s Contribution to Reconciliation in Rwanda 
Gallimore contends that the work of the ICTR contributed to 
reconciliation in five key ways:397 
a.  By Facilitating Re-Education and Communication to Encourage 
Respect for Human Rights and the Rule of                                                       
Law in Rwanda398 
Gallimore asserts that 
[r]econciliation comes about when the victim is joined by the bystanders (in this 
case the Tribunal) to condemn the actions of the perpetrator. Victim and 
bystander start down the road of reconciliation by agreeing on the wrongness of 
the victimization. The three basic steps in the reconciliation process are: 1) a 
complete and detailed public acknowledgment of the wrong/injury, 2) expression of 
contrition and acceptance of responsibility by the perpetrator who requests 
forgiveness and 3) voluntary forgiveness of the perpetrator by the victim for the 
injuries suffered.399 
Hence, in terms of who is supposed to be reconciling with whom through 
the ICTR, it seems to be the perpetrator (i.e. Hutu) reconciling with the 
victim (i.e., Tutsi), thereby reinforcing perceptions of “victor’s justice.”400 
Indeed, many Hutus have questioned the legitimacy of the ICTR, which 
has not prosecuted RPF military officers suspected of committing atrocities 
against Hutu civilians in 1994.401 Additionally, one scholar claimed that 
the Rwandan government’s agenda is to safeguard the Tutsi political and 
 
 396.  See generally Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, International Sentencing Law: In 
Search of a Justification and Coherent Framework, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 191 (2006). 
 397.  See The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339, at 251. 
 398.  See infra pp. 181–82. 
 399. The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339, at 253. 
 400.  KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, RWANDA’S GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL 
JUSTICE 3 (2005). 
 401.  Author Timothy Longman referred to a survey conducted where 74.1% of Hutu 
participants agreed or strongly agreed that the ICTR should try members of the RPF who 
committed war crimes. See Timothy Longman, The Domestic Impact of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIALS: MAKING A 
DIFFERENCE? 33, 38 (Steven R. Ratner & James L. Bischoff eds., 2004); see also MOGHALU, 
supra note 402, at 3. 
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military elite from investigation and prosecution, while simultaneously 
pursuing Hutu genocide perpetrators by military and judicial means.402 
Essentially, national reconciliation can only occur in an environment 
in which both sides feel that justice is being achieved, and international 
judicial institutions are not perceived as systematically biased towards 
one group. In order to promote authentic national reconciliation, there 
cannot be victor’s justice.403 
Yet the perceptions of victor’s justice appear to be misinformed. This 
may be attributed to the fact that information, in this regard, is “sparse 
and has not been put into the public arena for consumption.”404 The 
ICTR’s derivation, mandate and constitution preclude it from being a 
‘victor’s court,’ particularly as the Prosecutor can investigate and prosecute 
serious abuses of international humanitarian law on all sides of the 
conflict.405 The ICTR Prosecutor investigated serious abuses of international 
humanitarian law on all sides of the conflict and deferred prosecution of 
crimes by the RPF soldiers to the military courts in Rwanda.406 
 
 402.  Id.; see also Victor Peskin, Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting 
the Winners at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
4 J. HUM. RTS. 213, at 222–27 (2005). 
 403.  See Impunity Gap, supra note 31, at 77–78. 
 404.  JONES, supra note 21, at 181. 
 405.  The ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Jallow has publicly acknowledged on various 
occasions, including at the United Nations Security Council, the responsibility of the Office of 
the Prosecutor to investigate the allegations against the RPF. Letter from Hassan B. Jallow, 
ICTR Chief Prosecutor, to Kenneth Roth, Human Rights Watch Exec. Dir., OTP/2009/ 
P/084 (June 22, 2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/ 
2009_06_Rwanda_Jallow_Response.pdf. 
 406.  In 2008, the ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Jallow transferred one of its investigations—
the massacre of several clergy in Kabgayi by RPF soldiers–to the Rwandan government 
for national prosecution. Prior to this, the Prosecutor had already handed over thirty-five 
files relating to the genocide for Rwanda to investigate and prosecute at its discretion. 
The indictment in the Kabgayi case was drafted by the Military Prosecutor in Rwanda 
and cleared with the OTP—with allegations of violations not only of Rwandan law, but 
also as war crimes under the Geneva conventions. The prosecution of the officers 
proceeded on that basis. After the proceedings in Rwanda, the Prosecutor since stated 
that fair trial standards were observed in the case and that his office did not have any 
further indictments for other RPF cases. Moreover, the Kabgayi matter was not the only 
instance of RPF soldiers being prosecuted by Rwanda in relation to the events of 1994. 
Several military officers had been prosecuted before Rwandan military courts for 
offences committed against civilians in connection with the genocide.  Investigations 
were conducted on 42 RPF soldiers, 19 of which were prosecuted for offences committed 
within the jurisdiction of the ICTR and the remaining 23 for offenses committed post 
1994 against civilians suspected of genocide perpetration. Of the 19 soldiers prosecuted, 
12 were convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, 5 were acquitted, 
and the remaining two cases did not proceed due to the absence of the accused persons. 
U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4, 2009); see 
Letter from Hassan B. Hallow to Kenneth Roth, supra note 407. 
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Ostensibly, the Prosecutor’s decision on whether to indict was based 
on, inter alia, the availability of credible evidence and on the law (as is 
the position with all ICTR cases).407 Therefore, “balancing acts,” indicting 
all sides to the Rwandan armed conflict, become irrelevant.408 However, 
this approach is plausible with military prosecutions because a military 
court is typically an appropriate forum in which to hear cases involving 
members of the armed forces. Moreover, the perpetrators were relatively 
low ranking soldiers and proceeding with their cases would have been 
contrary to U.N. Resolution 1534 from 2004.409 
The ICTR has provided a solid base for international criminal prosecution 
of genocide and war crimes in terms of creating legal precedents, setting 
primary post-conflict international agenda, and obtaining cooperation 
from the international community with respect to arrest or detention of 
fugitives.410 It has pioneered victim-oriented justice within the context of 
international criminal law411 and serves as a model to the African continent 
and beyond in its endorsement of witness protection, the rights of detainees 
and prisoners, and the use of new technologies in judicial proceedings.412 
With regard to institutional reform, it is widely acknowledged that 
recent legal developments in Rwanda may ascribe to the influence of the 
ICTR.413 In 1996, Rwanda adopted Genocide legislation that expressly 
espoused the definitions of the 1948 International Convention on 
Genocide.414 Moreover, other Rwandan legislation acknowledges the 
 
 407.  Every prosecutor at international tribunals has the discretion in deciding 
which cases should proceed–taking into account their office’s mandate and 
practical considerations like resources and time. No prosecutor indicts in every possible 
case. Using the ICTR as an example, in November of 2004, Prosecutor Jallow clarified 
the specific criteria that the OTP uses to select cases for investigation and prosecution, 
including “the status of the person in Rwanda at the time of the genocide, the extent of 
involvement of the person, the nature and the seriousness of the offences alleged . . . as 
well as the need for geographical spread of the targets in Rwanda to ensure nationwide 
coverage.” Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
Guest Lecture at the Asser Institute: The Hague, The ICTR and the Challenge of Completion 
(Oct. 4, 2006), available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English%5CNews%5Cevents%5 
COct2006%5Cictr_completion.pdf. 
 408.  Id. 
 409.  S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004). 
 410.  Dieng, supra note 359, at 405. 
 411.  See ICTR General Information, supra note 291. 
 412.  Dieng, supra note 359, at 411–13. 
 413.  Id. at 416. 
 414.  See The Organic Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses 
Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since 1 
NWOYE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/12/2016  4:59 PM 
 
176 
principle of superior responsibility that is enshrined in the ICTR Statute.415 
The Rwandan Constitution of 2003416 reaffirms its adherence to international 
instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights417 and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.418 
In 2007, Rwanda adopted Organic Law Nº 11/2007,419 also known as 
the “Transfer Law.”420 The Transfer Law assigns the Rwandan High Court 
and Supreme Court “to deal with cases transferred to Rwanda from the 
ICTR or third-party states, and to exercise jurisdiction over crimes identical 
to those” in the ICTR Statute.421 Its development was based on various 
due process and fair trial standards of the ICTR, especially regarding the 
rights of the defendants.422 The Transfer Law was also built on the ICTR’s 
rules of evidence and can be applied to indictees transferred to Rwanda 
from the ICTR or other states.423 The law was then revised to allow 
Rwandan judges to hear evidence from witnesses abroad with a video-
link for the Rwandan viewers.424 
The Rwandan government officially abolished the death penalty 
in 2007,425 replacing it with life imprisonment.426 Further, Rwanda 
upgraded its prison facilities to meet the international standards for the 
 
October 1990, Organic Law No. 08/1996 of 1996 (Rwanda) [hereinafter Organic Law 
No. 08/1996]. 
 415.   Organic Law instituting the penal code, N° 01/2012/OL of May 2, 2012, § 5, 
art. 135. 
 416.  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA May 26, 2003, pmbl. ¶ 9, amend. 
II, available at www.parliament.gov.rw/fileadmin/Images2013/Rwandan_Constitution.pdf. 
 417.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/ 
RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 418.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
 419.  Organic Law Concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic of Rwanda From 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and From Other States, Organic Law No. 
11/2007 of 2007 (Rwanda). 
 420.  See e.g., Uwinkindi Appeal Decision, supra note 359, at ¶ 37 and note 95. 
 421.  Uwinkindi Decision, supra note 359, at ¶ 21; Dieng, supra note 359, at 417. 
 422.  Dieng, supra note 359, at 417. 
 423.  Id. 
 424.  Id. at 420. 
 425.  Organic Law Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Organic Law No. 
31/2007 of 2007 (Rwanda) [hereinafter Organic Law No. 31/2007]; Sulah Nuwamanya, 
Gacaca Courts to Get More Powers, THE OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2008), http://allafrica.com/ 
stories/200803060759.html ((last visited Oct. 20 2014); Rwanda scraps the death penalty, 
BBC NEWS (June 8, 2007),  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6735435.stm (last visited Oct. 
20 2014). 
 426.  Organic Law No. 31/2007, supra note 425, art. 4 (defines life imprisonment 
with special provisions and they are as follows: (i) a convicted person is not entitled to 
any kind of mercy, conditional release or rehabilitation, unless he/she has served at least 
20 years of imprisonment; and (ii) a convicted person is kept in isolation). 
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possible relocation of the ICTR convicts to serve their sentences.427 
Other recent reforms include the establishment of a separate Witness 
Protection Unit within the Judiciary and granting immunity to witnesses 
from abroad, thereby easing witnesses’ fears of indictment.428  However, 
this raises concerns as to how victims and survivors of the crimes would 
perceive this protection. 
b.  By Constructing a Factual Account of the Genocide Judicial History, 
Which is Unavailable to Historians429 
The testimony of witnesses and survivors is a significant element in 
the construction of the history of Rwanda and can provide a basis upon 
which to construct a new collective identity in the post-conflict era. The 
judicial records and ICTR archives are perhaps the best historical narrative 
of the genocide and should serve as an authentic public historical record 
against revisionism. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that the raison d’etre of the 
ICTR is not to provide an official history. The degree that a historical 
record is vital to individual trials is only incidental to the ICTR’s work, 
not its prime purpose. There is no real process in the ICTR for establishment 
of the truth, which would, ideally, lead to a shared acceptance of the history 
of the conflict. 
Nonetheless, through the recording of witness and defendant testimony in 
the trial process, the ICTR to some extent serves as a documenter of 
‘truth,’ even though this may be ‘legal truth’ and differ from case to 
case. It therefore operates at a limited level as a guardian of history, 
giving a verified factual account of what happened. 
c.  By Issuing Judicial Notice Confirming That There Was Genocide 
Against the Tutsi Ethnic Group in Rwanda430 
Judicial notice of the genocide means that the occurrence of the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda is taken as an established fact that is beyond dispute, 
 
 427.  Dieng, supra note 359, at 420. 
 428.  Id. 
 429. The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339, at 251, 255. 
 430.  RPE, supra note 350, at r. 94; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ngirabatware, Case No. 
ICTR-99-54-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 10, 1374 (Dec. 20, 2012) (citations omitted); 
The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339, at 255. 
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not requiring any further proof.431 This was particularly symbolic and 
crucial as it served to collectively validate genocide victims and survivors 
by its public acknowledgment of their dignity, humanity, victimization, 
discriminatory ill-treatment, moral injury, and the fact that they were 
targeted for extermination based on their ethnicity. 
d.  By Fostering the Concept of Individual Criminal Responsibility, 
Thereby Not Allowing Group Stigmatization or Criminalization 
This is a vital and foundational, yet controversial component in ICTR’s 
jurisprudence, because the focus is on individual guilt rather than collective 
or group responsibility.432 Hence, this approach implies that neither the 
military, the state, armed militia groups, the media (who were actively 
involved inciting perpetration of the genocide433), nor any other group can 
collectively be held accountable.434 
An accused is treated as an individual, never as an ethnic group, and 
this approach generally obviates the “criminalizat[ion] and stigmatizat[ion]” 
of an entire ethnic group for the deeds of its members, who bear individual 
responsibility for their criminal acts.435 
However, the ICTR is unable to avoid discourse on the basis of ethnicity 
because establishing individual criminal responsibility for genocide requires 
showing that victims were targeted for extermination and persecution 
just because they belonged to an ethnic group (i.e. Tutsi).436 The genocide 
perpetrators largely come from the same ethnic group (Hutu)437 and the 
fact that they targeted the Tutsi ethnic group for extermination on the basis 
of their ethnicity cannot be removed from the reconciliation equation, if 
the problem is to be solved. 
 
 431.  Starting June 16, 2006, Trial Chambers took judicial notice that between April 
6, 1994 and July 17, 1994, genocide occurred in Rwanda against the Tutsi ethnic group. 
For the ICTR Prosecutor, this meant he no longer had to prove the occurrence of the 
genocide in each case still pending before the ICTR, and could now focus on presenting 
specific evidence about the personal involvement each accused person still on trial had in 
the genocide. Id.; see Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision 
on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, ¶¶ 26, 32 (June 16, 
2006). The Appeals Chamber upheld this decision regarding judicial notice. Prosecutor 
v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision on Motion for Reconsideration 
(Dec. 1, 2006). 
 432.  The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339, at 255. 
 433.  See generally The Media Case, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, ¶¶ 106–08. 
 434.  See Kamatali, supra note 340, at 124. 
 435.  The Legacy of the ICT, supra note 339, at 239. 
 436.  See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at Annex, art. 2.2. The Tribunal’s identification 
of ethnicity is a necessity given both the language of the ICTR statute and the legal 
definition of genocide as the “targeting of a group for extermination.” 
 437.  But see infra p. 180 and note 455. 
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The Tribunal is therefore in the unsteady position of simultaneously 
having to acknowledge the significance of ethnic group identity for legal 
purposes (determining mens rea for genocide) and attempting to avoid 
ethnicity when establishing individual guilt to facilitate and endorse  
reconciliation. This quandary is especially crucial because the “ICTR and 
the Rwandan government have different approaches to national 
reconciliation, the former having the starting point of seeing Tutsi, Hutu and 
Twa as ethnic groups, and the latter basing its national reconciliation policy 
on deconstructing any such approach.”438 
Indeed, these approaches raise the question as to whether a crime that 
is collective in its nature, like genocide, can be redressed by punishing 
individuals. Common law presumes non-compliance or non-conformity 
from what is viewed as normalcy, as the basis for a criminal act.439 Yet, 
social psychology has revealed that the freedom of individual action is 
intensely habituated “by the perceived authoritative hierarchy in which 
the individual feels himself/herself to be situated.”440 Individual ethics 
and principles can be compromised in the face of authority.441 
In the Rwandan genocide, numerous people were murdered because 
there were numerous murderers.442 What persuaded several individuals 
to participate in the bloodshed was not just intimidation, submission, and 
compliance,443 but also the legitimate support of the idea that the entire 
Tutsi population had to be exterminated once and for all.444 People acted 
in concert with others in accomplishing this goal,445 thereby eliminating 
“questions of accountability which might arise.  If everybody is implicated, 
then implication becomes meaningless.”446 
Many also believed that exterminating the Tutsi ethnic group was a 
civic duty and “nothing less than the right thing to do.”447 This explained 
why the killings were so violent and committed in public, in view of an 
even larger number of people who simply acquiesced to the genocide.448 
 
 438.  Kamatali, supra note 340, at 121–22. 
 439.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 316. 
 440.  Id. at 315. 
 441.  Id. 
 442.  See Maogoto, supra note 4, at 192. 
 443.  See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
 444.  Maogoto, supra note 4, at 192. 
 445.  Id. 
 446.  TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED, supra note 3, at 96. 
 447.  Maogoto, supra note 4, at 192. 
 448.  DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 770. 
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Further, while many people may have not physically perpetrated the 
crimes, they may have been involved in other ways, such as directing 
attackers to where the victims were hiding, uttering hatred, or looting the 
properties of the victims after they were murdered.449 Of course, there were 
also many who were coerced to perpetrate or witness crimes.450 Hence, “the 
direct and indirect participation” of the populace in the crimes “blur[. . .] 
the line between guilt and innocence” and hinders reconciliation to a 
degree.451 
Hence, the question to consider here is whether individual and collective 
responsibilities are mutually incompatible notions when seeking national 
reconciliation. In truth, advancing the concept of individual guilt and 
responsibility as the basis of criminal punishment, for all perpetrators 
who participated in the Rwandan genocide, is a near-impossible feat. 
Alan Norrie argues, “blameworthiness and responsibility are issues that 
must integrate falsely dichotomizing tendencies such as seeing either the 
individual or society as being to blame. We need to replace ‘either/or’ with 
‘both/and’ thinking.”452 
But then again, the Rwandan ethnic categorizations are only appropriate 
to an extent. These groupings cannot be sustained because many Hutu, 
Twa and individuals of mixed heritage, who were deemed ‘Tutsi 
sympathizers’ were victims of the genocide and many Tutsi and Twa 
committed crimes.453 
Additionally there are also many complexities involved in attributing 
collective responsibility. For example, armed militia groups tend not to 
possess strict command structures and may not be entities per se. As 
such, prosecuting a group is difficult, especially many years after the crimes 
were perpetrated. The ICTR’s prosecutorial approach with regard to 
individual guilt seems to be a fair compromise. By prosecuting key 
individuals linked to certain groups, especially when the form of criminal 
liability charged is joint criminal enterprise,454  the ICTR effectively, albeit 
indirectly, has denounced and reviled these groups. 
 
 449.  DVD: GACACA, LIVING TOGETHER AGAIN IN RWANDA? (Anne Aghion Films 
2002) [hereinafter LIVING TOGETHER AGAIN]. 
 450.  Id. 
 451.  Maogoto, supra note 4, at 192. 
 452.  ALAN NORRIE, PUNISHMENT, RESPONSIBILITY AND JUSTICE: A RELATIONAL 
CRITIQUE 36, 115 (2000). 
 453.  NIGEL ELTRINGHAM, ACCOUNTING FOR HORROR: POST-GENOCIDE DEBATES IN 
RWANDA 69–99 (2004); THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, 
at 1, 333; Hybridity, Holism and Traditional Justice, supra note 167, at 766 and note 6. 
 454.  This form of liability amounts to “committing” under Article 6(1) of the ICTR 
Statute. S.C. Res 955, supra note 20, at Annex, art. 6(1); see, e.g., Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, 
Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 158 (July 7, 2006); Prosecutor v. 
Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36A-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 163 (Sept. 28, 2011); 
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e.  By Giving a Collective Voice to the Victims and Having Their  
Experience of Suffering Validated455 
To a degree, the testimonies given by witnesses and survivors during 
the trial at the ICTR have assisted with reconciliation, because it allowed 
victims and survivors to tell their stories, have their experiences of suffering 
acknowledged, and put them in a position to forgive and reconcile with 
the perpetrators. It implicitly recognizes victims and helps them rebuild 
a sense of political self-confidence and an awareness of their own capacity 
to act. Conversely, when witnesses testify, old wounds are reopened. 
They are called upon to recall events like rape and the murder of their 
babies. As such, they are often distressed and re-traumatized by the 
extensive and tough cross-examination of, at times, tactless defense 
counsels whose interest is in defending their client.456 
According to Nadler and Shnabel, this mechanism is called “socio-
emotional intergroup reconciliation,” which seeks to reconfigure in the 
self-identification of two formerly hostile parties by “removing conflict-
related emotional barriers that block the way to ending intergroup 
conflict,” thus respectively transforming their own collective perception 
and representation.457 While victims are generally keen on recovering 
credibility in “political agency, of which they had been violently deprived, 
 
Prosecutor v. Ndahimana, Case No. ICTR-01-68-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 1–5 
(Dec. 30, 2011). A common trait of international crimes is that they “do not result from 
the criminal propensity of single individuals but constitute manifestations of collective 
criminality: the crimes are often carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance 
of a common criminal design. Although only some members of the group may physically 
perpetrate the criminal act . . . the participation and contribution of other members of the 
group is often vital in facilitating commission of the offence in question.  It follows that 
the moral gravity of such participation is often no less—or indeed no different—from 
that of those actually carrying out the acts in question.” Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. 
IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 80 (Feb. 28, 2005) (citing Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, 
Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 188, 191, 195–226 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July, 15 1999). 
 455.  The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339, at 254–55; THE GACACA COURTS, 
POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 34. 
 456.  The Legacy of the ICTR, supra note 339 at 250–52. 
 457.  Arie Nadler & Nurit Shnabel, Instrumental and Socio-Emotional Paths to 
Intergroup Reconciliation and the Need-Based Model of Socio-Emotional Reconciliation, 
in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RECONCILIATION 37–39 (Arie Nadler, Thomas E. 
Malloy & Jeffrey D. Fisher eds., 2008) (emphasis omitted). 
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perpetrators are mostly interested in a moral rehabilitation of their collective 
self.”458 
The public acknowledgement of victims’ suffering may influence the 
process of identity rehabilitation far more deeply than the tacit and 
indirect attempts of enhancing the rule of law by displaying authoritative 
justice. As such, publicity and contact with the population is of critical 
importance, and the media can play an important role in the process. 
The ICTR established its Outreach Program in 1999, which was designed 
to keep Rwandan citizens informed of the ICTR’s objectives, relevance, 
and achievements.459 In 2000, it opened an Information and Documentation 
Centre in Kigali, commonly known as “umusanzu mu bwiyunge,” or 
“contribution to reconciliation”, and the Centre’s main objective is to 
“bridge the information gap between the Tribunal and the Rwandan 
population.”460 
Additionally, there are a number of ways in which victims and their 
grief can be recognized and acknowledged. One of them is reconciliation 
events. A relevant example is in 1998, when the former U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan and former U.S. president Bill Clinton apologized 
for failing to prevent the Rwandan genocide,461 so as to improve the 
apology and forgiveness cycle in Rwanda. Another example is anniversaries 
and sites of commemoration, like the annual commemoration of the 
1994 Genocide against the Tutsi by the ICTR462 and the Rwandan 
government.463 
 
 458.  WHEN JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS, supra note 143, at 312. 
 459.  See Peskin, supra note 364, at 951–52; but see Westberg, supra note 33, at 361. 
 460.  “The ICTR has opened ten “mini” information and documentation centres 
scattered across all provinces of Rwanda.” The ICTR planned that following the completion 
of the ICTR’s mandate, the UN will hand the centres over to the Rwandan government 
with the goal of ensuring that an accurate record of the ICTR’s historical judicial output 
is preserved and communicated beyond the closure of the Tribunal. Dieng, supra note 
384, at 408–09; ICTR Information Centre Opens in Kigali, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR 
RWANDA, ICTR/INFO-9-2-241 (Sept. 25, 2000), http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default. 
aspx?ID=374 (last visited Oct. 20, 2014); The ICTR Remembers, U.N. MECHANISM FOR 
INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL, http://unmict.org/ictr-remembers/  (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 461.  U.N., Secretary-General, in ‘Mission of Healing’ to Rwanda, Pledges Support 
of United Nations for Country’s Search for Peace And Progress , Press Release 
SG/SM/6552 AFR/56 (May 6, 1998), http://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980506.SGSM6552. 
html (last visited Oct. 17, 2014); CBS News, Text of Clinton’s Rwanda Speech, (Mar. 
25, 1998) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/text-of-clintons-rwanda-speech/ (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2014); History, The “Clinton Apology” http://www.history.com/speeches/the-
clinton-apology#the-clinton-apology (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 462.  ICTR to Host Ceremony in Commemoration of 20th Anniversary of the 1994 
Genocide in Rwanda, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www. 
unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1387 (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 463.  What is Kwibuka20?, KWIBUKA, http://www.kwibuka.rw/whatiskwibuka20  
(last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
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B.  The Gacaca System—Reconciliation Processes and Outcomes 
The Gacaca courts emerged as a result of the domestic system’s 
inability to deal with the huge number of back-logged genocide cases 
promptly.464 They were intended to be a temporary measure to relieve 
Rwanda’s weak and burdened legal system.465 After the genocide, the 
legal system was in tatters and not in a position to discharge the task of 
bringing the perpetrators to justice,466 particularly as many of the legal 
personnel were killed or fled the country.467 Moreover, Rwanda’s early 
post-genocide judiciary suffered from inadequate resources, inefficiency, 
corruption, and executive influence.468 
In its traditional form, gacaca is an informal, community-centered 
system of dispute resolution with pre-colonial Rwandan roots.469 Gacaca 
epitomizes “restorative justice principles because it does not seek to 
achieve justice by punishing the perpetrator, but to restore social order 
by finding communal, compromised solutions and by reintegrating the 
offender within the community.”470 
Akin to the traditional gacaca system, the ‘new’ gacaca process focuses 
on justice, truth and reconciliation among Rwandans through communal 
participation.471 The system also aims to prevent a recurrence of genocide 
and encourage truthfulness, in the form of confessions, by allowing 
sentence reductions for those who confess.472 Additionally, it makes justice 
accessible to the people. For example, anyone can make an allegation 
 
 464.  Westberg, supra note 33, at 347; THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, 
supra note 12, at 237, 239. 
 465.  See Genocide Courts Finish Work, supra note 41; Curtains fall on Gacaca, supra 
note 41. 
 466.  See JONES, supra note 21, at 84; see also Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Legal 
Adviser and Special Assistant to the Registrar, ICTR, Paper Presentation at the African 
Dialogue II Conference, Arusha, Tanzania (May 24–26, 2002). 
 467.  See supra note 27. 
 468.  LIVING TOGETHER AGAIN, supra note 449. 
 469.  Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 31, at 376; see Erin Daly, Between Punitive 
and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
355, 370–71 (2002). In many African countries, colonial powers introduced their own 
system of courts while allowing indigenous systems of dispute resolution to continue 
operating—resulting in a dual, parallel system of laws and courts (i.e., legal pluralism). 
See also Access to Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note 250, at 51; supra section 
IV.A. 
 470.  Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 31, at 376.   
 471.  Nagy, supra note 128, at 93. 
 472.  Id. at 94. 
NWOYE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/12/2016  4:59 PM 
 
184 
and the accuser gets the opportunity to face the offender in a judicial process 
held in the community,473 often where it took place in the accused’s 
home village.474 The judges then typically read-out the case file, comprised 
of depositions from the accusers.475 The judges and community members 
then hear from the accused, from any accusers, or any other person who 
wishes to speak.476 The panel of judges then “deliberate among themselves 
and pronounce the verdict in public.”477 
The process differs from traditional gacaca in that the new process is 
formally recognized and organized by the government,478 It represents “a 
re-birth of a traditional Rwandan solution . . . .”479 The rules are not 
customary, but rather codified in the Rwandan Transitional National 
Assembly Organic Law 40/2000 of January 26, 2001.480 
As of April 2012, the gacaca courts had tried approximately 
1,951,388 cases481 in fewer than eight years, and the conviction rate was 
about 65%.482 This differs with the national justice system, which dealt 
with only 10,026 cases between 1997 and 2004.483 The gacaca courts are 
generally independent from the national courts and there is no institutional 
 
 473.  Id. at 93–94. The Gacaca trials are held at various administrative levels 
depending on the category of offense of the accused. The lowest and smallest administrative 
level is the cellule, which is equivalent to a neighbourhood or small community. The 
next level is a secteur, which akin to a small village or groups of several cellules. The 
Gacaca courts deals with Category 2 and 3 offences–trials for Category 2 offences held 
at the secteur level and Category 3 offences tried at the cellule level (there is also an 
alternative type of dispute resolution under this category). Since 2008, the gacaca courts 
jurisdiction had been extended to include some Category 1 offenses. Confessions are 
considered during sentencing, and if done before appearing on a list of suspects, there is 
a further reduction in the sentence. See Ingelaere, supra note 128, at 41–43; see also 
Nuwamanya, supra note 427, at 60. 
 474.  Ingelaere, supra note 128, at 42. 
 475.  See id. at 41–42; Westberg, supra note 33, at 339. 
 476.  Ingelaere, supra note 128, at 42. 
 477.  Id.; Westberg, supra note 33, at 340. 
 478.  JONES, supra note 21, at 8. 
 479.  Id. Every gacaca jurisdiction has threelimbs: (1) the General Assembly, which 
is made up of the whole populace of the jurisdiction (i.e. cell, sector, district, or province); (2) 
a seat of elected judges; and (3) a Coordinating Committee chosen by the panel of 
judges. Western and Local Approaches, supra note 8, at 226. 
 480.  Organic Law Setting Up “Gacaca Jurisdictions” and Organizing Prosecutions 
for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity, Committed 
Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 2001 
(Rwanda) [hereinafter Organic Law No. 40/2000]. 
 481.  This figure likely includes all instances of trials and appeals. It also includes 
non-genocide cases such as offences against property (for example, looting, criminal damage 
etc.). Additionally, there is no joinder of parties in gacaca cases–even though multiple 
perpetrators may be involved in the same incident.  
 482.  See Genocide Courts Finish Work, supra note 41; Curtains fall on Gacaca, 
supra note 41. 
 483.  Ingelaere, supra note 128, at 45. 
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link between them.484 However, cases of Category 1 genocide crimes may 
be transferred from the gacaca courts to the national courts.485 
NURC encourages group-to-group reconciliation, which concentrates 
on repairing damaged relationships between groups of genocide survivors 
and perpetrators, presuming that the groups lived in a previous state of 
harmony and that the unity is salvageable.486 It also implies that social 
harmony is a dynamic inherent in Rwandan society and that it could be 
revived in the current context by establishing customs, such as those 
personified in gacaca. 
It is argued that the gacaca’s processes are cooperative, with the 
population being the focal agent and communal discourse being the 
principal form of deliberation.487 This is crucial if the divergent groups 
wish to rediscover how to coexist.488 The Rwandan government proscribed 
the use of ethnic labels on national identity cards in 2003489 and made it 
illegal to promote “divisionism” or “sectarianism.”490 As such, this inhibits 
public discourse on ethnicity. By extension, the groups involved in this 
process are no longer depicted as Hutus or Tutsis, but instead as 
“victims . . . and suspects” or “survivors and perpetrators.”491 This is 
appropriate to an extent, considering that the Rwandan conflict resulted 
predominantly from antagonisms between the two ethnic groups.492 It is 
imperative, nevertheless, to acknowledge the role ethnicity played in 
encouraging the commission of genocide. 
Public participation in gacaca was thus essential for the reinforcement 
of unity. This communal participation generates a greater sense of 
togetherness during the process of gacaca, which, in turn, engenders 
greater accord or reconciliation in the sense of group-to-group outside of 
 
 484.  JONES, supra note 21, at 94. 
 485.  Id. 
 486.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 310; see 
Marc Lacey, A Decade After Massacres, Rwanda Outlaws Ethnicity, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/international/africa/09RWAN.html. 
 487.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 310–11. 
 488.  Id. 
 489.  Id. at 310. 
 490.  Organic Law Nº 47/2001 of Dec. 18, 2001, ch. 2, art. 3; See Organic Law instituting 
the penal code, supra note 415, at ch. 2, art. 135.  See also Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity, 
supra note 4, at n.188; THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 
310. 
 491.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 310 (citations 
omitted). 
 492.  Id. 
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gacaca. The barring of legal representation in hearings is aimed at 
amplifying the community’s sense of ownership over the process.493 As 
such, the atmosphere in the gacaca proceedings is informal, less adversarial, 
and more participatory, thereby speeding up the process whilst putting 
the population at ease.494 
Some commentators have contended that gacaca has not succeeded in 
facilitating reconciliation.495 Ingelaere avers that gacaca permitted a 
negligible level of discourse among the participants.496 Equally, Waldorf 
argues that gacaca failed because the Rwandan government has 
‘politiciz[ed] gacaca’ so as to ‘collectivize the guilt’ of the Hutu-majority 
population for the mass atrocities perpetrated.497 Harrell, conversely, 
states that reconciliation through gacaca is akin to an individual-to-
individual process, with reconciliation involving the restoration  of 
relationships between individual perpetrators and survivors, and that 
confession and contrition are important instruments in this outcome.498 
He argues that the reintegration of detainees into their  home 
communities and the utilization of these detainees in activities can afford 
relatable benefits to survivors.499  He further states that community service 
as a punishment has “the potential to reconcile a wrongdoer with the larger 
community” by changing the way the community views his/her motives 
and actions,500 unlike one-dimensional, simple reintegration, which entails 
the detainee merely avoiding revenge attacks.501 
Similarly, Penal Reform International (“PRI”), an international NGO,502 
avers that use of community service as a mode of sentence is, in part, 
aimed “to repair the social tissue and promote reconciliation” while 
 
 493.  See Aneta Wierzynska, Consolidating Democracy Through Transitional Justice: 
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1934, 1957 (2004); Hybridity, Holism and 
Traditional Justice, supra note 167, at 796; Phil Clark, The Rules (and Politics) of 
Engagement: The Gacaca Courts and Post-Genocide Justice, Healing and Reconciliation 
in Rwanda in AFTER GENOCIDE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND BEYOND 304 (Phil Clark & Zachary D. Kaufman 
eds., 2009). 
 494.  Hybridity, Holism and Traditional Justice, supra note 167, at 795–96; Wierzynska, 
supra note 495, at 1958; but see Westberg, supra note 32, at 356 (citations omitted). 
 495.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 327 (citations 
omitted). 
 496.  Ingelaere, supra note 128, at 46–49. 
 497.  Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity, supra note 4, at 79; THE GACACA COURTS, POST- 
GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 246, 327 (citations omitted). 
 498.  HARRELL, supra note 18, at 87. 
 499.  Id. 
 500.  Id.; THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 328 
(citations omitted). 
 501.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 328 (citations 
omitted). 
 502.  NGO is Non-Governmental Organization. 
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contributing to “the social rehabilitation of detainees.”503 Indeed, while 
the view is plausible, the extent to which reconciliation occurs in gacaca 
in this regard is questionable. Reconciliation necessitates a thorough 
process and is not something that can be easily recaptured. The switch 
from reintegration to reconciliation can take a long time and will require 
more dialogue between detainees and their communities beyond when 
detainees first return home and during gacaca. 
The Rwandan population, whether as individuals or groups, experienced 
the conflict in dissimilar ways—some more deeply and intensely than 
others. As such, a proportion of the populace found it less problematic 
than others to reconcile. Indeed, some have expressed skepticism about 
the level of reconciliation possible during the aftermath of the genocide.504 
De Jonge commented, “given the survivors’ traumatic experiences . . . it 
is unjust to expect them to engage with perpetrators in any deep and 
taxing way.”505 
This feeling was exacerbated by a dilemma that existed within the gacaca 
system: that the detainees and local populations were afraid to confess to 
their own crimes or denounce others, fearing that they would be condemned 
for crimes that had not been brought to the gacaca court.506 Moreover, it 
is unsurprising that a number of detainees would lie, avoiding complete 
confessions, minimize their involvement, and blame others for crimes they 
committed in order to take advantage of the reduced sentences.507 
The gacaca system also seem to contribute to increased tensions and 
rekindled hatred between cultural groups in some communities,508 
particularly when large numbers of convicted perpetrators returned after 
serving their sentences to live side-by-side with genocide survivors.509 
 
 503.  PENAL REFORM INT’L, PRI RESEARCH ON GACACA REPORT: GACACA 
JURISDICTIONS AND ITS PREPARATIONS 13 (2002). 
 504.  See THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 329, for 
Phil Clark’s interview with Klass de Jonge, the Research Coordinator at PRI, in Kigal, 
Rwanda on January 29, 2003. 
 505.  Id. 
 506.  See LIVING TOGETHER AGAIN, supra note 449, for an interview with genocide 
survivor Annociata Muanyonga. 
 507.  See id., for the confession gathering at Rilima Prison; see also THE GACACA 
COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 209 (citations omitted). 
 508.  See Western and Local Approaches, supra note 8, at 227; but see THE GACACA 
COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 231–32. 
 509.  See THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 224–27. 
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There are examples of cases where gacaca judges or the participants were 
bribed, intimidated, or implicated in the genocide.510 
These issues, while appropriately raised, did not fully undercut the 
gacaca courts’ ability to represent “civic virtues of communal engagement, 
discourse and debate that are important for building trust and long-term 
peace.”511 It is important for a population to be able to fully express 
themselves within the limits of their laws in order to accurately observe 
the extent to which reconciliation has taken place. Gasibirege contended 
that the dialogue that gacaca encourages is required for the population to 
learn to resolve difficult issues communally and is vital to the wellbeing 
of the entire community.512 
Other criticisms of the gacaca courts centered on fair trial violations 
and victor’s justice.513 For example, Amnesty International stated that it 
“has a number of human rights concerns regarding the constitution of the 
Gacaca Jurisdictions and the fairness of their proceedings.”514 Concerns 
include the constitutionality of the gacaca legislation, particularly relating 
to the concepts of fair trial,515 legal representation,516 the placing of the 
burden of proof,517 the double jeopardy principle,518 and competence of 
the lay gacaca judges.519 Moreover, the gacaca system was perceived to 
deal only with crimes perpetrated by the Hutu population and not the 
RPF.520 This may have contributed to a “culture of impunity,” and the 
Hutus’ long term feelings or resentment and victimization.521 
 
 510.  Western and Local Approaches, supra note 8, at 227; Christopher J. Le Mon, 
14 (2) HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16, 17 (2007) http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/view 
content.cgi?article=1208&context=hrbrief (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
 511.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 234. 
 512.  Simon Gasibirege, L’Élection des juges inyangamugayo: rupture ou continuité, in 
6 CAHIERS DE CENTRE DE GESTION DES CONFLITS: DE LA PAIX À LA JUSTICE: LES ENJEUX 
DE LA RÉCONCILIATION NATIONALE 93–127 (Eugene Ntaganda ed., 2002); see also THE 
GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 201, 363, 296. 
 513.  Westberg, supra note 33, at 353–56; THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE 
JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 28. 
 514.  A Question of Justice, supra note 30, at 12, 34–40. 
 515.  Id. at 30. 
 516.  The lack of legal representation was contrary to Article 18 of the Constitution 
of Rwanda (adopted by referendum on May 26, 2003) which provides: “The right to be 
informed of the nature and cause of charges and the right to defence are absolute at all 
levels and degrees of proceedings before administrative, judicial and all other decision 
making organs.” CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA May 26, 2003, available at 
www.parliament.gov.rw/fileadmin/Images2013/Rwandan_Constitution.pdf. 
 517.  A Question of Justice, supra note 30, at 23. 
 518.  Id. at 33, 39. 
 519.  Id. at 37–39; Westberg, supra note 33, at 353–55. 
 520.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 211; Hybridity, 
Holism and Traditional Justice, supra note 167, at 806; Retributive Justice, supra note 116, at 
86. 
 521.  ELTRINGHAM, supra note 453, at 145; Ingelaere, supra note 128, at 56. 
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However, many of these criticisms stem from some Western views 
that focused on gacaca courts’ failure to punish.522 The criticisms are 
largely unsubstantiated for two key reasons. Principally, the gacaca court 
system cannot be framed as an exclusively legal institution, nor can it be 
framed in the absence of its aims relative to reconciliation.523 As Clark 
argues “[t]he dominant discourse fails to account for the hybrid nature of 
gacaca and the hybrid methods and objectives it embodies. We therefore 
require a more nuanced interpretation of gacaca and its objectives if we 
are to offer more appropriate suggestions as to how it may be reformed 
to aid its effectiveness as a tool of post-genocide reconstruction.”524 
The most significant weakness of the gacaca system is the inability to 
materially create social cohesion. Some academics have suggested that 
this fault results largely from the system’s dual focus on competing goals of 
reconciliation and retribution, whereby the court is not fully operational 
as “either a court or a customary dispute resolution mechanism.”525 The 
gacaca court system was re-constructed with aspirations that the telling 
and discovery of truths would then facilitate reconciliation and encourage 
both apology and forgiveness.526 These are weighted goals and, while 
integral to the processes of reconciliation, they may not achieve the 
necessary psychological shift required for reconciliation to occur. 
Sosnov cites, “sadly, reconciliation remains a distant hope. In pilot 
studies, gacaca created more divisiveness than communal bonds. Many 
survivors perceive confessions by genocide suspects as insincere, promoting 
resentment between Hutus and Tutsis rather than reconciliation.”527 Rettig 
offers a similar criticism of gacaca, pointing out that “attempting to strike a 
middle-ground between punitive and restorative justice,” ultimately 
produced inconsistent results, simultaneously encouraging confessions, 
lies, and more silence.528 
Nonetheless, the ambitiousness of the gacaca court system is admirable, 
bearing in mind that a seamless, efficient delivery of transitional justice 
was improbable through any legal system, given the deeply rooted 
 
 522.  Hybridity, Holism and Traditional Justice, supra note 167, at 806–07. 
 523.  Id. 
 524.  Id. 
 525.  Maya Sosnov, The Adjudication of Genocide: Gacaca and the Road to 
Reconciliation in Rwanda, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 125, 126 (2008). 
 526.  JONES, supra note 21, at 61–62; THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, 
supra note 12, see generally ch. 7. 
 527.  Id. at 143. 
 528.  See Rettig, supra note 26, at 44–45. 
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psychological origins of the genocide and the number of individuals 
involved. 
The gacaca system offered a re-orientation of Rwandan justice by 
focusing on confession, healing, and forgiveness without rejecting the 
importance of retribution.529  According to the NURC study, 89% of 
Rwandan citizens believed that “the punishments handed down to 
perpetrators were fair.”530 A key criticism regarding gacaca is the notion 
that retributive justice and reconciliation are incompatible legal 
philosophies.531 But, as the literature examining transitional justice 
suggests, retribution is integral and undeniably present.532  In turn, 
retribution serves as a component of the reconciliation process. Thus, to 
frame gacaca as the sole entity through which reconciliation may be 
achieved would be an overly narrow, insufficient framework. 
The gacaca system exists within the broader, social milieu of Rwanda’s 
post-genocide environment. It filled a valid need with respect to transitional 
justice directly and reconciliation processes indirectly. No legal system 
for transitional justice could have coped with the hundreds of thousands 
of individuals involved in the genocide. Criticisms of gacaca, in short, 
neglect the war-torn background in which the system existed. Gacaca 
was not solely a legal entity pursuing justice, but rather, a unique socio-
legal entity that was influenced by the psychology of the Rwandan 
collective, informed significantly through fear, anger, remorse, sadness, 
and varying levels of necessary human emotions that cannot be extricated 
from Rwandan society. 
C.  Rwandan Government Initiatives 
As part of the broader social scheme in the reconciliation process, the 
Rwandan government re-instituted a number of initiatives drawn from 
Rwandan culture and traditional practices.533 They were re-invented and 
adapted for modern development.534  These programs are designed to 
foster progress in all areas of Rwandan growth, including the economy, 
 
 529.  Id. at 31. 
 530.  Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer, supra note 167, at 65–66. 
 531.  See generally Mark J. Osiel, Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass 
Atrocity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 118 (2002). 
 532.  Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A 
Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 744–45 
(1998). 
 533.  Rwanda Governance Board, Presentation at Annual Interpol Expert Meeting, 
Reconciliation Process after genocide, War crimes, and Crimes against Humanity; “The 
role of Reconciliations  commissions in Africa.” Kigali, Rwanda (Apr. 15, 2014) (on file 
with author). 
 534.  Id. 
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healthcare, social issues and governance.535 With the exception of 
NURC and the gacaca courts, these initiatives, while not directly linked 
to reconciliation, relate to governance, general welfare and communal 
interaction, which, in turn, can contribute to reconciliation. 
Moreover, these initiatives have gone some way to fill some of the 
gaps inherent the legal pluralist system. In addition to NURC and the 
gacaca courts, these schemes include: 
 Performance Contract (Imihigo);536 
 Local Mediation Committees (Abunzi);537 
 Community Works (Umuganda);538 
 National Dialogue Council (Umushyikirano);539 
 One Cow per Poor Family (Girinka);540 
 Social Health Insurance (Mutuelle de Sante);541 
 Communal Action and Reciprocated Support (Ubudehe);542 
 National Leadership Retreat (Umwiherero);543 
 Solidarity Camps (Ingando);544 
 Saving and Credit Cooperatives (Umurenge SACCOs);545 
 
 535.  Id. 
 536.  Imihigo, RWANDAPEDIA, http://www.rwandapedia.rw/explore/imihigo (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2014). 
 537.  Abunzi, RWANDAPEDIA, http://www.rwandapedia.rw/explore/abunzi (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2014). 
 538.  Umuganda is a day, usually the last Saturday of each month, when communities 
come together to do a variety of communal labour. Umuganda, RWANDAPEDIA, http://www. 
rwandapedia.rw/ explore/umuganda (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 539.  Umushyikirano, RWANDAPEDIA, http://www.rwandapedia.rw/explore/girinka (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 540.  Girinka, RWANDAPEDIA, http://www.rwandapedia.rw/explore/girinka (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2014). 
 541.  Health System, GOV’T OF RWANDA, http://www.gov.rw/Health-System (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2014). 
 542.  Ubudehe, RWANDAPEDIA, http://www.rwandapedia.rw/explore/ubudehe (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 543.  Umwiherero, RWANDAPEDIA, http://www.rwandapedia.rw/explore/unwiherero 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 544.  See Ingando, supra note 225. 
 545.  Alex Rutareka, Saving Can Help to Lift Rwandans From Poverty, THE RWANDA 
FOCUS (Nov. 7, 2011), http://focus.rw/wp/2011/11/saving-can-help-to-lift-rwandans-from- 
poverty (last visited Oct. 20, 2014); Alphonse Nahayo et al., Assessing the Contribution 
of Umurenge Saving and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) Loans to the Household Income: 
A Case Study of Nyabihu District, Western Rwanda, from 2010 to 2011, 2 GLOBAL J. 
CURRENT RES. 6 (2013); Umurenge SACCO records high increase in deposits, TWIZIGAMIRE 
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 Civic education programs that promote values of unity, citizenship 
and the culture of hard work (Itorero);546 
 Citizen Report Card;547 
 Rwanda Governance Scorecard.548 
Currently, these programs have appeared to produce positive, constructive 
results. For example, since 2007, Umuganda, the community works 
project, is estimated to have contributed to Rwanda’s development at a 
value of $60 million U.S. dollars.549 Since its reintroduction in 2006, 
Girinka has enabled more than 180,000 poor families to receive cows, 
contributed to an increase in agricultural production in Rwanda, particularly 
in milk products, which has reduced malnutrition and increased incomes.550 
More recently, the Rwandan government initiated a program called Ndi 
Umunyarwanda, which aims to “build national identity based on trust 
and truth.”551 Yet, there may still be difficulties in objectively assessing 
and measuring their real impacts and influence on reconciliation, for 
instance in terms of: 
1. Time: considering Imihigo was reintroduced in 2006, Itorero 
was re-launched in 2009, while both Umurenge SACCOs 
and Ndi Umunyarwanda were established recently, it may 
be too early to get a clear picture given the fact that 
reconciliation can be a long-term process; 
2. Scope: it is uncertain how comprehensive the study needs 
to be in order to reflect the impact the various initiatives; 
 
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.twizigamire.com/2013/08/umurenge-sacco-records-high-
increase-in-deposits/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 546. Itorero, RWANDAPEDIA, http://www.rwandapedia.rw/explore/itorero (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2014). 
 547.  The Citizen Report Card is a citizen perception survey that assesses the “quality, 
adequacy and efficiency of public services and improves public accountability to citizens. It 
has the objective of using the feedback obtained from citizens as a tool for recommending 
remedial actions.” See Jean Paul Munyandamutsa, 2010 Citizen Report Card Survey: Major 
Findings, RWANDA GOVERNANCE ADVISORY COUNCIL (IPAR Research Conference Dec. 
8, 2011), available at http://www.ipar-rwanda.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task= 
Doc_download&gid=49Itemid=151. 
 548.  “The Rwanda Governance Scorecard (“RGC”) is an annual publication of the 
Rwanda Governance Board that seeks to accurately gauge the state of governance in 
Rwanda.” Rwandan Governance Scorecard 2012, RWANDA GOVERNANCE BOARD (Dec. 
2012), available at http://www.rw.undp.org/content/dam/rwanda/docs/demgov/RW_RGS% 
202012%20Final%20Report%2006_05.pdf. 
 549.  Umuganda, supra note 538. 
 550.  Girinka, supra note 540. 
 551.  Goal, NDI UMUNYARWANDA, http://www.ndiumunyarwanda.rw/ (last visited Oct. 
20, 2014). 
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3. Participants: determining the proper parties to consult and 
question may prove difficulty in terms of identification and 
objectivity. 
D.  Interim Summation: Reconciliation in Rwanda 
Conflict between social groups, at all levels, are an inevitable aspect 
of human society.552 Fundamentally, it occurs when the objectives of one 
group vary from those of another group in terms of causes, actions, 
intensity, and duration.553 While some conflicts are relatively short and 
easily resolved through negotiations, others endure for decades, penetrating 
the social fabric of society.554 
Within this spectrum, there are differing echelons of reconciliation 
requirements, whereby relatively short-term conflicts do not necessarily 
require any reconciliation effort at all. The Rwandan genocide, however, 
came about mainly as a result of deeply-entrenched ethnic enmity.555 
Ultimately, this foundation posed a difficult challenge to achieving post-
genocide reconciliation in Rwanda, necessitating the focus on all levels 
of infrastructure and society.556 
Divergent reconciliation objectives are connected to the nature of the 
conflict rather than the mechanisms supporting the reconciliation process. 
The role of individual emotion is critical, because it could encourage 
collective resistance to, or support for, reconciliation. Furthermore,  anger, 
hatred, and fear could become deeply embedded in the national psyche 
over time and cause continual conflict. In turn, it could then be sustained 
by collective and national memory, which thus catalyzes continual conflict. 
What emerges from this concept of reconciliation is the fundamental view 
integral to this study—reconciliation does not naturally occur following 
conflicts such as the Rwandan example. It requires proactive, fervent, 
and multidimensional efforts on every societal level.557 
Karekezi confirms this perspective by arguing that reconciliation is 
not “the manufacture of a cheap and easy bonhomie,” but rather requires 
“facing unwelcome truth in order to harmonize incommensurable world 
 
 552.  The Nature of Reconciliation, supra note 155, at 12–13. 
 553.  Id. 
 554.  Id. 
 555.  Supra sections II., II.A., and II.B. 
 556.  The Nature of Reconciliation, supra note 155, at 12–13. 
 557.  Id. 
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views.”558 She further states that reconciliation will be tricky to attain 
and will require prolonged, often painful discourse between rival groups 
and individuals in order to rebuild damaged relationships.559 
Rival groups in society require specialized mechanisms that will foster 
both reconciliation and integration. The process of reconciliation can thus 
be framed in terms of the provisional transitional justice mechanisms, 
such as the ICTR and gacaca courts. Reconciliation outcomes are reflected 
in the psychological shift that results from these processes. While the 
reconciliation process is distinguishable from peacemaking, the role of 
sustainable peace is closely bound to reconciliation outcomes. 
The shift occurring in the behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes of one group 
toward another is the outcome of reconciliation. It is closely bound to 
individual and collective psychological processes and penetrates deeply 
into the social fabric of a post-conflict nation. 
In the Rwandan context, the psychological dimension of reconciliation 
is significant because of the ingrained historical nature of the conflict.560 
As an international mechanism of transitional justice, some have criticized 
the ICTR for not facilitating the psychological dimension of reconciliation 
in Rwandan society.561 
The gacaca courts, in contrast, are more optimally positioned to facilitate 
reconciliation on both the individual and collective levels, because of their 
scope and size. However, the degree to which gacaca encourages 
reconciliation goals is linked to the psychological change of the Rwandan 
population. This is integral to reconciliation as an outcome. 
While both the ICTR and gacaca endorsed reconciliation as a process 
and as a legal pluralist system that is central to Rwanda transitional 
justice, it was the gacaca courts that generated the most critical support 
of reconciliation as an outcome. Nevertheless, the role of the ICTR must 
not be understated. The ICTR afforded international involvement and 
garnered attention to transitional justice in post-genocide Rwanda. 
Furthermore, it added another dimension to reconciliation as a broader 
collective outcome important to the global community. 
As highlighted in section two above, the divergent collective memories of 
Rwandan history by both Hutus and Tutsis may obstruct reconciliation.562 
 
 558.  Alice Karekezi, Juridictions gacaca: lutte contre l’impunité et promotion de la 
réconciliation nationale, in 3 CAHIERS DU CENTRE DE GESTION DES CONFLITS: LES JURIDICTIONS 
GACACA ET LES PROCESSUS DE RÉCONCILIATION NATIONALE 9, 85 (Eugène Ntaganda ed., 
2001); see also THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 330. 
 559.  Karekezi, supra note 558, at 83–90. 
 560.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST–GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 40 (citations 
omitted). 
 561.  Ingelaere, supra note 128, at 51; Westberg, supra note 33, at 360–61. 
 562.  Supra § II.B.1. 
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Arguably, recollection of the past may require immoderate revision in 
order to fashion a synchronized, mutually acceptable history. Moreover, 
the longstanding nature of the ethnic conflict that impelled the genocide 
has facilitated the accrual of considerable intergroup grievances requiring 
recognition and resolution through healing and forgiveness. 
Where the Rwandan government emphasizes individual healing and 
forgiveness as fundamental to its reconciliation definitions,563 the international 
community does not embody these goals, perhaps due to its existence on 
a more individual, internal and domestic level. Yet, there is divergence as to 
how and whether healing and forgiveness should be envisaged as important 
to reconciliation outcomes at all. Healing and forgiveness may not be 
possible in some severely divided societies that are affected by extreme 
violence.564 
Due to its external position, the ICTR is incapable of  facilitating 
reconciliation goals beyond the justice-based processes that are integral 
to its proposed outcomes. Gacaca, on the other hand, was optimally 
positioned as a transitional justice mechanism that could, in theory, 
prompt reconciliation as both a process and outcome. 
According to the NURC, the monitoring of the reconciliation process 
serves to forewarn decision-makers in Rwandan government about areas 
of failed reconciliation efforts, potential unrest and the degree to which 
various transitional justice mechanisms, such as the ICTR and gacaca, 
have promoted reconciliation goals more broadly.565 
In evaluating reconciliation progress, the NURC asks whether citizens: 
(1) view political institutions as legitimate; (2) feel material, physical and 
cultural security; and (3) possess a tolerance for diversity in combination 
with a shared sense of identity and citizenship, citizens will be more willing 
to commit themselves to the reconciliation process and reconciliation is 
more likely to occur.566 Additional hypotheses include that if Rwandan 
citizens are given a space within which to confront sources of historical, 
socio-cultural divisions, then there is a greater likelihood for reconciliation.567 
The NURC’s study posited that over 87% of Rwandan citizens believe 
that there has been open and frank discourse about the historical roots of 
the genocide between the rival sides; although, nearly 40% of the 3,000 
 
 563.  Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer, supra note 167, at 32, 61–63, 70, 88. 
 564.  The Nature of Reconciliation, supra note 155, at 19. 
 565.  Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer, supra note 167, at 9. 
 566.  Id. at 9–10. 
 567.  Id. at 10–11. 
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citizens surveyed said that there are people living in the nation who would 
commit another genocide if the opportunity arose.568 This suggests that, 
while the Rwandan population has a potentially safe space within which 
to tell the truth, the psychological healing resulting from reconciliation 
has yet to occur. 
The NURC posits further that the belief that justice has been served 
was integral to the process of reconciliation. Moreover, the NURC 
highlighted both the ICTR and gacaca systems as potentially integral to 
the role of transitional justice in promoting reconciliation.569 While both 
the ICTR and gacaca system have advanced the transitional justice 
component of reconciliation, neither have been successful in encouraging 
the psychological healing aspect. 
Apart from what was directly experienced, gacaca educated nearly 
94% of Rwandan citizens about the genocide.570 Despite ostensible flaws 
in the progress, the truth-telling at the gacaca trials and meetings aided 
the reconciliation across all class lines and in all geographic areas 
assessed by the NURC. However, a considerable fissure in the gacaca 
system was the level of social cohesion it facilitated, which is still a subject 
of debate.571 
Structural components alone cannot channel the process of reconciliation. 
Transitional justice mechanisms can provide a space within which various 
justice outcomes can be achieved. But instead, the psychological outcomes 
of reconciliation would be linked to the human, rather than structural, 
element. 
Political, social, and economic processes that encourage the conflict, 
must irrefutably be restructured in order to foster greater intergroup relations 
and eliminate discrimination and inequalities.572 The criticisms of gacaca 
highlight the system’s inefficiencies in addressing discrimination toward 
the Hutus after the genocide, specifically by not addressing revenge killings 
and Tutsi perpetrators of violence.573 
The restoration of the justice system in Rwanda was not conducted 
solely through gacaca. Rather, gacaca emerged from a need to address 
the widespread perpetration of crimes in a timely manner and in a way 
that would promote the reconciliation process. The ICTR’s key achievement 
is the promotion of an international post-conflict agenda, which was not 
 
 568.  Id. at 58–60. 
 569.  Id. at 7071. 
 570.  Id. at 66. 
 571.  See e.g., Genocide Courts Finish Work, supra note 41; Curtains fall on Gacaca, 
supra note 41. 
 572.  The Nature of Reconciliation, supra note 155, at 16, 25. 
 573.  See Rettig, supra note 26, at 40; see also Hybridity, Holism and Traditional 
Justice, supra note 167, at 806; see also Sosnov, supra note 527, at 139. 
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linked to traditional notions of reconciliation outcomes. These outcomes 
usually exist on both individual and collective levels within the confines 
of a geographic area. Instead, this agenda views reconciliation as an 
ongoing process where the international community becomes more cohesive, 
participatory, and aware of the interconnectivity of human society. 
The combination of the ICTR and gacaca systems is therefore illustrative 
of how steps to reconciliation can be meaningfully sourced from both the 
macro (collective) and micro (individual) levels (i.e., above and below), 
thereby facilitating reconciliation outcomes that are sustainable on all 
levels of society. 
E.  The Legal Pluralist System and Reconciliation From                            
Above and Below 
Reconciliation processes that are sourced from above include political 
institutions and leadership or transitional justice mechanisms like the 
ICTR. Those from below include community engagement and intergroup 
interactions on the micro levels. These processes produce the most 
sustainable outcomes.574 Grassroots efforts, such as those indicated by 
gacaca, are more meaningful and relevant when they are grounded in 
policy and take on the perspectives of leaders reflected in the gacaca system. 
The reconciliation process requires policies that create a psychological 
shift (the critical outcome of reconciliation) for all citizens. These policies 
should not only be conveyed in formal statements, articles, and speeches, 
but also through acts of symbolic collaboration and communication. 
Communications shifts the relationship shift towards social cohesion.575 
The Rwandan situation demonstrates that transitional justice mechanisms, 
on both the macro and micro levels, or above and below respectively, 
cannot alone channel reconciliation outcomes. NURC’s study implicitly 
concluded that social cohesion was not directly linked to transitional 
justice, but was instead connected to “economic cleavages” in society. It 
also found that social cohesion somewhat lagged behind the other indicators 
of reconciliation, despite relatively high levels of confidence in the ICTR 
and gacaca systems.576 
The Rwandan government, through NURC, has defined reconciliation 
as the practice of consensus among the nation’s citizens who share 
 
 574.  The Nature of Reconciliation, supra note 155, at 27. 
 575.  Id. at 27–28. 
 576.  Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer, supra note 167, at 70–71, 86, 88. 
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common nationality, culture and have equal rights.577 Additionally, it asserts 
that truth and the healing of one another’s wounds in the post-genocide 
environment is critical to achieving reconciliation. Further, it claims that 
“radical change” is necessary for the nation to meaningfully and sustainably 
transform into a “reconciled” society.”578 While the gacaca system 
confronted reconciliation more directly and from a grassroots level, the 
ICTR served in an arguably equal capacity in contextualizing both conflict 
and reconciliation within the global community. 
The NURC categorizes the reconciliation process as occurring solely 
on a domestic level.579 These processes are defined as: the promotion of 
the Rwandan identity, the creation of a nation that respects the rule of 
law and human rights, the promotion of synergy in nation-building, and 
truth-telling that heals psychological wounds.580 
The gacaca system has largely served these processes, making it a unique 
model for future post-conflict reconciliation, when channeled through 
socially-minded transitional justice. The ICTR has served these processes 
on a broader collective, and global level by: combating genocide ideology 
in the worldwide community, indicating that gross human rights violations 
will not be internationally tolerated, and, more saliently, reflecting synergy 
and trust on an international level. While the gacaca system was more 
optimally positioned to facilitate internal reconciliation outcomes, the 
ICTR represents an international-level transitional justice mechanism 
that is relevant to the post-conflict reconciliation process. 
Typical criticisms of the ICTR refer to its structural and logistical 
weaknesses581 that resulted in the conclusion of only a relatively limited 
number of cases.582 Censures of the gacaca system focus more narrowly 
on the inability of its system to promote social cohesion.583 It is worth 
noting that national reconciliation was never the core objective of the 
ICTR, especially due to its external positioning.584 
The extent of the ICTR’s intervention may not appear to be significant, 
with only 68 cases completed585 since its establishment. Contrast that 
 
 577.  Id. at 18. 
 578.  Id. at 18–19. 
 579.  Id. at 19–20. 
 580.  Id. at 19. 
 581.  See Lana Ljuboja, Justice in an Uncooperative World: ICTY and ICTR 
Foreshadow ICC Ineffectiveness, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 767, 768 (2010). 
 582.  Westberg, supra note 33, at 360. 
 583.  Id. at 356. 
 584.  See supra note 298. 
 585.  See supra note 35 and text accompanying notes 283–85. This figure represents 
cases against individuals that have gone through the trial and appeal processes and have 
resulted in either convictions or acquittals. 
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with the gacaca courts’ 1,951,388 cases.586 However, it would not have 
been possible or practical for the ICTR to handle thousands of cases, as 
this would require more resources than were available.587 Furthermore, 
given the large number of perpetrators of serious crimes and the ephemeral 
make-up of the ICTR, the UNSC intended588 and called on the ICTR to 
focus on those most responsible, leaving the rest to national courts.589 
The Prosecutor could not take on more cases because of the prearranged 
time limits set by the UNSC.590 The Prosecutor was also encouraged to 
decide which cases to proceed with and which cases were to be transferred 
to competent national jurisdictions (the latter set of cases were considered to 
involve intermediate and lower ranking individuals) to allow the ICTR 
to meet its deadlines.591 
In any event, while the ICTR was created to fight against impunity, it 
would have been limited in this regard if it had acted alone and focused 
on a small number of high-level perpetrators. This would leave “an 
accountability gap which could undermine the effort to end impunity.”592 
Moreover, it was important for Rwanda’s domestic legal system to close 
this gap by prosecuting most of the offenders.593 International third party 
prosecutions could have assisted, but, as with the ICTR, they were also 
limited in the number of perpetrators they could arraign.594 
As a legal pluralist system, the ICTR and the gacaca courts represent 
a constructive avenue for multidimensional transitional justice outcomes, 
from collective and individual levels, respectively. The ICTR was integral 
to reconciliation, primarily in terms of taking a stance globally and 
symbolically against atrocities committed in future conflicts and reflecting 
reconciliation, in terms of its role in the broader, human society. Within 
the Rwandan context, the ICTR alone has not directly influenced domestic 
reconciliation. Nevertheless, it has fostered acknowledgement among 
 
 586.  See supra note 480. 
 587.  See supra p. 159 (particularly note 296).  
 588.  SC Verbatim Record 3453, supra note 2, at 3 (submissions of the representative of 
France). Reaffirmed in S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) 1-2 and 
S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004). 
 589.  S.C. Res 1534, supra note 409, ¶ 4. 
 590.  S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 359, ¶ 7; S.C. Res 1534, supra note 409, ¶ 6. 
 591.  S.C. Res 1534, supra note 409, ¶ 6. 
 592.  Sigall Horovitz, Presentation at Annual Interpol Expert Meeting, Can International 
Criminal Tribunals Close the Impunity Gap?, Kigali, Rwanda, 1 (Apr. 14–15, 2014) (on 
file with author). 
 593.  Id. 
 594.  Id. 
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political leaders that the international community is connected to the 
nation through their mutually embodied goals. 
F.  The ICTR, Gacaca and Reconciliation Symmetry 
The gacaca system has provided an initial and necessary step toward 
promoting reconciliation outcomes, in terms of psychological healing. 
While reconciliation is an enduring process in any context, Rwanda, in 
particular, may demand decades of social and psychological reconstruction 
in order to generate the social cohesion indicative of reconciliation goals. 
The NURC’s study suggests that, while progress is being made, social 
cohesion has not been achieved nearly two decades following the genocide.595 
Additionally, there are notable censures of the gacaca system, indicating 
that it channeled conflict more than it reduced animosities.596 
However, social transformation in Rwanda has undoubtedly occurred, 
with possible symmetries in Hutu and Tutsi perspectives beginning to be 
visible.597 Kriesberg posits that symmetry begins with truth-telling and 
justice and that neither of these two processes is indicative of eventual 
reconciliation outcomes, but rather, they are major processes that could 
foster longstanding psychological change.598 
At the crux of the ICTR’s contribution to reconciliation is the fact that 
Rwanda does not exist in isolation to the global community. The unique 
nature of the legal pluralist system that embodies both grassroots, 
community participatory efforts through the medium of gacaca and 
international, largely objective efforts through the ICTR is indicative of the 
evolving nature of the global community. This embryonic nature is also 
suggestive of reconciliation itself. The reconciliation goals, as stated by 
the Rwandan government for instance, are limited to subsist within the 
nation’s borders. However, those of the international community 
acknowledge the importance of the collective, supranational level in 
achieving reconciliation goals. 
G.  The Global Community and Reconciliation 
In determining both the individual impact of the ICTR as well as that 
of the legal pluralist system (comprised of both the ICTR and the gacaca 
courts), it is useful to reframe reconciliation for its role within twenty-
first century society. Reconciliation has changed due to the forces of 
 
 595.  Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer, supra note 167, at 86. 
 596.  See supra text accompanying notes 495–97, 508–09, 527. 
 597.  See Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer, supra note 167, at 86–88. 
 598.  Louis Kriesberg, Reconciliation: Aspects, Growth and Sequences, 12 INT’L J. 
PEACE STUD. 1, 3–9 (2007) [hereinafter Aspects, Growth and Sequences]. 
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globalization.599 This includes the increasingly fluid movement of people, 
goods, information, services, and ideas that bring about unprecedented 
interconnectivity and is bound to create trends within the legal, social, 
economic and political discourse.600 
Kriesberg highlights that there are three particular trends in human 
thought which are particularly pertinent to the reframing of reconciliation 
for the twenty-first century environment: (1) developments in religious 
beliefs; (2) thinking about human relations; and (3)  a focus on democracy 
and human rights.601 
In the Rwandan context, all three trends are essential  to the 
reconciliation process. In particular, religious beliefs played a substantial 
role in the gacaca processes.602 According to Clark, people’s religious 
beliefs enhanced the likelihood of their meaningful participation at 
gacaca.603 He argues that this widely ignored factor facilitates reconciliation, 
particularly when mercy, forgiveness, and grace represent crucial rudiments 
of the faith in question.604 While interviewing survivors, he observed 
that many alluded to their religious convictions and thus were willing to 
forgive and to reconcile with genocide perpetrators.605 This standpoint 
has been vital for gacaca’s ability to facilitate reconciliation. 
Human relations in the global community are largely influenced by 
secular thinking, which focuses on equality and cooperation. However, 
there are counter developments in human relations in the form of racism, 
belligerence, and avarice.606 Kriesberg contends that “[o]n the whole, 
nevertheless secular ways of thinking have developed that provide 
increasing recognition of the importance, use and contributions of 
reconciliation to human life. First, intellectual support for racism has 
gradually declined. Recent academic work has demonstrated how ethnicity 
is socially constructed and that races too are social constructs, their nature 
varying from one culture to another.”607 Moreover, the global community 
reproaches unilateral, socio-economic exploitation of one group over 
another as “counterproductive,” and negatively views any form of 
 
 599.  Id. 12–13. 
 600.  Id. 
 601.  Id. at 10. 
 602.  THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 337–38, 341. 
 603.  Id. 
 604.  Id. 
 605.  Id. at 337–38. 
 606.  Aspects, Growth and Sequences, supra note 598, at 11. 
 607.  Id. 
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democracy that endorses ethno-nationalism (thereby excluding entire 
groups of people).608 
Global developments and trends relating to the material and social 
worlds are also changing. This is evident from the emergent socio-economic 
interdependence, expanding communication and burgeoning productivity.609 
International organizations such as the U.N. and the ICTR, are a 
consequence of these trends, with the growing interdependence of the 
global community inducing a more participatory role in the reconciliation 
process by international bodies.610 Intervention by entities such as the 
ICTR both reflect and shape the ways in which human relations are 
changing, with external intervention by these bodies brought  about 
by recognition that reconciliation is beneficial to the global order rather 
than just a domestic, human rights issue.611 
External, international entities’ role in sourcing reconciliation is therefore 
a crucial, but enigmatic one, since reconciliation is not brought in from 
even the most participatory, global organizations.612 Huyse points out 
that any international agency seeking to foster the reconciliation process 
after a violent conflict must view its role solely in terms of supporting, 
rather than counteracting, domestic policies for reconciliation.613 He further 
states that the international community must exert caution. It must be 
conscious of the nature of a transitional society and recognize that the 
process is locally owned, especially since “[o]nly the victims and the 
perpetrators can reconcile themselves with one another.”614 The unique 
nature of every violent conflict precludes a universal approach to 
international involvement in post-conflict reconciliation. 
If reconciliation is reframed for the international context, then the 
participation of an objective, global community is critical to the 
reconciliation process, provided it does not interfere with domestic 
delivery of both justice and reconciliation.615 International entities, such 
as the ICTR, can function to give priority to programs that indirectly, but 
not authentically, facilitate reconciliation. From this viewpoint, the 
ICTR served an ideal purpose by seeking to create favorable conditions 
within which reconciliation could take place without interfering with the 
domestic justice system. 
 
 608.  Id. 
 609.  Id. at 12–13. 
 610.  Id. 
 611.  Id. 
 612.  Luc Huyse, The International Community, in RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT 
CONFLICT: A HANDBOOK 163 (David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes & Luc Huyse eds., 2003). 
 613.  Id. at 163–64. 
 614.  Id. 
 615.  Id. at 164. 
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Because of the legal pluralist system, transitional justice in Rwanda 
resulted in very favorable and successful outcomes. As a significant  
weakness in the system, social cohesion may be more appropriate during 
the healing process rather than in the delivery of justice. In conclusion, 
the nature of the post-genocide environment in Rwanda precludes total 
psychological healing and, by extension, total reconciliation in a short 
period of time. 
Entire social thought patterns must be reconstructed and vicious atrocities 
forgiven for reconciliation to occur. It is not, therefore, the counterproductive 
nature of the gacaca system’s reconciliation and retribution goals that 
preclude social cohesion, but rather the socio-cultural context in which 
the system exists. 
H.  Moving from Legal Pluralism Towards “Interlegality” 
At this point, a conceptual distinction needs to be made between legal 
pluralism and “interlegality.”616 Legal pluralism assumes plural normative 
arrangements, such as parallel legal systems. Conversely, interlegality 
refers to a continuous interactive mix between different legal beliefs and 
viewpoints.617 This thereby influences and shapes new normative orders 
that are customized to take into account cultural factors and thus reach a 
middle ground regarding adaptations, negotiations, and antipathies between 
the plural legal and normative orders.618 Interlegality represents a give 
and-take approach between international values and local customs and 
will always be changing in the context of transitional justice.619 
Generally, non-governmental or intergovernmental forces that create 
their own mandatory standards both internally and externally influence 
national laws, rules, and regulations.620 Therefore, implementation of 
national laws relies on government social arenas.621 Exchanges between 
domestic and traditional/customary laws can be varied, dynamic, and 
serve as a vehicle for continuing negotiation and clarification between 
different legal spheres.622  There will always be uncertainty, which prevents 
universalization and the imposition of a one-size-fits-all solution based 
 
 616.  Nagy, supra note 128, at 101. 
 617.  Id. 
 618.  Id. at 102. 
 619.  Id. 
 620.  Nagy, supra note 128, at 101. 
 621.  Id. 
 622.  Id. 
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on a naïve supposition that indignity is unsound and irrelevant in the 
modern world. The goal is to reach a common ground between the two 
spheres.623 
The existence of interlegality is already evident in the continuing 
interactions between the Rwandan government and the international 
community. For example, while the U.N. and the international community 
were moving away from one-size-fits-all type solutions, the Rwandan 
government adapted the gacaca courts with key support from non-
governmental organizations such as Avocats Sans Frontières,624 Réseau 
de Citoyens,625 and Penal Reform International.626 
Rwanda, as a country is neither liberal nor non-liberal.627 Regardless, 
the international community and international law should provide 
continuous legal and normative resources in this and similar situations. 
Yet, international standards and law should only be viewed as part of a 
transitional framework and not an absolute, ‘gospel’ truth. It is clearly 
possible to have more than one suitable approach in a transitional justice 
framework. In post-genocide Rwanda, there was no other substitute 
(particularly one that is culturally sympathetic to the Rwandan population 
and the genocide milieu) to the national courts, other than gacaca. The 
challenge for any transitional justice approach is whether it has the spirit 
of interlegality ingrained in it (i.e. a system that constantly acclimates 
and adopts local standards, protects human rights, and engages social, 
political, legal and economic issues on various levels). 
 
 623.  Id. 
 624.  Anuradha Chakravarty, Gacaca Courts in Rwanda: Explaining Divisions 
within the Human Rights Community, 1 YALE J. INT’L AFF. 132, 136–37 (2006). Avocats 
sans Frontières use their legal skills to support the rule of law in fragile political systems, 
train and support local lawyers, and advocate respect for human rights. They have been in 
Rwanda since 1996 and have become increasingly engaged in matters such as representing 
defendants accused of genocide in national courts and petitioning to the government to 
consider, inter alia, the prisoners who were minors at the time they allegedly participated 
in the genocide. 
 625.  Id. at 137. Established in 1994, the Réseau de Citoyens have supported the 
development of legal infrastructure needed for genocide trials. Their volunteers train 
court clerks and magistrates, assist to produce code books and facilitate access to legal 
manuals, organize seminars on law and human rights and develop syllabi for legal training at 
local institutions. 
 626.  Id. at 136. Penal Reform International monitor, document and research the 
system of prison reform. They also do the same for restorative justice and alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms, and make recommendations to the government for 
systematic improvements. 
 627.  Nagy, supra note 128, at 102. 
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VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While the connection between national reconciliation and transitional 
justice may seem idyllic, its field execution still requires extensive 
development. After all, the aim of transitional justice is to re-create an 
environment where members of a society can live in harmony and peace 
after periods of conflict or repressive rule. 
The 1990s marked one of the most violent decades in recorded history, 
defined by a sharp increase in violent conflicts fuelled by ethnic unrest, 
and concluded with a considerable civilian death toll.628 During 1996 
alone, all major conflicts in the world were civil or intra-state and tens of 
millions of human beings were estimated to be at risk as a result of these 
civil conflicts. Parallel with the drastic rise in these volatile intra-state 
conflicts was mounting attention to human rights and individual security, 
emerging prominently within the international community’s agenda.629 
In conjunction with multiple, multilateral declarations, charters and 
other channels for communicating relevant goals globally, the quality and 
quantity of conflict intervention measures increased considerably during 
the late 1990s.630 By recognizing that divided societies were providing 
fertile ground for violent unrest, ethnic cleansing, and genocide to occur, 
the international community began creating institutions and tools through 
which conflicts could be countered. At the same time, they were conversely 
endorsing transitional justice and reconciliation.631 
However, the complex nature of these conflicts (with Rwanda serving 
as a prime example) have meant resistance to the development of a 
universal, international agenda for conflict intervention. While human 
rights concerns and the evident urgency to protect those living in divided 
societies represent common and positive forces in shaping the post-conflict 
agenda, the variety of stakeholders on multiple levels with multiple 
perspectives has partially counteracted the development of a successful, 
international agenda for both transitional justice, specifically and 
reconciliation, more broadly. More saliently, these complexities coexist 
with visible animosity among domestic communities instead of international 
intervention.632 
 
 628.  Francis K. Abiew & Tom Keating, Outside Agents and the Politics of 
Peacebuilding and Reconciliation, 55 INT’L J. 80, 80 (2000). 
 629.  Id. at 80–81. 
 630.  Id. at 81. 
 631.  Id. 
 632.  Id. at 105. 
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While the Rwandan context did not exhibit any considerable animosity 
against the ICTR or the U.N., it did point out the limited and external 
role of the international entity in the reconciliation process. Therefore, 
when evaluating the extent to which the ICTR and gacaca courts’ legal 
plurality should inform the post-conflict agenda, it is important to highlight 
the motivations for pursuing interventions in post-conflict societies from 
both above and below, respectively. 
The term “reconciliation” has appeared in about 10% of the ICTR’s 
judgments633 and is often quoted alongside Resolution 955,634 but without 
any formulation as to how it impacts national reconciliation in Rwanda, 
the term seems to have only been deployed rhetorically. 
The ICTR represents an outsider intervention in a divided society. 
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that if the ICTR was viewed as 
contributing indirectly to national reconciliation and thereby firmly 
connecting justice (i.e. international justice) and reconciliation, there is a 
risk that its main objective and achievement, i.e. justice, would be 
frustrated. Yet, this is a brand of justice that looks at the past and whose 
outcome depends, to some degree, on the competencies of the investigators, 
lawyers and judges. Conversely, reconciliation, as Rigby puts it, “refers 
to the future and requires the active participation of those who were 
divided by enmity”635 and it is difficult to see how the ICTR can guarantee 
such involvement. From this perspective, it is even more challenging 
to see how international criminal tribunals, like the ICTR, can contribute 
to reconciliation. 
Outsider interventions can engender considerable skepticism in regard 
to the international community’s motivation. Specifically, the literature 
shows that, post genocide, the international community’s moral obligation 
derived largely from the U.N.’s guilt for failing to intervene in the genocide 
sooner.636 However, this moral obligation did not alone influence the 
construction of the ICTR, nor did it define the reconciliation or transitional 
justice agenda the international community had for Rwanda. 
Keating and Abiew posit that the international institutions, such as the 
ICTR, have emerged under very specific conditions. Such mechanisms 
are unlikely to be reestablished in another context unless the following 
elements are recreated: an urgent call for action and international  
involvement in post-conflict societies; the international community’s 
mounting interest in global, human rights; and an increased attention to 
 
 633.  See supra notes 318–19 and accompanying text. Eight out of seventy-five 
convicts have pleaded guilty after entering into plea agreements with the ICTR Prosecutor. 
 634.  S.C. Res 955, supra note 20. 
 635.  RIGBY, supra note 200, at 12. 
 636.  See supra Part II.C.; The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, supra note 
140, at 542. 
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peace-building and cross-national “Western hegemony” in terms of post-
conflict goals.637 
While their postulation is plausible, it is unlikely that the U.N. will 
create another ad hoc tribunal, given its high costs and limited efficiency.638 
Nonetheless, the Rwandan setting for transitional justice and reconciliation, 
by extension, is one in which these realities converged to inform a post-
conflict agenda including measures from both micro and macro levels. 
One of the most salient points emerging from this Article is the role of 
reconciliation as being both a process and an outcome. Furthermore, it is 
based on both the individual and collective level. In using the Rwandan 
context to inform a post-conflict agenda, it is essential to base this agenda 
within these points, as well to assert the significance of legal pluralism 
in addressing reconciliation in divided societies. 
From a legal pluralist perspective, most criticisms of the ICTR and 
gacaca become largely inconsequential. This is because the dual system 
encourages international awareness of the post-genocide environment, 
promotes transitional justice within the broader context of reconciliation 
from both above and below, and facilitates reconciliation, specifically, 
on both the individual and collective levels. 
In essence, the ICTR symbolizes an unprecedented measure that 
promotes justice and reconciliation objectively and through international, 
external actors. It did not seek to focus on individual healing, forgiveness, 
and apology, which is more akin to the grassroots efforts promoted 
through the gacaca system. 
The reconstruction of a social fabric shredded by genocide and, in 
particular, one that was fuelled by longstanding ethnic tension represents 
a far more difficult and arduous task than the comparatively simple 
rebuilding of infrastructures following a natural disaster. It necessitates 
total redefining and reorienting relationships across societal lines, which 
subsists in the social, economic, and political dimensions. It also requires 
the concurrent endorsement of psychological healing. 
Arguably, reconciliation in Rwanda has a largely top-down dynamic. 
As such, it would be imprudent to suppose that completion of gacaca 
indicates that reconciliation has been attained. 
A furtherance of all-inclusive transitional justice projects is required, 
which should carry on the spirit of interlegality. The test will be to bring 
 
 637.  Abiew & Keating, supra note 628, at 83–84. 
 638.  See supra text accompanying notes 290–96. 
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out the strengths of an indeterminate, pluralistic approach to transitional 
justice. One that is continuously adapting, embraces local values, protects 
human rights, and engages social, political, legal and economic issues on 
multiple levels. 
The post-conflict agenda must therefore be sourced, both internally and 
externally, in order to facilitate multilateral resource contributions while 
remaining socio-culturally relevant and competent. The international 
community has historically intervened to end violence. Peace-building 
and reconciliation have represented divergent processes that follow this 
primarily military, political action. Contextualized within the broader 
framework of reconciliation, transitional justice is a complex way of 
rebuilding the socio-legal systems and delivering justice in the post-conflict 
environment. Reconciliation, however, is a far more burdensome, 
longstanding, and intricate process that goes beyond the delivery of 
justice. This process is continuing in Rwanda even now that the ICTR 
and gacaca courts have largely concluded their roles within the transitional 
justice system. 
The legal pluralist system contextualized in Rwanda by the ICTR and 
the gacaca courts does not denote a perfect mechanism for reaching all 
reconciliation and transitional justice goals. They did, however, function 
as partners to facilitate reconciliation as a process that demands transitional 
justice from both the collective and individual levels, as well as highlight 
gaps in the system that can and should be filled during future instances 
of reconstruction. In spite of the positive steps taken, it is difficult to 
measure reconciliation. 
In any event, national reconciliation does not need to rely a great deal 
on justice, especially international justice. Instead, it must depend on 
political actions and other methods to resolve and manage conflict. 
These political actions must also be supported by economic progress and 
development, just as the Rwandan government reconciliation initiatives 
have begun to demonstrate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
